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PREFACE
This thesis is the product of my keen interest in in-
ternational environmental politics, one of the most urgent
problems the world faces today, its outcome is based on
years of study at the University of Heidelberg and the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts at Amherst, research at the United
Nations in New York, various interviews, and my journalistic
background in environmental issues. All these experiences
shaped in different ways my own awareness of the complexity
as well as the limits of the study of political science in
general and international environmental politics in particu-
lar .
I have debts of gratitude to the many people, perhaps
too many to mention, who in various ways helped me to pursue
my studies in Germany and the United Sates and to accomplish
this work. My thesis committee (Professors Peter M. Haas,
John Hird, and M. J. Peterson of the Department of Political
Science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst) pro-
vided me with useful advice and invaluable support during
the long process of transforming my first ideas on this sub-
ject into the final draft. To all the persons whom I inter-
viewed in New York, Washington, D. C., and Nairobi, I would
like to express my thanks for their cooperation. My research
on the influence of Non-Governmental Organizations on the
environmental policy of UNEP and World Bank would not have
been possible without the support of the library staff at
v
the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, at the UNEP and
the UNDP in New York, and at the World Bank in Washington,
D. C. My special thanks go to Dominic Walubengo (KENGO),
Wangu Mwani (ECONEWS), Heinz Grejn (ELCI), Tony Hill (UN
Non-Governmental Liaison Service), Professor Safei Hamed
(Environmental Planning Specialist at the University of
Maryland and Counselor at the World Bank), and Nadia Saad
(former employee of the environmental department at the
World Bank). Without their advice and support during my re-
search at the United Nations headquarters in New York, I
would not have been able to finish this thesis.
My graduate studies at Amherst would not have been pos-
sible without the granting of an exchange scholarship by
both the University of Heidelberg and the University of Mas-
sachusetts for the academic year of 1992 - 1993 and of a
Stipend by the Max-Kade-Foundation . I am also grateful for
the support I received during my second year at the Graduate
School at Amherst through the awarding of a foreign student
scholarship by the University of Massachusetts. I give spe-
cial thanks to the staff of the political departments and
foreign student offices, both in Heidelberg and Germany. In
particular, I have debts of gratitude to Regine John and
Professor Nicholas Xenos, who were both very supportive
throughout my stay in the United States.
ORTRUD ELISABETH KAMPS
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INTRODUCTION
The discussion of sustainable development and how it
can be achieved is becoming increasingly important, because
unlimited economic growth without respect for nature and its
laws is a major reason for the global ecological crisis. Ac-
cording to the Brundtland Commission, "sustainable develop-
ment" is defined as
development that meets the needs of the pre-
sent without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their needs. 1
This vague definition given by the international commu-
nity is a response to ideological and organizational pres-
sures. Sustainability is a relatively new concern. The defi-
nition of sustainability and conceptions of how it can be
achieved vary according to personal experience and ideologi-
cal background. 2 In the context of this thesis, the author
defines sustainable development according to the following
principles:
1. Stanton S. Miller, "The Road from Rio," Environmental
Science & Technology . Vol.26, No. 9, September 1992, page
1712.
2. Further definitions of sustainable development for ex-
ample in Charles A. Francis, Cornelia Butler Flora, and
Larry D. King (Editors)
,
Sustainable Agriculture in Temper-
ate Zones
.
(New York, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990)
,
pages 3-8; Ian McAllister, Sustaining Relief with Develop-
ment
.
(Norwell, Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1993), pages 14-16.
1
1) Economically and Socially - Sustainable develop-
ment's purpose is to improve the standard of living for the
bulk of the population. That means that profits and the
function of a project should directly benefit those for whom
the project was created, as well as those displaced by the
project, and those remaining in the local region. Profits
from and the projects themselves must improve basic needs
such as food and water supply, health, electricity, and ba-
sic education.
2 ) Environmentally - Sustainable development should en-
hance biodiversity, protect ecosystem stability, and limit
short-term as well as long-term environmental damage.
^
3) Process — An element of sustainable development is
the search for creative solutions which works to solve the
goals of economic development and environmental protection.
If these goals are not harmonious, a compromise must be
sought.
Governments, International Governmental Organizations
(IGOs)
,
development agencies, and multilateral lending agen-
cies unevenly incorporate sustainable development into their
planning processes. An important factor explaining this un-
3. Accordingly, the adjective "environmental" as used in
this thesis exclusively refers to environmental concerns. It
is thus a much narrower expression than "sustainable", the
latter combining environmental and socioeconomic concerns.
2
evenness is institutionalism. According to this approach,
there is a causal relation between an organization's struc-
ture and its policy outcomes.
The thesis concentrates on XGOs as the main organizers
of cooperative efforts among governments which focus on pol-
icy shifts toward sustainable development. It investigates
efforts to promote sustainable development by two IGOs, the
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the World
Bank. 4 These two organizations have been chosen because of
their structural differences. UNEP is an "open" organiza-
tion, the World Bank a "closed" organization. This means
that UNEP has a structure which makes it more sensitive to
external factors, while in the case of the World Bank, most
external factors have little influence on policy determina-
tion. This thesis undertakes to show how outside pressure,
especially that of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 5
,
has facilitated the inclusion of sustainable development to
varying degrees, in direct correspondence to the degree of
openness or closure of the institutional structure. The the-
sis draws the conclusion that UNEP is more responsive to
NGOs and their values of sustainable development than the
IBRD. However, the World Bank has recently begun to open its
4. Also known as International Bank of Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD)
.
5. Robert Livernash defines NGOs as non-governmental, non-
profit organizations; see Robert Livernash, "The growing in-
fluence of NGOs in the developing World," Environment ,
Vol.34, No. 5, June 1992, page 14.
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structure, thus the influence of NGOs on the organization
and its policies pertaining to sustainable development is
increasing. In general terms, this means that open organiza-
tions are more responsive to environmental NGOs and their
values of sustainable development than closed organizations:
The more an organization shifts from being closed to being
open, the more it promotes sustainable development.
The thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter one
outlines the theoretical framework of the thesis, including
alternative theories, and important dimensions of NGOs.
Chapter two and chapter three investigate UNEP and World
Bank with respect to their foundation, organizational and
financial structures as well as changes in these structures,
organizational values and strategies, the influence NGOs
have on the institutions, the programs of UNEP and World
Bank, the policy outcome of these programs in response to
successes as well as failures, and the influence NGOs have
on these policy outcomes.
Since the World Bank as a development agency concerns
itself primarily with Third World development projects, and
since UNEP tends to focus on Third World aspects of sustain-
able development, the thesis concentrates upon the sustain-
ability of programs and projects in the Third World. Sus-
tainability will be measured according to the degree to
which socioeconomic and environmental concerns as defined by
the author of this thesis have been included in these pro-
grams and projects. Two case studies on regional Third World
4
issues have been chosen for particular investigation. The
first one deals with the Intergovernmental Negotiating Com-
mittee for the Elaboration of a Convention to Combat Deser-
tification, where UNEP plays a key preparatory role. The
second one investigates the Sardar Sarovar Dam Project in
India, partly planned and financed by the World Bank. The
levels of these case studies - one referring to an
international conference, one to a local project - first of
all indicate the differences in the character of the work of
UNEP and World Bank, for the World Bank is mostly project-
oriented, while UNEP tends to encourage new thinking about
environmental issues already at the planning level. The case
studies also illuminate the different policies of UNEP and
World Bank in promoting sustainable development.
Chapter four summarizes the outcome of research done in
the previous chapters and compares the two international in-
stitutions accordingly, thus referring to the importance of
open or closed institutional structure for the realization
of sustainable development. It also attempts to predict in
how far UNEP and the World Bank will develop their features
toward more sustainability in the future, as well as the
role of NGOs in this development process.
5
CHAPTER 1
STRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCE OF IGOs
1 • 1 Importance of Structural Factors
Sustainable development is now a catchword of interna-
tional development. International institutions are widely
regarded as vital actors in the promotion of national ef-
forts for sustainable development, particularly in develop-
ing countries.
According to the institutionalist approach, the struc-
ture of a formal organization itself facilitates or ob-
structs specific policy outcomes. These policy outcomes are
a consequence of the values and strategies of actors in
IGOs. Important classical institutionalists are Selznick,
who focussed on external values and how they could be in-
fused into IGOs and their actors, or Meyer and Rowan, who
explicitly discussed and characterized institutionalized or-
ganizations. During the 20th century, institutionalism has
developed many different perspectives in several disciplines
such as economics, sociology, and political science. For the
purpose of this thesis, however, it will be sufficient to
focus on organizational theory as one important institu-
tional perspective. 6 Organizational theory seeks to explain
6. A detailed discussion of institutionalism for example
in Sven-Erik Sjoestrand, Institutional Change
,
(Armonk, New
York: M. E. Shape, 1993), pages 3-34.
6
Main
the nature and functioning of formal organizations.
7
representatives of organizational theory are Emery and
Tnst, Thompson, and Haas. They all have in common that they
distinguish between open and closed organizations.
According to this distinction, this thesis uses the de-
gree of openness of the two IGOs as independent variable,
measured by the following IGO features: Organizational
structure, financial structure, values and strategies, and
ease of access for NGOs. The dependent variable used is the
extent to which the policy outcome of World Bank and UNEP
reflects sustainability concerns. If this thesis can prove
that NGOs actually influence UNEP to a larger degree than
the World Bank, this would support the structural approach.
UNEP's efforts are more sustainable than the IBRD's because
its approach of sustainable development is much more similar
to the definition in this thesis than the World Bank's ap-
O
proach. The author argues that different degrees of sus-
tainable development in policy outcomes between the two IGOs
are due to the different degrees of openness. 9
7. More information on organizational theory in Jack C.
Plano, Robert E. Riggs, and Helenan S. Robin, The Dictionary
of Political Analysis
.
(Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO,
Second Edition, 1982), pages 84, 85.
8. Detailed information on the definition and implementa-
tion of sustainable development by the two IGOs in chapters
two and three (especially 2.4, 2.7, 3.4, and 3.7)
9. Other variables like economic prerogatives and politi-
cal agenda will be dealt with in the following chapters.
7
In order to measure the access of NGOs to UNEP and
World Bank, it is necessary to develop concrete indicators
of an organization's openness or closure. Organizational
theorists such as Emery, Trist, and Thompson have developed
typical features of open and closed organizations.^®
Open organizations accept their dependency on a turbu-
lent, uncertain environment as a natural state. Accordingly,
they do not intend to control it, but try to manage it by
means of constant interaction: Outside experts and other ex-
ternal authorities interact with the open system and pene-
trate it with their values. Given the changes in the envi-
ronment and its values, the open system survives through
evolution: It has to be able to break down an old integrity
and to continuously renew itself toward states of greater
heterogeneity and complexity. Within the system itself, a
central individual manages a dominant coalition.
Closed organizations perceive the turbulences of the
environment as dangerous aggressions, thus they seek maximum
control over them: Outside forces have to be predictable to
defend the market position of the organization. Therefore,
closed systems reduce the influence of the environment and
its external values as far as possible and instead seek to
completely control the state they move to next. Accordingly,
10. F. E. Emery and E. L. Trist, Towards a Social Ecology
.
(London and New York: Plenum Press, 1973), pages 212, 214,
220-222; James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action
.
(New
York, New York: MC graw-hill book company, 1967), pages 1-4,
7-10, 84.
8
the internal system has to be functional, logical, and pre-
dictable. This is only possible within a rigid and hierar-
chical structure: Thus closed systems try to establish a
pyramid of power which is headed by one very powerful indi-
vidual. Compromise is minimized. Instead, closed systems aim
at growth toward maximum homogeneity: The goal are known,
the tasks are repetitive, and efficiency is reached with
technical logic.
Emery and Trist also describe their closed system as
being limited to passive adaptation, which means that such
an organization simply has to respond to the initial stimu-
lus of its environment (conditioned behavior, goal directed
systems) . Open systems, on the contrary, are able to attain
active adaptation. Instead of trying to control the complex-
ity of the environment by reducing it, they cope with this
complexity by appropriately extending their system-environ-
ment relations (learning behavior, purposeful systems). 11
Though Ernst Haas does not talk explicitly about open
and closed systems in his book "When Knowledge is Power",
there are interesting parallels to Thompson in the defini-
tion of what Haas calls "adaptation" in contrast to
"learning" of organizations.
Adaptation is change that seeks to perfect
the matching of ends and means without questioning
the theory of causation defining the organiza-
tion's task. Adaptation does not require new con-
11. Emery and Trist, Towards A Social Ecology , pages 7, 18,
19, 47, 50.
9
knowledge
. I reserve the term learning forhe situations in which an organization is inducedto question the basic beliefs underlying the se-lection of ends
.[...] Revaluation implies shiftingone s cognitive horizon toward beliefs aboStcauses that are different from previous beliefsRevaluation is made possible by the existence ofbodies of knowledge not previously available.Learning involves the penetration of political ob-pectives and programs by new knowledge-mediated
understandings of connections. 2
In the case of adaptation, actors add or drop activi-
ties without examining the values and implicit theories un-
derlying their programs. Thus, the organization does not
question its ultimate purpose. It is concerned with changes
in the means, and not ends, of its actions. Technical ratio-
nality has absolute priority. In the case of learning, ac-
question the original values and implicit theories that
underlay their programs. Both means and ends are questioned,
and the ultimate purpose is redefined. Substantive rational-
ity prevails. Learning is possible only if consensual knowl-
edge is available, it becomes the basis of new ends and new
problem sets. 13
The author of this thesis believes that these defini-
tions involve sufficient parallels to the ones stated above
to assume that there is a certain connection between the
12. E. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power
.
(University of Cali-
fornia Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1990), page 36; con-
sensual knowledge is defined on page 21 as "Generally ac-
cepted understandings about cause-and-ef feet linkages about
any set of phenomena considered important by society, pro-
vided only that the finality of the accepted chain of causa-
tion is subject to continuous testing and examination
through adversary procedures."
13. E. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power
,
page 3.
10
limitation of "adaptation" by closed systems and the ability
of "learning" by open systems. Given that this is the case,
the detailed features of "learning" and "adaptation," as
listed in chapter four of Haas' book, can be used as indica-
tors with respect to open and closed organizations and ac-
cessibility of NGOs.
Haas writes that learning will occur in an organization
when adherents of two ideologies 14 have arrived at a working
compromise. The executive head of the organization builds
and manipulates a dominant coalition by practicing crisis
management. The secretariat's autonomy is restricted, and an
increase in shared administration takes place. Voting is
avoided altogether. Instead, the organization aims at tran-
scendence of controversy by compromise. NGOs can participate
as long as they are friendly to the dominant states, and
epistemic communities are dominant as most relevant experts.
Knowledge becomes more consensual. Capital subscriptions and
voluntary contributions are sources of revenue. Program bud-
geting prevails. Learning includes the ability to reasonably
justify expanding and interconnected goals. Decision-making
style is pragmatic and analytical. Issues are linked in a
fragmented manner, but they simultaneously reach toward sub-
stantive linkage. 15
14. The author of this thesis defines an ideology as a ma-
jor set of values.
15. E. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power
,
pages 90-92.
11
In the case of adaptation, one ideology prevails in an
organization. The executive head defers to whatever dominant
coalition prevails. The secretariat is totally penetrated by
dominant members. Voting is based on single or qualified ma-
jorities. Various kinds of outside experts and some selec-
tive NGOs are tolerated. Knowledge is not consensual and
does not become more consensual. The organization's politi-
cal goal structure is specific and static, and it has diffi-
culties to decide if and how to change this structure when
it faces pressure to move toward interconnected and expand-
ing goals. Attempts to link different issues remain frag-
mented. 16
Open and closed organizations also have different fi-
nancial structures which are strongly related to their orga-
nizational differences. Open organizations tend to have a
smaller regular budget than closed ones. The reason is that
rich donors are afraid of supporting open organizations with
large sums of money: They know that the open organizational
structure - especially the more democratic decision making
process - restricts their influence on budgetary decisions.
Open organizations try to cope with this democratic
"weakness" by drawing money from many different sources such
as voluntary and counterpart contributions to increase their
small regular budget. On the contrary, closed organizations
attract rich donors: Voting is based on single or qualified
16. E. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power
,
pages 90-92.
12
majorities, thus might be based on the amount of financial
contribution. The stronger influence of donors on budgetary
decisions in closed organizations considerably encourages
their support.
Moreover, open and closed organizations have different
dynamics of values and strategies. According to the Dictio-
nary of Political Analysis, values are "internal, subjective
standards of morality, ethics, esthetics, and personal pref-
erence." Thus a value is a "concept of what is desirable or
good." 17 Values are important because they motivate certain
strategies and policies. A strategy refers to "almost any
kind of systematic plan for achieving desired goals." 18
Policies are the primary outputs of a political system. They
are the activities which determine who gets what in the po-
litical struggle. 19
Accordingly, the author defines the values of an IGO as
a major set of subjective beliefs, shared by a majority of
its leading political actors. These values of an IGO repre-
sent these actors' ideology with respect to the final ends
they try to achieve within the organization. IGO strategies
are the means political actors choose to facilitate the re-
alization of these values in form of certain policies. Thus
17. Plano, Riggs, and Robin, The Dictionary of Political
Analysis
.
page 165.
18. Plano, Riggs, and Robin, The Dictionary of Political
Analysis
.
page 152.
19. Plano, Riggs, and Robin, The Dictionary of Political
Analysis
.
page 85.
13
the values of actors within an IGO shape their strategies,
which in turn shape their policies. However, the change of
strategies and policies do not necessarily entail a change
of underlying values.
These are definitions of elements relating to openness
and closure: A closed organization tends to have a static
set of values, a dominant ideology which is never ques-
tioned. 20 At the same time, the strategies of the organiza-
tion to realize these values are very likely to change in
response to some modification in response to policy failure.
This is what Ernst Haas calls "adaptation:" 21 Closed organi-
zations adapt. An open organization is able to go through
more fundamental changes, because it can change its underly-
ing values, which in turn may cause changes in its strate-
gies in order to realize these new values. This is what
Ernst Haas calls "institutional learning:" 22 Open organiza-
tions learn. It is assumed that IGO values develop according
to the knowledge which is available to their political ac-
tors, and that this knowledge is carried into the organiza-
tion by NGOs according to the IGOs degree of openness. 20
While it is relatively easy to measure strategies and
policy outcomes (as far as they already exist)
,
the measur-
20. These values are very important because they shape the
organization's policy.
21. E. Haas
,
When Knowledae Is Power. page 3 .
22 . E. Haas, When Knowledae Is Power
.
page 3 .
23. E. Haas When Knowledae Is Power. page 3 .
14
mg of values is a difficult task: Strategies and policy
outcomes are externally visible and thus can be investigated
on their own, based on political research. Values, however,
only exist in the actors' minds. Thus their investigation is
more difficult and should be done in several steps: First,
it is important to find out which statements actors make and
which beliefs they write down. However, this is not suffi-
cient, for the truth of their statements and written beliefs
cannot be taken for granted. Thus second it is important to
investigate to which degree the strategies and policy out-
puts of the actors' organization are consistent with the ac-
tors' statements and written beliefs. That way, strategies
and policies can be important additional indicators for val-
ues of IGO actors - though one has to be aware that the same
strategies and policies can be the result of very different
values. Thus it is important to keep these problems in mind
during the investigation.
As centers of international environmental research and
consciousness-raising, NGOs are excellent representatives of
external factors which try to influence IGO values, strate-
gies, and policy outcomes. 24 The United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development (UNCED)
,
which took place in
Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and brought together 118 heads of
24. More important information on NGOs in chapter 1.3, for
example how NGOs define sustainable development and why they
carry sustainable development advice.
15
state, shows the increasing importance of NGOs in the inter-
national discussion on sustainable development. 25
Based on all these characteristics mentioned in organi-
zational theory and deepened by additional personal re-
search, the author of this thesis has developed the follow-
ing criteria to measure openness of IGO structure and the
likelihood of NGOs to gain access to it. Attributes of open
organizations are:
1) Organizational structure
Power is shared between the executive head and a
dominant coalition of member states
- Main function of the executive head is coordination
- Organization's internal structure facilitates non-
hierarchical contacts with the other organizational
units
- Decisions are rarely made by voting, but depend on
coordination and compromise
- Transparency of decision making process within the
organization
25. More than 7000 NGOs from 165 countries participated.
Compared to earlier conferences, their presence has in-
creased considerably, for example at the Stockholm Confer-
ence in 1972, 4,000 NGOs participated; Miller, "The Road
from Rio," page 1712; the NGO number is based on informa-
tion given by Wayne Kines, Director of Communication at
UNEP until 1975 and Coordinator of NGOs at the Stockholm
Conference; for further information on the Rio Conference,
read Susanna Hecht and Alexander Cockburn, "Rhetoric and Re-
ality in Rio," The Nation . June 22, 1992, pages 848-853;
Miller, "The Road from Rio," pages 1710-1713.
16
- Locus of organizational power
2) Financial structure
Limited influence of donors on budgetary decisions
- Funding depends on sources such as voluntary
contributions
- Small budget
3) Values and Strategies
- Compromise of two ideologies
~ Ideology of global interdependence prevails
- Cross-cutting strategies, wide-ranging linkage of
issues
- Emphasis on monitoring and consciousness-raising
- Increase of consensual knowledge
- Mission of "learning" at the point of the
organization's founding
4) Role of NGOs
- NGOs not only consult, but also work actively within
the organization
- NGOs are included in areas where sustainable
development is not first priority (for example
economic and juridical department)
- NGOs have access to most important meetings and
informations
- NGOs lobby actively before important decisions are
made
- NGOs tend to cooperate with the organization and its
programs
17
In the same way, the author of this thesis has devel-
oped criteria to measure closure of igo structure and the
unlikeliness of NGOs to gain access to it. Attributes of
closed organizations are:
1) Organizational structure
- Power is concentrated at the top
- Strong hierarchical structure
- Institutional structure makes wide-ranging reforms
difficult
— Strong time—constraints for decision making
- Lack of transparency of decision making process
within the organization
- Locus of organizational power
2) Financial structure
— Considerable influence of donors on budgetary
decisions
- Voting is based on amount of financial contribution
- Large budget
3) Values and strategies
- One ideology is dominant
- Ideology of economic liberalism prevails
- Values of stability and predictability
- Problems are coped with by shifts in strategies, not
in underlying values
- Mission of "adaptation" at the point of the
organization's founding
18
4) Role of NGOs
NGOs are limited to certain advice
- NGOs are not included in areas where sustainability
concerns are not first priority
- NGOs have no access to important meetings and
informations
- NGOs do not participate in important decisions
- NGOs tend to confront the organization and its pro
grams
Organizational and financial structures, values and
strategies, and the ability of NGOs to gain access to an or-
ganization are strongly interconnected. For example, an or-
ganization capable of "learning" will be readier to listen
to the advice of experienced NGOs; an organization limited
to "adaptation" will feel threatened by outside influence,
and it will try to "control" and limit NGO access as much as
possible
.
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Though not all of these criteria may be found in open
or closed organizations, the author of this thesis believes
that it is sufficient when a large majority of the features
fits. In exceptional cases proof might not be possible, but
strong likelihood can be shown.
26. A thorough explanation why NGOs succeed in gaining ac-
cess to the World Bank and UNEP according to the openness or
closure of the IGOs' structure in chapter 4.
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1 • 2 Alternative Thpnn'og
Though the thesis focuses on institutionalism, this is,
of course, not the only theoretical approach to interna-
tional relations. Given the limited space of this Master
Thesis, however, a thorough explanation of other theories is
impossible to include. Briefly, the forces that shape inter-
national politics are roughly divided in terms such as
power27
,
interest 28
,
structure, and knowledge. 29 These dif-
ferent approaches are again split up in particular theories,
such as neorealism, elite theory, organizational theory, or
the epistemic community approach.
With respect to this thesis, critics of institutional-
ism focus on four alternative theories - neorealism, group
theory
,
rationalism, and incrementalism - which claim that
27. Especially from the economic point of view; further in-formation on power analysis in Robert 0. Keohane, Neorealism
—
its—Critics, (New York, New York: Columbia University
Press, 1986), especially pages 9-11, 194, 195.
28. Especially from the point of view of political scien-
tists and sociologists; further information on interest and
related theories in Robert Axelrod, Conflict of Interest .
(Chicago, Illinois: Markham Publishing Company, 1970) ;
Robert H. Salisbury, Interest Group Politics in America .
(New York, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1970)
,
pages
29.
Professor Ernst Haas, for example, argues that it is
very questionable if structural constraints are the only
ones or even main important factors shaping policy outcome
in international relations. This would mean that no member
of an international organization could contribute to a
change in policy outcome by change in personal values and
policies. Further reading in E. Haas, When Knowledge Is
Power
,
pages 8, 9.
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successful sustainable development as achieved by iGOs is
not based on NGO influence. 30
Neorealists believe that power is the underlying force
that shapes policy outcomes. Accordingly, igo actors' ef-
forts and successes in promoting or inhibiting sustainable
development are dependent on the will of financial, politi-
cal, or military powers involved in the organization and its
policies. For example, the role of donor and recipient in-
terests can be important with respect to voting or budget
priority of research and projects. 31 in addition, openness
and closure of IGO structure itself (at the foundation of an
organization) may be the consequence of political decisions
rather than being a background condition for promoting sus-
tainable development. In this case, structure reflects in-
terests of one or several dominant founders responsible for
the creation of the institution.
Group theory is based on interest as the underlying
force that shapes policy outcomes. The theory suggests that
interaction among groups is the main reason for political
decisions. Individuals with common interests join a group
and exert pressure on the respective institutions. Thus the
30. More information on institutionalism and its alterna-
tives in James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Insti-
tutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,"
American Political Science Review
.
Vol.78, No. 4, 1984, pages
734-749.
31. Considering, for example, the institutional realloca-
tion of resources: Money can be given to new types of pro-
jects, possibly in different countries.
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policy output is an equilibrium of various group interests.
With respect to this thesis, the promotion or disregard of
sustainable development by World Bank and UNEP would be the
consequence of an interest equilibrium among such groups as
governments or financial donors rather than of NGO influ-
ence.
According to rationalism, policy outcome is defined as
the maximization of efficient value achievement. These val-
ues can always be redefined, in response to new experiences
or earlier disappointments. All known relevant values of a
society are included. They can be of social, political, or
economic character. According to rationalism, IGO changes
toward more sustainable development would be based on
changes of societal values, causing IGO actors themselves to
review their rational calculation and finally convincing
them that it is most efficient to facilitate sustainable de-
velopment. 32
Incrementalism sees policy as a continuation of an or-
ganization's past activities with only incremental changes.
Due to constraints of time, intelligence, and cost, adminis-
trators are not able to identify the full range of policy
alternatives and their consequences. Therefore, a cost-bene-
fit calculation or the formulation and implementation of
clear goals is impossible. Due to this uncertainty, IGO ac-
tors build their decisions rather on step-by-step changes
32. E. Haas, When Knowledge is Power
,
page 3.
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based on past experience. This might also be the case for
the Bank's slow development toward sustainability; it could
be the consequence of previous negative experience with a
policy exclusively focussing on economic growth.
In addition to the alternative theories mentioned
above, other factors may be the cause or lack of IGO changes
toward more sustainable development. For example, decisions
may be a consequence of bureaucratic rivalries or career
concerns instead of true interest in sustainable develop-
ment. Furthermore, lack of leadership capabilities, of ap-
propriate management, of focus and political will, of aware-
ness of the problem, and of sufficient financial sources for
monitoring and personnel may inhibit the promotion of sus-
tainable development. The decline of the global economy or
events such as the oil crisis in the 1970s may diminish the
necessary financial support of donors. Preferences concern-
ing more or less sustainable development might be neither
clear nor clearly ordered, because the decision is made by
an entire bureaucracy, and not by a single individual.
Changes might also be caused by ideological shifts of IGO
actors due to their previous experiences, or they may simply
be the consequence of their opportunism or personal prefer-
ences. Moreover, actors might use unsystematic methods of
analysis, thereby not profiting from the available knowl-
edge. They might even be irrational. 33
33. E. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power
,
pages 10, 14, 15, 32,
35.
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It is not possible to list up, explain, and investigate
all theories which are competing with institutionalism in
this thesis. Some of the alternative approaches may well be
interconnected, which makes a comprehensive clarification
even more difficult. Thus the author has concentrated on the
competing explanations which she considers most important.
All these alternatives have to be taken seriously as
additional or overlapping factors. However, this thesis in-
tends to show that they are not able to challenge the impor-
tance of IGO structure as the main factor in the promotion
of sustainable development. For example, though rationalism
and incrementalism consider knowledge to be an important un-
derlying factor in the promotion of sustainability concerns,
none of them lays emphasis on the "external" NGO knowledge
which penetrates IGOs according to their structure. Instead,
they argue that IGO actors gain their knowledge in response
to personal experiences which are unrelated to NGO influ-
ence. Neorealist models so far do not offer well developed
models of environmental politics at all, thus their criti-
cism is weak as well.
Due to such differences, institutionalism has been cho-
sen as the framework for this thesis, though the author is
well aware of the fact that other explanations might well be
substantiated. 34
34. A broader discussion on alternative theories in 4.5.
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I • 3 Important Dimensions of NGOs
As mentioned before, this thesis emphasizes the influ-
ence of NGOs on the values, structure and policy outcomes of
UNEP and World Bank.
To further improve the knowledge on the likelihood of
NGOs to gain access to IGOs, the thesis will investigate:
- What different kinds of NGOs do exist, and are they
competitive or rather cooperative?
What are their values and strategies with reference
to the promotion of sustainable development?
- At what point did NGOs enter into the IGO decision
process?
- If NGOs have an influence on IGOs, to what extent and
in what form?
- Is the influence limited to consciousness-raising, or
does it include mobilization and policy
implementation?
- Where are the limits of NGO influence and cooperation
with respect to IGOs?
- Where do IGOs' values and strategies come from in
absence of NGOs?
- If IGO policy and implementation succeeds unrelated
o tr
to NGO pressure, what are the reasons for it?
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The reason why the author has chosen NGOs as carriers
of values is not only due to the fact that they are of in-
creasing political importance - considering their strong
presence at UNCED, for example - but also based on the fact
that they are centers of international environmental re-
search and consciousness-raising
- thus necessarily value-
laden. 36
Though there are differences in opinion, most of the
NGOs share a common vision on sustainable development. 37 Ac-
cording to the World Resources Institute, most NGOs
want to reduce poverty, advance human devel-
opment, and manage national resources in a sus-
tainable way. They believe that local participa-
tion and/or control is important to the success of
sustainable development.®
This quotation indicates that the vision of sustainable de-
velopment shared by most NGOs is close to the one presented
by the author of this thesis: Most NGOs lay emphasis on
35. Peter M. Haas, Robert 0. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, In-
stitutions for the Earth
.
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT
Press, 1993)
,
page 420.
36. Werner J. Feld and Robert S. Jordan, International Or-
ganizations
.
(New York, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988)
,
page 7
.
37. Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmen-
tal Politics
.
(Boulder & Oxford: Westview Press, 1991)
,
page
56; Livernash, "The growing influence of NGOs in the devel-
oping world," page 13.
38. World Resources Institute, World Resources 1992-1993
.
(New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), page
216.
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poverty reduction, advance of human development, and manage-
ment of natural resources at the same time. 39
Though most literature refers to NGOs as a group and
seldom to one specific NGO, it is possible to make state-
ments on the kinds of NGOs involved in certain UNEP and
World Bank programs. The author was able to get the names of
all NGOs involved in the negotiations for the desertifica-
tion conference and the Sardar Sarovar Dam Project, which
will support the comparison of the two IGOs. 40
When evaluating the influence of NGOs on UNEP and World
Bank, it has to be taken into account that various types of
NGOs exist. The author of this thesis has identified several
important characteristics:
- Some NGOs are small and work on the community level
with only limited resources (local NGOs) . They are
mostly located in the developing countries.
- Others have grown large and prosperous (international
NGOs) . They are mostly located in the developed
countries.
39. Further information on NGOs' distinctive policy frame-
work with respect to sustainable development in chapters
2.5, 2.7, 3.5, 3.7, and 4.4; for further information on dif-
ferences between their approach and the one of UNEP and
IBRD, read chapters 2.4, 3.4, and 4.3.
40. An exception are well-known international NGOs such as
"Greenpeace" or "Friends of the Earth."
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- Northern NGOs are less aware of the importance of
sustainable development than Southern NGOs 42
.
- Some of the NGOs cooperate with their governments.
- Others oppose the policy of their governments.
This is only one way to characterize types of NGOs. The
literature mentions all kinds of NGOs. For the purpose of
this thesis, however, it is sufficient to focus on the types
of NGOs specified by the World Resources Institute. Its dis-
tinction offers enough similarities to be used as addition
to the characteristics mentioned above. The institute dis-
tinguishes four types of NGOs: 43
1) Grassroots organizations which focus on villages and
cities in the developing world. Their main strength is their
particular local experience in successfully implementing
sustainable development. Grassroots organizations suffer
from certain weaknesses: As local organizations, they tend
to be small in size and are thus unable or unmotivated to
expand their activities or to influence governments. They
may also lack appropriate management abilities and technical
expertise. Thus, their survival and growth depends on the
41. Northern NGOs are defined as NGOs in the developed
countries, most of which are located in the Northern hemi-
sphere.
42. Southern NGOs are defined as NGOs in the developing
countries, most of which are located in the Southern hemi-
sphere .
43. World Resources Institute, World Resources 1992-1993 .
pages 216, 222-224.
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judicial, financial, and other details of public policies
and their ability to collaborate with service organizations.
2) Service organizations which support the development
of grassroots groups. They are more effective at reaching
the Poor, though less effective at reaching the very Poor.
They work on all levels - regional, national, and interna-
tional. To be successful, they rely on active participation
of their beneficiaries, thus they have to adapt their pro-
grams to local conditions. Many service NGOs are not innova-
tive, and can even be as rigid as governments departments.
They may have limited technical capacities or weak mana-
gerial skills. They may be unable to successfully transfer
local projects to a higher level and to sustain themselves
after initial outside help stops. Many service organizations
fail insofar as their projects are not supervised on a long-
term basis or compared to communities not affected by them.
Such an evaluation may be difficult, however, because many
NGO projects have multiple, diffuse goals which may change
over time.
3) "Thematic" organizations at the regional, national,
and international level which work in fields such as envi-
ronment, development, and family planning, and many of them
support service and grassroots NGOs. International service
NGOs have more financial resources to pay for monitoring and
staff that regional grassroots and service NGOs; however,
many of them lack the local experience with sustainable de-
velopment .
29
networks and
4) Regional, national, and international
coalitions of NGOs.
The World Resources Institute also offers additional
information on the relations between NGOs and governments.
They are very complex and may vary from country to country.
Sometimes NGOs cooperate with governments and have consider-
able impact on their policy outcomes, sometimes they oppose
them in extremely confrontational ways, as for example
Greenpeace. Confrontational tactics can have dramatic re-
sults and might lead to repression, imprisonment, or even
death of NGO members. Depending on the situation, tactics of
cooperation may be more successful. According to the World
Resources Institute,
A program coordinated by KENGO44 to develop,
test, and produce the Kenya Ceramic Jiko cookstove
proved so effective that the Ministry of Energy
became involved in organizing the training of ar-
tisans and the construction of demonstration cen-
ters. 45
In some cases, governments are even launching NGOs,
though these NGOs might fail to win allegiance from other
NGOs. The relations between governments and NGOs depend on
several factors, such as the competence of the government,
the kind of political system, and the type and location of
particular NGO projects. Relations tend to be best when a
populist and capable government meets an NGO with mainstream
44. Kenya Energy and Environment Organizations.
45. World Resources Institute, World Resources 1992-1993 .
page 227.
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development programs. However, even if this is the case,
tensions are unavoidable, for the government is interested
in controlling NGO activities, while NGOs want to maintain
their organizational autonomy. For example, conflicts arise
when a government uses its funding of NGO programs to reduce
the autonomy of NGOs. 46
Environmental NGOs — and IGOs - have come into exis-
tence only recently. This makes the analysis of their char-
acteristics, influences, successes and failures difficult.
the same time, it is an interesting challenge to do re-
search in this newly emerging field of international poli-
tics. On the whole, one should be aware that models always
simplify reality. Yet, this simplification is necessary, for
it also is an attempt to clarify and thus understand real-
ity.
46. World Resources Institute, World Resources 1992-1993 .
page 226, 227.
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CHAPTER 2
UNEP
2 • 1 UNEP / s Foundation
In the middle of this century, global environmental de-
struction emerged as one of the most urgent problems of hu-
manity. in response, the United Nations Organization (UNO)
in 1972 initiated the Stockholm Conference on the Human En-
vironment. It was UNO's first effort to fight the danger of
global environmental destruction at the international level.
The Stockholm Conference was also the first official recog-
nition of the environment as a subject of general interna-
tional concern. As a consequence of this concern, UNO cre-
ated a new agency, called the United Nations Environmental
Program or UNEP. In Resolution 2997 (XXVII), the UN General
Assembly established the necessary institutional and finan-
framework for the new environmental agency. ^
The openness of this institutional and financial frame-
work can be measured according to the criteria developed in
chapter 1.1 of this thesis. Thus the chapters 2.2, 2.4, and
2.5 will investigate in how far UNEP fits these characteris-
tics .
47. United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile .
(Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP, 1990), page 3; Porter and Brown,
Global Environmental Politics
,
page 71.
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2 • 2 UNEP ' s Structnrp
2*2.1 Institutional Structure
Power is shared between the executive head and a dom-
inant coalition of member states:
UNEP is led by a small Environmental Secretariat with
an Executive Director, an Environmental Coordination Board,
and a Governing Council. The Executive Director is elected
by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on the nomina-
tion of the UN Secretary General. In his role as creator and
innovator, the Executive Director has the power to influence
the implementation and amendment of international agree-
ments. The Governing Council has fifty-eight members, each
r
’ePr
"esen'ting one of the United Nations member governments.
The regional formula distributes the seats as follows: 16 to
Africa, 13 to Asia, 6 to Eastern Europe, 10 to Latin Amer-
ica, and 13 to Western Europe and the Other States Group
(WEOG)
. The members are elected on a staggered basis for
three years by UNGA. The Governing Council reviews the
world's environmental problems and provides general policy
guidance for UNEP's secretariat and the UN system, supported
by reports and recommendations of the Executive Director.
Decisions of the Governing Council are implemented by a
small secretariat of some 200 professionals. 48
48. A. Leroy Bennett, International Organizations
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), page
297; United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile .
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function of the executive head is coordination:
Since its foundation, UNEP has had three Executive Di-
rectors, first Maurice Strong of Canada (1972-1976), then
Mostapha Tolba of Egypt (1976-1992), and since 1992 Eliza-
beth Dowdeswell of Canada. The Executive Director is not
only charged with supporting the Governing Council and im-
plementing its mandate, but also with coordinating programs,
advising other UN organs, securing the cooperation of the
international scientific community, and facilitating inter-
national cooperation for the promotion of sustainable devel-
opment. The Executive Director meets with heads of states
and gives speeches in order to promote international envi-
ronmental consciousness-raising
.
49
- Organization's internal structure facilitates non-hi-
erarchical contacts with the other organizational units:
UNEP's Environmental Coordination Board fosters cooper-
ation among the secretariats of the UN and its specialized
agencies. More than a quarter (95) of all the UNEP projects
under implementation in 1991 were implemented in coordina-
tion with other UN agencies and bodies, for example with the
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) on climate, with the
pages 3, 13, 35; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Pol-
itics
.
pages 48-51, 71; Mark Imber, "Too Many Cooks," Inter-
national Affairs . Vol.69, No.l, 1993, pages 58-62; interview
conducted on January 15th in New York with Dominic
Walubengo, representative of the Kenya Energy and Environ-
ment Organizations (KENGO)
.
49. Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics , pages
48-51; Imber, "Too Many Cooks," International Affairs , pages
58, 61, 62.
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Food and Agriculture Organization ( FAO) on tropical forests
and agriculture, and with the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on education
and training. In addition, the operational directives for
sustainable development as given by the Executive Director,
the Governing Council, and the Environmental Secretariat,
are implemented, for example, by the UN regional economic
commissions, by non-governmental organizations, and by gov-
ernments. Finally, UNEP works together with organizations,
committees, councils, and universities all over the world . 50
Decisions are rarely made by voting, but depend on
coordination and compromise:
The sovereignty of UNEP's members leads to a situation
where they reserve the ultimate power of decision making for
themselves and give no real authority to UNEP. Instead, Ex-
ecutive Director and Governing Council are responsible for
the coordination of sustainability activities and the promo-
tion of governmental cooperation, especially on the planning
level . 51
50. Bennett, International Organizations
,
page 297; United
Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile
,
pages 4-39;
Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
,
pages 48,
71; Imber, "Too Many Cooks," pages 59, 60; Mostapha Tolba,
"UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Director," in
Matsuura, Kumiko, Mueller, Joachim W.
,
and Sauvant, Karl P.
,
Annual Review of United Nations Affairs 1992
.
(Dobbs Ferry,
New York: Oceana Publications, Vol . 3 , 1993), pages 1069,
1080-1087, 1151, 1170; pocket, figure A.l.
51. Bennett, International Organizations
,
pages 55, 297;
United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile
,
pages
3, 13, 35; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics ,
pages 48, 71; Imber, "Too Many Cooks," pages 59, 60.
35
Transparency of decision making process within the
organization:
The transparency of the decision making process is
proved, for example, by the fact that NGOs (as "external
factors") can attend all Governing Council meetings. 52
- Locus of organizational power:
During the Stockholm Conference in 1972, the G 77 urged
the participants to locate UNEP in the developing countries.
As a consequence of this pressure, UNEP's headquarters are
located in Nairobi, Kenya. Thus the organization is the
first UN body to be based in the Third World. The importance
of this decision for UNEP is that is made the organization
more accessible for Third World, especially African based,
NGOs. This meant African NGOs were able to take more advan-
tage of UNEP's openness than of opportunities to exploit ac-
cess to organizations headquartered in the United States or
Europe. 53
52. More information on this issue in chapter 2.5.
53. Bennett, International Organizations
,
pages 297, 298;
United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile
,
pages
3, 13, 35; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics ,
pages 48, 71; Imber, "Too Many Cooks," pages 59, 60.
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2-2.2 Financial Strnrtnro
Limited influence of donors on budgetary decisions:
Due to the fact that UNEP's budget is extremely lim-
ited, its main strategy is to start up programs which will
draw funding from other agencies, organizations, and govern-
ments. Of all the 995 projects supported by UNEP between
1972 and 1985, 55 percent of the funding for these projects
did not pass through UNEP's hands at all. National govern-
ments, for example, spent $200 million on environmental mon-
itoring facilities and $500 million on environmental re-
search stimulated by UNEP's programs during these years. In
addition, UNEP is financially supported by international
agencies such as the World Bank and the Arab Gulf Program
for United Nations Development Organizations (AGFUND)
,
which
is an important source of aid for Clearing-house activities
in less developed countries.
^
- Funding depends on sources such as voluntary contri-
butions :
Unlike other organizations in the UN system, UNEP is
not a funding agency. UNEP's funds come from four sources:
The regular budget of the United Nations; voluntary contri-
54. Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft, Environmental Pol-
icy in the 1990s
.
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quar-
terly, 1990), pages 17, 380; Peter M. Haas, Saving the
Mediterranean
.
(New York, New York: Columbia University
Press, 1990), page 9; United Nations Environmental Pro-
gramme, UNEP Profile
,
page 37; Imber, "Too Many Cooks," page
62; appendix A, figure A. 2.
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butions to the Environment Fund; trust funds; and counter-
part contributions. In 1991, the UN budget contributed with
about $6.1 million (6.9 percent), the Environment Fund to-
taled over $59 million (66.4 percent), counterpart contribu-
tions equaled about $5.4 million (6.1 percent), and trust
funds about $18.4 (20.6 percent). 55
The G 7, minus Italy, contributes more than 50 percent
of the voluntary member contributions. Thus most of these
contributions come from the wealthy industrialized coun-
tries. However, the amount of money given by voluntary con-
tributions is extremely small. For example, the US govern-
ment as leading contributor gave only about three percent of
its annual national research budget for cognate activities
to UNEP - 36 percent - and this is still the largest share
between 1972 and 1980 in comparison to the other contribu-
tors. 56
- Small budget:
In comparison to other IGOs such as the World Bank or
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 57
,
UNEP has a
55. Tolba, "UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Di-
rector," page 1167; Tolba, "UNEP - 1990 Annual Report of the
Executive Director," in Matsuura, Mueller, and Sauvant, An-
nual Review of United Nations Affairs 1991
.
page 786.
56. Vig and Kraft, Environmental Policy in the 1990s
.
page
17; P. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean
,
page 9; United Na-
tions Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile
,
page 37.
57. Information on the World Bank's budget in 3.2.2; UNEP's
budget for 1990-1991 totaled about 1.33 billion; James Gus-
tave Speth, "1991 Annual Report of UNDP," in Matsuura,
Mueller, and Sauvant, Annual Review of United Nations Af-
fairs 1992
.
pages 1441, 1442.
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very small budget: In 1993, the overall financial contribu-
tions equaled $135 million. However, present efforts and fi-
nancial commitments still lag behind the crisis. When UNEP
focuses on the financing necessary to implement its pro-
grams, the issue becomes difficult. For years, UNEP's budget
remained roughly constant, which meant that it shrank be-
cause of inflation. At the end of the 1980s, its resources
began to grow, but they will have to multiply many times
over in order to solve the immense environmental problems of
today. Recently, UNEP's Executive Director has estimated an-
nual costs of $400 million in order to implement UNEP's sus-
tainable development projects. Though this sum met with some
criticism from rich potential donor states, UNEP's budget
has doubled between 1990 and 1992, reaching $100 million. If
this trend continues, the $400 million level could be
reached before the year 2000. 58
2 . 3 UNEP's Programs
UNEP is the primary IGO that initiates and manages
global sustainability negotiations. Nearly 50 agreements -
one third of all agreements since 1972 - have at least
partly been negotiated, led and administered under UNEP aus-
pices and involve most of the world's countries. UNEP has
58. Bennett, International Organizations , page 304; United
Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile , pages 34, 40,
41; Tolba
,
"UNEP - 1990 Annual Report of the Executive Di-
rector," page 786; appendix A, figure A. 3.
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played a major role in the adoption of five international
agreements: The Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal in
1989, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer in 1985, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that De-
plete the Ozone Layer in 1987, the Convention on the Conser-
vation of Migratory Species (CMS) in 1979, the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES)
,
and the Regional Seas Programmes. Thus UNEP
has been involved in most of the major environmental conven-
tions of the 1970s and 1980s. 59
Furthermore, UNEP promotes international environmental
guidelines as basis for future treaty negotiations and tries
to generate general political will for the promotion of sus-
tainable development. To reach this aim, UNEP regularly pre-
pares and participates in a number of intergovernmental,
scientific, and non-governmental meetings, for example in
UNCED. 60
Though most of UNEP's activities take place on the
global level, it also develops, coordinates, and carries out
some national and regional programs and projects in favor of
sustainable development. For example it recommends pilot
59. Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics , pages
48, 51, 52; United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP
Profile
,
page 32; a complete list of all UNEP programmes in
appendix A, figure A. 4.
60. Tolba
,
"UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Di-
rector," pages 1069, 1080-1087, 1151, 1170; United Nations
Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile , page 36.
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projects for self-sustaining food and fuel production, and
for the protection of river watersheds in villages and semi-
arid stock-raising zones. UNEP supervises and implements
training workshops on soil and water conservation and man-
agement for Western Africa. It helps launch national pro-
grams for resource management in countries such as Peru and
Mongolia. 61
In addition, UNEP can use the information gathered by
its "Earthwatch" network. The Stockholm Conference adopted
this action program, charging UNEP as network manager.
Earthwatch not only assesses the current environmental situ-
ation and possible dangers worldwide, but also collects and
distributes information about them. The three-part Earth-
watch Program consists of the Global Environmental Monitor-
ing System (GEMS) which has 110 monitoring stations around
the world, the International Registry of Potentially Toxic
Chemicals (IRPTC)
,
and INFOTERRA, which directs environmen-
tal questions to appropriate international sources. That
way, UNEP has set up an international network which enables
countries to exchange information collected through national
impact studies. Moreover, the organization publishes envi-
ronmental reports, creates technical and world databases 62
61. Tolba, "UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Di-
rector," pages 1069, 1080-1087, 1151, 1170; United Nations
Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile
,
page 36.
62. For example INFOTERRA, UNEP's global information sys-
tem.
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as well as computerized planning pools, and runs public in-
formation campaigns. 63
In 1990-1991, UNEP's $68 million budget was distributed
to 13 programs: Environmental Assessment (21.8 percent),
Terrestrial Ecosystems (17.5 percent, including desertifica-
tion), Environmental Awareness (13.6 percent), Technical and
Regional Cooperation (10.6 percent), Oceans (10.3 percent),
Energy, Industry, and Transport (6.3 percent), Environmental
Management (5.7 percent), Water (5.0 percent), Atmosphere
(4.0 percent)
,
Human Health and Welfare (2.2 percent)
,
Human
Settlements (1.9 percent)
,
Lithosphere (0.9 percent)
,
and
Peace and Security (0.6 percent). This financial distribu-
tion is an excellent indicator for UNEP's issue priority:
Environmental assessment (including INFOTERRA, IRPTC, and
GEMS) took over one-fifth of the program budget. In 1991,
21,500 users from over 95 countries benefitted from IN-
FOTERRA's information services. The financial distribution
also shows a strong priority for terrestrial ecosystems,
with a special focus on arid lands (just under one fifth of
the overall budget) . Thus desertification (and the sub-pro-
grams for tropical forests and woodland ecosystems) are one
of UNEP's central activities. The desertification program
63. P. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean
,
page 14; Bennett,
International Organizations
,
page 298; Porter and Brown,
Global Environmental Politics
,
page 52; United Nations Envi-
ronmental Programme, UNEP Profile
,
pages 3, 36.
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15 countries which
aims at the provision of assistance to
are victims of soil degradation. 64
According to Camilla Toulmin, director of the Drylands
Programme and member of the International Panel of Experts
on Desertification, a broad definition of the causes of de-
sertification has been drawn up and agreed upon within the
context of Agenda 21. It is defined as "land degradation in
semi-arid and dry subhumid areas resulting from cli-
matic variations and human activities
.
"^5
UNEP reports that over 35 percent of the land surface
of the earth is now threatened by desertification. According
to the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Re-
search (CGIAR)
,
every year about 6.0 million hectares of
arable land are lost through desertification. Three-quarters
of the desertification occurs in the developing countries.
Desertification originally develops for various reasons: The
causes of this major environmental destruction are a very
complex combination of environmental and socioeconomic prob-
lems in fields such as water supply and utilization, health,
food, population, development, meteorology, culture, sci-
ence, and technology. The affected areas are then further
destroyed if heavy rains follow lengthened droughts. The
64. Imber, "Too Many Cooks," pages 62, 63; Tolba, "UNEP -
1991 Annual Report of the Executive Director," page 1114.
65. Camilla Toulmin, "Combatting Desertification: Setting
the Agenda for a Global Convention," Dryland Networks Pro-
gramme: Issues Paper (London, England: International Insti-
tute for Environment and Development (IIED)
,
June 1993)
,
No. 42, page 2.
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population moves out of these regions and crowds in other
areas, thus facilitating further environmental destruction
and land degradation. This effect is reinforced by overpopu-
lation and poverty in the developing countries, leading to a
vicious circle which mutually enforces poverty and environ-
mental destruction. 66
These are the reasons why desertification is one of the
major obstacles to sustainable development - and why UNEP
has chosen it as an issue of major concern. According to
this importance, the case study which has been chosen to
show the influence of NGOs on UNEP is the International Con-
vention to Combat Desertification.^
The idea to realize such a convention developed during
the UNCED preparatory process. Representatives from the
African countries felt that the desertification issue had
66. Appendix A, figure A. 5. offers a multi-level set of ex-
planations for desertification; further information on de-
sertification and its consequences in Jeremy Rifkin, Bio-
sphere Politics. (San Francisco, California: Harper Collins
Publishers, 1991), page 74; Speth, "A post-Rio compact,"
Foreign Policy
. No. 88, Fall 1992, pages 149, 150; Langston
James Goree, Wangu Mwani, and Anjala Saini (Editors),
"Report of the Workshop 'Listening to the People: Social As-
pects of Dryland Management'", Proceedings
. Vol.l, No. 4, De-
cember 1993, page 1; Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
,
"More People and a Threatened
Environment," CGIAR
.
(Washington, D.C.: CGIAR, January
1993), page 3; interview with Walubengo.
67. Goree, Mwani, and Saini (Editors), "Report of the Work-
shop 'Listening to the People: Social Aspects of Dryland
Management'", page 1; International Institute for Sustain-
able Development (USD), "A Brief History of the INCD,"
Earth Negotiations Bulletin
. Vol . 4 , No. 24, 17 January 1994,
page 1
.
44
been poorly addressed during the UNCED preparatory process.
Due to the pressuring by these countries on UNGA, the deser-
tification issue gained importance at the Earth Summit in
1992. A formal commitment was made according to Chapter 12
of Agenda 21 to negotiate and convene a conference by June
1994, with particular focus on African countries. During its
47th session in 1992, the General Assembly adopted Resolu-
tion 47/188, calling for the establishment of the Interna-
tional Negotiating Committee for a Convention to Combat De-
sertification (INCD). 68
UNEP plays an important role in the INCD through its
Desertification Control Program Activity Center (DC/PAC)
,
established in 1978 following the UN Conference on Deserti-
fication in Nairobi in 1977. 69
Meanwhile, the Secretariat for the INCD has been estab-
lished in Geneva. Five negotiation sessions have been ar-
ranged: In Nairobi in May/June 1993, in Geneva in September
1993, in New York in January 1994, in Geneva in March 1994,
and in Paris in June 1994 - with agreement and signature.
The General assembly not only invited all UN member states
to participate in the INCD, but also all relevant NGOs to
contribute constructively to the outcome. The Desertifica-
tion Convention will consist of a set of general principles,
68. Toulmin, "Combatting Desertification," pages 4, 13.
69. Toulmin, "Combatting Desertification," pages 4, 13.
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agreed objectives, and a series of legally binding commit
ments to move toward such objectives. 70
2 • 4 UNEP's Values and Strategies
— Compromise of two ideologies;
UNEP's concept of sustainable development combines two
ideologies; Environmentalism and belief in economic growth.
The concept itself never varied. The 1991 Annual Report of
UNEP's Executive Director Mostafa Tolba shows how UNEP de-
fines sustainable development. The programs launched during
1991 can be separated in the two areas environmental protec-
tion (for example water, soils, biological diversity), and
socioeconomic concerns (for example human settlements,
women, energy, industry, information, and transportation.)
The various programs indicate UNEP's intention to integrate
environmental and developmental concerns according to the
definition given in chapter one of this thesis. 71
70. Toulmin, "Combatting Desertification," pages 20, 21,
23; KENGO, ENDA-TM, NEST, and GUAMINA, Proposals to the In-
tergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Convention to
Combat Desertification (INCD)
.
(Nairobi, Kenya: KENGO, ENDA-
TM, NEST, and GUAMINA, August 12-20, 1993), page 2; Toulmin,
"Combatting Desertification," pages 20, 21, 23; Interna-
tional Institute for Sustainable Development (USD) . "A
Brief History of the INCD," page 1.
71. Tolba, "UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Di-
rector," pages 1061-1064.
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For example in the chapter "The Year in Retrospect,"
Mostapha Tolba writes that
We have done what we could [...] in the hopethat the world community will rise to the chal-lenge of meeting the needs of a growing population
while protecting, even enhancing, the human envi-
ronment . ^
With respect to desertification, he explains that
Soil degradation affects not only agriculture
and forestry, but other sectors of the economy in-
cluding the manufacturing and commercial sectors.
Land degradation can have adverse effects on other
sectors: e.g. siltation of dams can reduce the
production of energy. [...] To formulate sustain-
able land use policy, it is important to identify
the main issues and problems of soils and land use
and their relation to the specific environmental
conditions and socioeconomic needs. 3
Thus, sustainable development as defined by UNEP is
based on the concept that the ideas of environmental protec-
tion, social needs, and economic growth are complementary
and mutually reinforcing. Accordingly, in the late 1970s
UNEP began to concentrate on specific measurements, and on
research and seminars focussing on concrete sectorial ef-
forts. By the late 1980s, environment and development no
72. Tolba
,
"UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Di-
rector," page 1067.
73
.
Tolba "UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Di-
rector," page 1077.
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longer were a separate category, and UNEP started to focus
its resources on science and monitoring. 74
- Ideology of global interdependence prevails:
From the beginning, a considerable number of scientific
holists belonged to UNEP's staff. 75 They saw the world as a
single entity and believe that all environmental conditions
are the consequence of the mutual interplay of multiple
forces. Coordination between the different programs and ac-
tivities within UNEP was therefore believed to be essential
for the success of sustainable development. 76
- Cross-cutting strategies, wide-ranging linkage of is-
sues :
As pointed out by Mostapha Tolba, many issues are in-
terlinked and inseparable from the protection of sustainable
development, such as afforestation, soil conservation, irri-
gation, protection of biodiversity, health and overall liv-
ing conditions. This wide-ranging linkage of issues in turn
leads to appropriate cross-cutting strategies, focussing on
74. P. Haas, From Theory to Practice: Ecological Ideas and
Development Policy (Harvard University, Massachusetts: Work-
ing Paper Series, No. 92-2), pages 31-34.
75. It would be an interesting question for further inves-
tigation to what extent UNEP has its values because its sec-
retariat is comprised of holists; alternatively, one could
imagine that UNEP was charged to have these values at UNCHE,
and hired a staff with corresponding beliefs.
76. P. Haas, From Theory to Practice , pages 15, 29, 30;
Tolba, "UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Direc-
tor," page 1070.
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areas important for the promotion of sustainable devel-
opment. 77
- Emphasis on monitoring and consciousness-raising:
UNEP is not an executive program, charged to do major
scientific research; instead, it mainly serves as a clear-
ing-house, monitoring environmental data and research, it
operates demonstration projects which promote international
consciousness-raising. If successful, these would later be
adopted by the member states and other UN organs on large
scale. Thus, UNEP's aim is to bridge the gap between envi-
ronmental awareness and action. 78
- Increase of consensual knowledge:
The Executive Director and the Governing Council are
charged with the promotion of important international scien-
tific and other professional communities in order to ex-
change and reassess knowledge on sustainable development. 79
This fact creates the best conditions for an increase of
consensual knowledge according to the definition in chapter
1.1 of this thesis. There, consensual knowledge refers to
"phenomena considered important by society" and a "chain of
77. In addition, consider the wide-ranging linkage of is-
sues with respect to UNEP's programs in chapter 2.3; Tolba,
"UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Director," pages
1087, 1088, 1103.
78. Imber, "Too Many Cooks," page 58.
79. Bennett, International Organizations , page 297; United
Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile , pages 3, 13,
35; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics , pages
48, 71; Imber, "Too Many Cooks," pages 59, 60.
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causation [...] subject to continuous testing and examina-
tion through adversary procedures."
- Mission of "learning" at the point of the organiza-
tion's founding:
UNEP's catalytic function was already established at
the point of the organization's founding. Thus the implicit
mission of "learning" was UNEP's goal from the beginning: To
gain more consensual knowledge on the global environment and
function as major international knowledge pool on sustain-
able development.
2 . 5 Influence of NGOs on UNEP
- NGOs not only consult, but also work actively within
the organization:
UNEP attaches great importance to its links with NGOs.
It maintains contacts with NGOs throughout the world, and
they work actively with the agency in order to plan and im-
plement conferences, meetings, programs, and projects. For
example, UNEP's Governing Council invites NGOs to its meet-
ings. Moreover, UNEP has set up procedures for mutual con-
sultation and effective coordination of activities at the
field level. In 1982, there were nearly 15,000 NGOs regis-
tered with UNEP's Environmental Liaison Center. In 1986,
• • • 8 0
UNEP even organized a conference of NGOs in Nairobi.
80. P. Haas, Levy, and Parson, "A summary of the major doc-
uments signed at earth summit and the global forum," Envi-
ronment . Vol.34, No. 8, October 1992, page 15; P. Haas, Sav-
ing the Mediterranean , page 16; United Nations Environmental
Programme, TJNEP Profile , pages 35, 36; Feld and Jordan,
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A good example for the active work of NGOs within UNEP
and its programs and projects is the INCD. When the commit-
tee failed to agree on a final compromise text after the
first session in Nairobi, NGOs decided to take several ini-
tiatives. They held an international NGO conference at Ba-
mako in August 1993. Here they elaborated their role in the
Convention process and implementation, formulated concrete
proposals, provided a discussion forum on NGO strategies in
order to offer and develop their own skills and experience
in the negotiating process. NGOs also raised funds to ensure
the publication of their "Econews" newsletter throughout the
next four sessions, and developed networking strategies
.
8
Such strategies include: Getting thorough information
from the broad NGO network and from official sources; lis-
tening to and analyzing government positions; and unifying
individual NGO positions, because split opinions weaken
their power on critical positions toward governments. NGOs
meet every night during conferences to discuss the
"happenings," write articles and solve NGO conflicts. Other
strategies are lobbying, organizing seminars and using local
media to highlight their positions. 82
International Organizations
.
page 223; interview with
Walubengo.
81. KENGO, ENDA-TM, NEST, and GUAMINA, Proposals to the In-
tergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Convention to
Combat Desertification (INCD)
,
page 2; Toulmin, "Combatting
Desertification," pages 20, 21, 23.
82. Heinz Grejn, Lobby Manual for NGOs
.
(Nairobi, Kenya:
Environmental Liaison Centre International, January 1994),
pages 167-172; appendix C; interview with Walubengo;
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Finally, NGO working groups are established for all
parts of the INCD texts. They analyze, discuss, draft, and
write out textual amendments. They also gather support from
the UNEP Secretariat for the amendments. Much more impor-
tant, however, are receptive government officials who are
willing to integrate these amendments to their own negotia-
tions and national policy. 83
- NGOs are included in areas where sustainable develop-
ment is not first priority (for example economic and juridi-
cal department)
:
According to UNEP's general focus on sustainable devel-
opment, it is unlikely that the organization has areas at
all where sustainable development is not first priority.
Should such areas exist, however, it is likely that NGOs are
included there - according to their active role in the orga-
nization.
- NGOs have access to most important meetings and in-
formations :
NGOs have access to UNEP's information network and can
attend all meetings organized by UNEP, for example the
preparatory meetings for the Desertification Convention. 84
interview conducted on January 15th in New York with Tony
Hill, representative of the UN Non-Governmental Liaison
Service
.
83. Grejn, Lobby Manual for NGOs
.
pages 167-172; appendix
C; interview with Walubengo; interview with Hill.
84. P. Haas, Levy, and Parson, "A summary of the major doc-
uments signed at earth summit and the global forum," page
15; P. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean , page 16; United Na-
tions Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile , pages 35, 36;
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This access might further be broadened in the future: in the
Address to the Third INCD Session, the Administrator James
Gustave Speth of the UNDP explained that
A new generation of national action pro-
grammes would specify what actions the country
would take in a variety of sectors and policy ar-
eas in order to halt land degradation and address
the underlying forces leading to desertification.
Their development would involve extensive partici-
pation of NGOs, affected communities, women's
groups, and grassroots organizations. 85
- NGOs lobby actively before important decisions are
made:
The preparatory meeting for the Desertification Conven-
tion shows NGOs lobbying strategies: They write their opin-
ions for Econews, participate in the delegation of the re-
spective country, have meetings with delegations between the
sessions to convince them to support NGO positions, and make
interventions during INCD sessions. However, it is far bet-
ter to lobby between the sessions, when government delegates
do not have fixed instructions yet but are still developing
their position. In their home countries, NGOs can be most
successful persuading government officials and members of
the parliament familiar with their point of view to maintain
or add the right aspects in the draft text and to delete the
Feld and Jordan, International Organizations , page 223; in-
terview with Walubengo.
85. Speth, "Towards an Effective And Operational Interna-
tional Convention on Desertification," Address to the Third
INCD Session
.
(New York, New York: UNDP, January 17, 1994),
page 3
.
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wrong aspects in order to promote sustainable development.
For any lobbying success, however, it is very important that
NGOs coordinate their lobbying activities. 86
NGOs tend to cooperate with the organization and its
programs
:
As a consequence of the broad connections between UNEP
and NGOs, the latter have increasing impact on UNEP. Their
most important contributions are not their small resources
but their consciousness-raising, cooperation, and ability to
move other institutions to follow their advice. For example
at the INCD, NGO representatives 8 ^ have the mainstream NGO
position, which is that it is more reasonable to use exist-
ing institutions and financial resources more efficiently
rather than increasing financial aid or creating new insti-
tutions. This shows their cooperative attitude toward UNEP
and the governments involved in the preparations. Meanwhile,
UNEP has had so much positive experience with NGO coopera-
tion that the organization itself increasingly seeks the ad-
vice of NGO members. Also, some governments now give finan-
cial support for NGOs' environmental actions. 88
86. Grejn, Lobby Manual for NGOs
.
pages 167-172; appendix
C; interview with Walubengo; interview with Hill.
87. The NGOs who attend the INCD are mostly local grass-
roots and service NGOs from the Third World. Only 4 or 5 out
of 4 0 NGOs expected at the Negotiating Committee come from
Northern countries.
88. Aubrey Williams, "A growing role for NGOs in develop-
ment," Finance and Development
.
December 1990, pages 31-33;
interview conducted on January 15th in New York with Wangu
Mwangi, editor for "Econews Africa " in Kenya.
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According to the results of chapters 2.2, 2.4, and 2.5,
the author concludes that UNEP has a very open structure.
2 • 6 Successes and Failures of UNEP's Programs
One can argue that the programs which UNEP has created
already are successes in themselves. The agreements which
have been achieved in various conventions and protocols show
UNEP's ability to bring governments, industries, and other
important international factors together in order to develop
strategies for global environmental protection. To a certain
degree, the organization has been successful in bringing de-
veloped and developing countries closer together in order to
fight common dangers threatening people in the present and
the future. 120 countries around the world now participate
in UNEP's programs, and eight international conventions and
O Q
18 protocols and agreements have been adopted.
Executive Director Mostafa Tolba himself played an im-
portant role by participating directly in the negotiations
during the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, pushing forward negotiations on limits on the
89. United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile ,
pages 40, 41.
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global use of chlorofluorcarbons (CFCs). 90
fessor Peter M. Haas,
According to Pro-
.
ne9°tiating meetings, Executive Direc-tor Tolba urged delegates to seek consensus andconstantly pressed for a strong treaty. He person-ally chaired meetings and at one point eventhreatened not to let the delegates go to dinner
until they had reached agreement. 9 ^-
UNEP ' s successes, however, go further than exchanging
information and negotiating treaties. Meanwhile, many na-
tions have themselves initiated far-reaching sustainability
programs, and more than 40 have integrated national conser-
vation strategies into their development plans. 9 ^
However, UNEP's programs and projects sometimes fail to
be successful due to factors mentioned in chapter 2.2. For
example, it is a long way from signing an environmental
treaty and implementing the policies in one's own country.
For example, Greenpeace criticizes the Montreal Protocol be-
cause it does not protect the ozone layer from further dete-
rioration. Moreover, it is impossible to verify national or
industrial compliance with CFCs reduction, for most of the
respective national data and statistics are secret. However,
despite of non-compliance, a convention might still be an
90. Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
,
page
49.
91. P. Haas, "Banning chlorofluorcarbons : epistemic commu-
nity efforts to protect stratospheric ozone," International
Organization . Vol.46, No.l, Winter 1992, page 194.
92. United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile ,
pages 3, 40, 41.
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improvement, for it leads to public discussion and criti-
cism, which will inspire people to change the situation
through grassroots organizing. That way, UNEP's activism
will be an incentive for new relationships between scien-
tists and decision-makers, engineers and financiers, indus-
trialists and environmental activists on behalf of the envi-
ronment - for environmental changes do not only depend on
the cooperation of national governments, but take place in
many spheres and on all different levels. 93
Another problem is that the United States has the
strongest influence on both the UNEP secretariat and council
decisions. It is the single largest financial contributor to
the organization. The American influence has created ten-
sions. Some of the secretariat's proposals were criticized
for being responsive to the needs of the United States and
other developed countries rather than to the Third World.
During the Reagan and early Bush years, the United States
withdrew government support for international population
planning through United Nations agencies, arguing that eco-
nomic growth could solve all population problems. At the
same time, UNEP has a democratic voting structure (one state
- one vote) and the Third World Countries held and still
93. Greenpeace International, The Failure of the Montreal
Protocol, (June 1990), pages 2, 3; United Nations Environ-
mental Programme, UNEP Profile
,
pages 3, 40, 41.
94. Democratic in comparison to the World Bank's voting
structure, which depends on the amount of financial contri-
butions .
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hold the majority of the seats in the UNEP Governing Coun-
cil: This situation increases the possibility of limiting
the influence of the United States and other industrialized
countries in UNEP. Over the years, the Third World members
have often succeeded in strengthening their position and fi-
nally reaching acceptable sustainability agreements by con-
95sensus
.
Moreover, Third World countries increasingly criti-
cized Mostapha Tolba. Although he has sometimes defended the
position of the developing countries against that of the in-
dustrialized countries, in recent years the G 77 has in-
creasingly accused him of being too susceptible to the in-
terests and problems of the North, focussing on issues as:
Climate change, ozone depletion, and biological diversity.
The G 77 wanted Tolba to put more emphasis on issues such as
fresh water, urban air, water pollution, and desertifica-
tion, which are of primary concern in the Third World. By
1990 the Group had lost confidence in Tolba and finally was
able to deprive UNEP of a major role in the UNGA resolution
on UNCED. In UNGA, the developing countries have more possi-
bilities to influence the negotiations, for they enjoy a 10-
to-1 majority. The G 77, especially Brazil, India, Mexico,
and Indonesia, theoretically now gains more influence
through UNGA - as long as they stay united. Some defend the
95. Vig and Kraft, Environmental Politics in the 1990s ,
page 314; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics,
page 48.
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shift, while others fear that the General Assembly is too
broad an institution to deal with that issue. 96
Also the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and
the World Health Organization (WHO) do not want UNEP to in-
tervene, for they are large and well—entrenched bureaucra-
cies already dealing with environmental aspects to a certain
degree. Thus UNEP, which neither has the status of a spe-
cialized UN agency nor possesses a large staff and budget,
has never been treated as an equal by FAO, WHO, and others.
As a consequence, the ability of UNEP to influence policies
of other specialized UN agencies are very limited. In addi-
tion, UNEP and other UN agencies compete with UNDP for addi-
tional authority and financial support in environmental pro-
jects in the Third World. For example, UNEP and UNDP both
released their own environmental agendas in preparation for
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
in 1992, and the United Nations Children Fund and the United
Nations Population Fund have both included environmental is-
sues in their antipoverty and population stabilization pro-
97grams
.
An additional problem is the fact that the capabilities
for sustainable development in the Third World are very lim-
96. Christopher Anderson and Peter Aldhous, "Third world
muscles on climate treaty," Nature, Vol.349, No. 6312, Febru-
ary 28, 1991, page 727; Porter and Brown, Global Environmen-
tal Politics
,
pages 50, 51.
97. Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics , page
52; Vig and Kraft, Environmental Politics in the 1990s, page
316.
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ited because of a lack of environmental monitoring capabili-
ties and small enforcement staffs. Finally, UNEP's analytic
models are sometimes inadequate and analytically question-
akle, partly due to the fact that ecological surveys and en-
vironmental research are still a low budget priority of all
governments. The monitoring technology for environmental
protection is much less developed than, say, the one for so-
cial demography. 98
With respect to the INCD, NGO member Christopher Manu
criticizes the actions of the world community to combat de-
sertification. He believes that the actions so far are be-
low what is needed to implement the UN Plan of Action to
Combat Desertification (PACD) . Not only are the financial
sources insufficient, there is also a lack of political will
for appropriate implementation. Though most African coun-
tries are parties to the Desertification Convention, impor-
tant elements for them such as financial resources, imple-
mentation and monitoring mechanisms were not included in the
• • • qq
original text of the convention.
Due to these problems mentioned above, the results of
UNEP have been disappointing to many people. However, most
98. Gaye D. Ness and Stephen R. Brechin, "Bridging the gap:
International organization as organization," International
Organization
.
Vol.42, No. 2, Spring 1988, page 261; Vig and
Kraft, Environmental Politics in the 1990s , page 240; P.
Haas, Saving the Mediterranean , page 16.
99. Christopher Manu, "The Road to the Desertification Con-
vention," Resources
.
(Nairobi, Kenya: KENGO, Vol.4, No. 2,
1993 ) , pages 7-10
.
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of the criticism refers to factors which lay beyond UNEP's
influence. Considering the fact that UNEP is a recent and
small organization, the author believes that it has already
had an influence far beyond its years, and an impact far
greater than its size or resources.
^ ^ Successes—and Failures of NGOs' Influence on UNEP's
Programs
NGOs have been successful insofar as they have partici-
pated in and influenced the preparations and negotiations of
the international environmental conventions mentioned above.
For example, several NGOs such as Greenpeace and Friends of
the Earth^l were present in Montreal and contributed to the
outcome of the agreement. NGOs are not only successful at
the international planning level, but also at the national
and local level, when it comes to the implementation of pro-
grams. For example, NGOs publicly ask people running for of-
fice for their sustainability agenda. NGOs can study envi-
ronmental law and politics, and then provide appropriate in-
formation for small governments which do not have the staff
or technical ability to deal adequately with these issues.
100. United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile ,
pages 40, 41; Vig and Kraft, Environmental Politics in the
1990s
.
pages 249, 316.
101. Even NGOs such as the Air-Conditioning and Refrigera-
tion Institute, which is the umbrella trade organization for
the largest CFC producer in the world and announced plans to
curtail all such manufacturing.
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On the level of local programs, the advantage of NGOs is
their socioeconomic and ecological experience with respect
to the realization of sustainable development. Their rela-
tive independence and local experience allows them to pay
attention to professional rather than to political or geo-
graphic considerations in the selection of personnel and
projects
.
102
Especially in the Third World, where governments are
rather poor and thus depend on external assistance, NGOs are
of increasing importance, for example they help to plan pro-
jects and evaluate them. 103 According to John K. Sambu, Min-
ister for Environment and Natural Resources in Nairobi,
Kenya
,
We work quite closely with NGOs in all areas,
environment namely. We have several NGOs working
on the conservation of the environment, forests,
wildlife, etc. In the National Environmental Ac-
tion Plans, NGOs are well represented. 104
As based on information by Masse Lo, representative of
the NGO "Environment-Et-Developpement Du Tiers Monde" (Enda-
102. Williams, "A Growing Role for NGOs in Development,"
page 32; Ness and Brechin, "Bridging the gap," page 272 ;
Fred Pearce, "Japan's billions may bypass World Bank," New
Scientist
. Vol.134, No. 1825, June 13, 1992, page 4; United
Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile
,
page 14; in-
terview conducted on January 16th in New York with Safei
Hamed, Professor of environmental planning at the University
of Maryland, College Park.
103. Interview with Walubengo.
104. Interview conducted on January 17th in New York with
John K. Sambu, Minister for Environment and Natural Re-
sources in Nairobi, Kenya.
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TM) in Dakar, the new environmental minister in Senegal has
also started to work closely with NGOs. They now get invita-
tions for information exchanges
.
106
However, it seems that NGOs have only limited influence
on national powers insofar as they can advise them and try
to persuade them to promote sustainable development. Accord-
ing to Dominic Walubengo, representative of the Kenya Energy
and Environment Organizations (KENGO)
,
a major problem is
that governments do not have to tell NGOs or their con-
stituents how much money they received and what they intend
to do with it. This lack of accountability in national af-
fairs is an on-going problem, especially in undemocratic so-
cieties. At the same time, some NGOs are criticized them-
selves for occasional mismanagement. 106 According to Robert
Livernash,
Many service NGOs fail, however, in that they
do not help poor people, are not innovative, and
are as rigid as government departments. In addi-
tion, some service NGOs have been criticized for
having limited technical capacity for complex pro-
jects, for an inability to replicate successful
projects, for a limited ability to sustain them-
selves after initial outside help is withdrawn,
and for relatively weak managerial and organiza-
tional skills. 10 '
105. Interview conducted on January 16th in New York with
Masse Lo, NGO representative from Enda-TM, Senegal.
106. Pearce, "Japan's billions may bypass World Bank," page
4; United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile ,
page 14; Williams, "A Growing Role for NGOs in Development,"
page 32; Ness and Brechin, "Bridging the gap," page 272; in-
terview with Walubengo.
107. Livernash, "The growing influence of NGOs in the devel-
oping world," page 18.
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NGOs may fail especially in matters of organization and
regular attendance at meetings. Many of the grassroots NGOs
do not have access to the funds necessary to attend meet-
ings, thus their points of view cannot be highlighted. On
the other hand, international NGOs have enough money and
personnel to attend the conferences, but their wide scope
does not enable them to discuss grassroots issues. As a con-
sequence, such meetings may fail to include the opinions of
grassroots NGOs with respect to sustainable development. 108
The differences among NGOs are not part of any fixed
pattern, but depend on concrete issues. Northern NGOs, for
example, often do not see desertification as an important
environmental problem, thus they offer little support in the
discussion and implementation of more sustainable develop-
ment. 109
The INCD is an example of NGO successes as well as
failures. Their successes are already visible. First of all,
parts of the Conference text include NGOs as important ac-
tors in combating desertification. For example Article 10
(f), titled "National Action Programmes", points out the ne-
cessity to
give grassroots organizations, and non-gov-
ernmental organizations more generally, an effec-
tive role in the preparation, implementation and
review of the programmes, making full use of their
108. Interviews with Mwangi and Walubengo.
109. Interviews with Mwangi and Walubengo.
64
expertise
nition and
[and granting them institutional
appropriate assistance] . 10 recog-
Thus NGOs are included in a broad variety of fields,
giving them a basis to influence the formulation and imple-
mentation the International Convention to Combat Desertifi-
cation. 111
At the same time, however, NGOs
'
power to influence the
outcome of the convention is limited. At the Conference of
Parties, NGOs merely have observer status. According to Ar-
ticle 24 (2 . k)
,
The Conference of Parties is the supreme body
of the Convention. It shall keep the implementa-
tion of the Convention under regular review, and
inake
,
within its mandate, the decisions nec-
essary to promote its effective implementation. To
this end, it shall: [...] seek, as appropriate,
the services and cooperation of, and information
provided by, competent intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations; [...]112
110. United Nations General Assembly, "Negotiating Text of
the Convention," Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for
the Elaboration of an International Convention to combat De-
sertification in those Countries experiencing serious
Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa (New
York, New York: 17-28 January 1994, Third Session, Agenda
item 2, UN Document A/AC. 241/15)
,
page 184; the complete
document can be read in appendix C; similar provisions re-
ferring to NGO involvement are found throughout the text,
namely in Article 15 (b)
,
titled "Assistance in the elabora-
tion and implementation of action programmes," Article 16
(2.), titled "Coordination in the elaboration and implemen-
tation of action programmes," Article 18 (d)
,
titled
"Information collection, analysis and exchange," Article 20
(1., 2. (a)), titled "Transfer, acquisition, adaptation and
development of technology," and Article 21 (l.a, 3., [4.]),
titled "Capacity building, education and public awareness."
111. United Nations General Assembly, "Negotiating Text of
the Convention," pages 194, 195.
112. United Nations General Assembly, "Negotiating Text of
the Convention," pages 194, 195.
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This means that NGOs' views do not take legally part in
formal consensus building, but are considered advisory. They
will not sign the Convention, but play a major role behind
the scenes. As long as they can not improve their legal sta-
tus in decision-making - which is highly unlikely, given the
governments' resistance - their major focus will be to im-
prove their techniques of lobbying and other means of indi-
rect influencing. Two rounds of negotiations have shown that
NGOs' input in the elaboration of the Convention can be very
constructive. Many of their concerns are now part of the
^raf1: convention. 113 It is possible to prove concretely the
influence NGOs have on the Final Draft of the Convention by
comparing this with the text "NGO Interventions at the 2nd
Session of INCD, " which in 9 statements sums up the views of
the NGO community with respect to INCD formulation and im-
plementation. One example is Point 7, referring to Financial
Resources and Mechanisms:
The Conference of the Parties should elabo-
rate the criteria for funding thereby taking into
account: [...] principles of transparency and ac-
countability in management of the resources. ^
113. Goree, Mwani, and Saini (Editors), "Report of the Work-
shop 'Listening to the People: Social Aspects of Dryland
Management'", page 1; Grejn, Lobby Manual for NGOs
.
page
205.
114. NGO interventions at the 2nd Session of INCD (Geneva,
Switzerland: September 13-24, 1993), page 206; appendix C.
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of the Negotiating Text
In comparison, Article 23 [ 4 .]
states that
The modalities in paragraph 3 shall providetransparency and accountability in the manage-ment of the resources of the fund, [ . .
.
]
9
According to an interview with NGO representatives
Wangu Mwani and Masse Lo, the striking similarities within
these two texts prove the influence of NGOs and their values
on the text of the convention: They succeeded in making
their proposals part of the Negotiating Text of the Conven-
tion - thus without their active lobbying, the provisions
would not have been included. Another example is point 9
(ii) of the NGO statements, where they write
For the purpose of achieving ecologically
sustainable development within the context of the
objectives of this Convention, and to implement
its provisions, annexes and protocols, the Parties
shall be guided, inter alia, by the following
principles: [...] the principle of collective re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of a sound and
healthy global environment which entails, inter
alia, rational and ecologically sustainable man-
agement of natural resources, avoiding land degra-
dation and loss of productive capacity [...].
Similarities to point 9 (ii) can be found in Article 2
and Article 3 (d) of the Convention, for example. Addition-
ally, NGO propositions are integrated in the INCD, be it
115. United Nations General Assembly, "Negotiating Text of
the Convention," page 194.
116. Interview with Mwani and Lo.
117. NGO interventions at the 2nd Session of INCD
.
page 207.
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with respect to participation and education of local people,
women issues, proposals concerning trade, debt, or subsi-
dies
.
118
Despite NGOs ' influence behind the scenes, it is a
failure of NGOs that they have not managed so far to include
their legal rights in the Convention to a considerable de-
gree. Legal aspects can be important tools for the national
implementation of the Convention, for in case of non-compli-
ance, governments could be sued by the international commu-
nity. However, this would require massive changes in the
general norms of the international system, thus it is diffi-
cult to achieve. Though point 8 of the NGO statements pro-
poses very concrete and far reaching measures with respect
to "Legal Aspects Relating To Ratification And Domestic Im-
plementation Of the Convention," the Convention only men-
tions very briefly in Article 10 (d) that National Action
Programs shall "create an enabling national environment by
removing legislative and other obstacles to required ac-
tion," followed by similarly vague statements concerning
legal aspects in Article 11 (m) and Article 21 ( 1
.
( i) )
.
Thus
in this case NGOs have failed so far to integrate their
points of view into the text of the Convention.
118. Goree, Mwani, and Saini (Editors), "Report of the Work-
shop 'Listening to the People: Social Aspects of Dryland
Management'", page 1.
119. United Nations General Assembly, "Negotiating Text of
the Convention," page 184.
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CHAPTER 3
THE WORLD BANK
3,1 F°undation of the World Bank and of its Environmental
Department
The developmental and environmental policy of the World
Bank are strongly interconnected. Thus, it is important to
not only analyze its environmental department but the World
Bank as a whole.
The World Bank was founded in 1944 at the Bretton Woods
Conference. When the Bank began to operate in June 1946, it
had two functions: First, to help reconstruct the European
and Japanese economies destroyed by the Second World War,
and second, to assist in "developing" the "less developed"
world - a vague expression open to interpretation. Until the
mid-1950s, however, the Bank's main goal was the restoration
of global economic stability, while the developmental con-
cern remained peripheral. 120
Over the long term, the Bank's inadequate financial re-
sources and the strong competition of the Marshall Plan aid
with its generous grants forced the Bank to shift its main
focus from Europe and Japan to a new constituency to keep
120. Winsome J. Leslie, The World Bank and Structural Trans-
formation in Developing Countries (Boulder & London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1987), pages 2, 22; Robert L. Ayres,
Banking on the Poor
.
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT
Press, 1983), pages 1, 2; Pearce, "Japan's billions may by-
pass World Bank," page 4.
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itself in business. Simultaneously, an increasing amount of
developing countries emerged as independent nations and
pressured the Bank for multilateral aid according to the
second goal of the World Bank's charter. Moreover, the Third
World Countries used their influence in the United Nations
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) to formulate an agenda promoting Third World Devel-
opment. Foreign aid was seen as crucial to develop the Third
World economies. Capital transfers from the World Bank, pri-
vate banks, UNDP, and other organizations became increas-
ingly important
.
12
1
As a consequence, the World Bank began to concentrate
its financial assistance to the Third World. However, until
the late 1960s its multilateral aid was limited to the stim-
ulation of economic growth. According to Robert Ayres,
Between fiscal years 1961 and 1965, 76.8 per-
cent of all Bank lending was for electric power or
transportation. Only 6 percent was for agricul-
tural development, and a paltry 1 percent for so-
cial service investment. 122
According to the trickle-down theory of economic
growth, the Bank believed that progress in this industrial-
ization and capitalization would later also benefit the poor
121. Ayres, Banking on the Poor , page 1; E. Haas, When
Knowledge is Power
,
pages 12, 13, 142; Jeff Frieden, "Third
World Indebted Industrialization," International Organiza-
tion
.
Vol.35, No. 3, Summer 1981, pages 408-410, 414; Leslie,
The World Bank and Structural Transformation in Developing
Countries
.
pages 2, 20, 22.
122. Ayres, Banking on the Poor , pages 2, 3.
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of these countries, and would solve their "peripheral" prob-
lems such as high population growth, low levels of savings,
and political instability. From the very beginning, the Bank
had to borrow money from US investors in order to finance
its lending program. This dependence on the United States
forced the Bank in a conservative direction: The Bank would
finance only those projects that yielded enough money to re-
pay the initial investment, thus avoiding riskier sec-
tors. 123
During the years when Robert McNamara was president of
the World Bank (1968-1981), a major change occurred in the
organization: The World Bank recognized that its exclusive
focus on capitalization and industrialization had not
brought the expected results with respect to development in
the Third World. Thus, especially after 1973 the Bank
shifted its funding projects away from building basic eco-
nomic infrastructures toward the reduction of Third World
poverty. The nature of the projects changed in favor of the
poor people, who had long been neglected: Funds were given
to experimental rural projects, focussing on the social as-
pects of development. This liberal policy concentrated on
agriculture, education, urban development, and population
planning. Due to this enlargement, several internal changes
occurred, for example in 1973, the Agriculture and Rural De-
123. Ayres, Banking on the Poor , pages 4, 5; Leslie, The
World Bank and Structural Transformation in Developing Coun-
tries
.
pages 2, 20, 22; E. Haas, When Knowledge is Power ,
pages 12, 13, 142.
71
velopment Department was created, in 1975
,
and in 1979
,
the
Population, Health, and Nutrition Department. The Bank be-
came increasingly bureaucratic and a center of attention for
journalists, politicians, and the public. Now it was not
only the most important international development organiza-
tion, but also became the largest antipoverty agency. 124
In 1981, Ronald Reagan became President of the United
States and A. W. Clausen replaced McNamara as World Bank
president. The new American administration criticized the
poverty-oriented development of the Bank under McNamara.
Clausen, the former Chief Executive Officer of the Bank of
America and thus an eminent commercial banker, was more
likely to adapt to President Reagan's market-oriented
strategies: He focused rather on the development of the pri-
vate sector than poverty alleviation. From the beginning,
the Reagan administration opposed McNamara's "welfare" pol-
icy, and aimed at the reduction of American financial par-
ticipation in it. The American influence was very strong due
to the fact that the United States is the Bank's largest
donor. 125
124. S. Shahid Husain, "The World Bank and Economic Policy
in Developing Countries," Recovery in the Developing World
(Washington, D.C. : The World Bank, 1986)
,
page 50; Ayres,
Banking on the Poor
,
pages 1, 5-7; Leslie, The World Bank
and Structural Transformation in Developing Countries
, pages
2, 3, 22.
125. Ayres, Banking on the Poor
,
pages 229, 230, 231, 232;
Leslie, The World Bank and Structural Transformation in De-
veloping Countries
,
page 26.
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are
The changes in development policy under McNamara
important insofar as the new social and population aspects
indirectly facilitated environmental protection, for example
the fight against overpopulation. Moreover, due to increas-
ing international pressure and public concern for the promo-
tion of sustainable development, an Office of Environmental
Affairs was created for environmental advice in 1972. How-
ever, it consisted of only 6 professionals who had to review
more than 300 new project proposals each year. Thus, it was
not capable of having much impact on the lending activities
of other World Bank units. 126
While the global community became increasingly aware of
the need for sustainable development in the 1970s, concern
with environmental protection was less prominent at the
World Bank. 2 The Bank itself admits that during these
years, some of its projects were damaging the environment.
It became apparent that the Bank's response
did not match the changing realities either in the
degree of effort devoted to environmental matters
or in the approaches actually used. This, combined
with a few well-publicized cases in which Bank
projects actually had negative environmental con-
sequences - such as contributing to the destruc-
126. P. Haas, From Theory to Practice
,
page 37; Porter and
Brown, Global Environmental Politics
,
pages 54,55; Vig and
Kraft, Environmental Policy in the 1990s
.
page 297; Ayres,
Banking on the Poor
,
pages 5-7; S. Husain, "The World Bank
and Economic Policy in Developing Countries," page 50;
Leslie, The World Bank and Structural Transformation in De-
veloping Countries
,
pages 3, 22.
127. Ayres, Banking on the Poor
,
pages 4, 5; Leslie, The
World Bank and Structural Transformation in Developing Coun-
tries
.
page 20.
73
tion of tropical rain forests and posing threatsto wildlife, indigenous people, and establishedhuman settlements
- prompted the institution to
rethink and adjust its policies toward environmen-
tal management.
3*2 Structure of the World Bank and of Its Environmental
Department
3.2.1 Institutional Structure
- Power is concentrated at the top:
The World Bank is led by the president and a small
board of directors. Power is concentrated at the top. 129
- Strong hierarchical structure:
The World Bank's structure is strongly hierarchical.^ 39
- Institutional structure makes wide-ranging reforms
difficult:
As the previous pages have shown, this is true for the
first decades of the World Bank's existence. Though some
changes took place, for example under McNamara, it is
doubtable if they can be called "wide-ranging reforms." This
would only be true for more fundamental structural shifts,
128. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment ,
1990, page 11.
129. Ayres, Banking on the Poor , pages 65-67; Philippe Le
Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge ,
(Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1989),
page 61; an overview of the World Bank Structure in pocket,
figure A. 6.
130. Ayres, Banking on the Poor , pages 65-67; Le Prestre,
The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge , page 61; an
overview of the World Bank Structure in pocket, figure A. 6.
74
for example an increased degree of openness in favor of sus-
tainable development. It is mainly due to pressure from
American environmental groups and congressmen in the 1980 s,
that some more fundamental changes of this kind occurred. In
1986, World Bank President Barber Conable announced the com-
plete reorganization of the Bank. Conable established a new
Environmental Department and new environmental offices
within the Bank's regional operations divisions. This step
was necessary for the environmental aspects of development
projects and the evaluation of natural resource conservation
in general. 131
Many of the new positions were given to scientific
holists and ecological epistemic community members. As a re-
sult, sustainability concerns entered the discussion. The
new reorganized department was given only a few powers and a
small staff of 60 professionals with very limited powers to
review the environmental impact of development projects. At
the same time, the staff of the Bank itself expanded consid-
erably in the 1970s and 1980s, for example from 1,348 pro-
fessionals in 1971 to 3,617 in 1986. Including technical and
support staff, the World Bank today has a permanent staff of
131. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
.
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, First Annual Report, Fis-
cal 1991), pages 2, 3; The World Bank, The World Bank and
the Environment
.
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, First
Annual Report, Fiscal 1990), page 72; The World Bank, The
World Bank and the Environment
.
(Washington, D.C.: The World
Bank, First Annual Report, Fiscal 1992), pages 126, 127.
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5,000-6,000 people. This includes the staff of mission of-
fices all over the world, for example in China and India. 132
In 1989, an Environmental Assessment Operational Direc-
tive (EAOD) was adopted, which required environmental as-
sessments of new Bank projects and components with signifi-
cant environmental impact. EAOD was developed by scientific
holists in order to make project participants understand the
interdependency of ecological issues, and to propose alter-
natives to current development actions. 133 According to the
World Bank,
The central environment department, located
in the Vice-Presidency for Sector and Operations
Policy (OSP)
,
is a policy-oriented, interdisci-
plinary group that is responsible for planning,
formulating, and coordinating the Bank's overall
environmental policies and approaches. It recom-
mends environmental and social policies, initia-
tives, guidelines, and standards to Bank manage-
ment. 134
^
Today the Environmental Department focuses upon issues
such as tropical deforestation, the loss of biological di-
versity, and the problems of desertification in sub-Saharan
Africa. It works together with several countries which face
132. P. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean
,
page 13; P. Haas,
From Theory to Practice
,
pages 37, 38; Le Prestre, The World
Bank and the Environmental Challenge
,
pages 60, 61; Porter
and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
,
pages 54,55; Vig
and Kraft, Environmental Policy in the 1990s
.
page 297; in-
terview with Hamed.
133. P. Haas, From Theory to Practice
. 1992, pages 39, 40.
134. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
.
1992, page 125.
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immense environmental problems and helps them to improve
their management of natural resources. 30 National Environ-
mental Action Plans (NEAPs) so far have been designed to de-
velop comprehensive national environmental planning strate-
135gies.
Currently
,
106 higher level and 34 support-level staff
work in the Environmental Department, which is composed of
economists, engineers, land use planners, ecologists,
foresters, anthropologists, sociologists, and institutional
experts. It conducts policy and research functions in envi-
ronmental, economic, and social areas, supplies certain op-
erational support to the regions, and provides training for
staff. The Regional Environment Divisions are located in the
technical departments of each of the four regional offices
and together contain 30 high-level staff and about 15 con-
sultants. In addition, a certain number of Bank staff works
partly on environmental matters. For example, the Legal De-
partment has its own environmental unit, and the Economic
Development Institute has included the environment as cross-
sectional theme in its training activities for borrowing
countries. The Environmental Department also houses the
Global Environment Fund (GEF) Office of the Administrator
and the GEF Office of the Operations Coordinator. Moreover,
135. Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics , pages
54,55; Vig and Kraft, Environmental Policy in the 1990s ,
page 297; P. Haas, From Theory to Practice . 1992, pages 39,
40; The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment ,
1990, page 12.
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the Environmental Department increasingly cooperates with
major international institutions and organizations such as
the Economic Development Institute (EDI), the International
Finance Corporation (IFC)
,
and specialized agencies within
the UN system. 136
However, the legal structure of the World Bank makes it
very difficult for the environmental department or external
forces such as NGOs to push forward more fundamental change
in favor of sustainability. A major problem is that the Bank
is unaccountable to its member states: The Bank's Articles
of Agreement states that management and staff are responsi-
hle exclusively to the Bank and to no other authority. 13 "^
According to Patricia Adams,
Even the accountability of the board of exec-
utive directors is ambiguous: The Bank argues that
its executive directors are individuals deriving
their authority from and owing their paramount
loyalty to the Bank, even though they are elected
by, and vote on behalf of, member countries. 3 °
To sum up, some major reforms took place in the World
Bank in the late 1980s. Though most of the old structural
problems continue to exist, the new Environmental Department
136. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment ,
pages 2, 3; The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environ-
ment . 1990, page 72; The World Bank, The World Bank and the
Environment . 1992, pages 126, 127.
137. Patricia Adams, "The World Bank and the IMF in Sub-Sa-
haran Africa," Journal of International Affairs . Vol.46,
No.l, Summer 1992, pages 98, 99.
138. Adams, "The World Bank and the IMF in Sub-Saharan
Africa," page 100.
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itself has a far more open structure than the rest of the
Bank. This structure facilitates the promotion of sustain-
able development in the Bank.
Strong time—constraints for decision making:
In an average week, the World Bank approves some $400
million in loans, and the top level of the Bank has just two
weeks to review multi-million dollar projects. In addition,
the extensive individual workload of the small environmental
staff leaves little time for an extensive project analysis
or for the improvement of its knowledge. The members had
little time to communicate their concerns and perspectives
with other departments of the Bank in order to promote envi-
ronmentally sound projects. 139 The World Bank itself admits
that
Overall, based on time recorded by staff,
some 270 staff years (regular staff plus consul-
tants) were devoted to environment this year
[1991]. This corresponds to about 6 percent of to-
tal Bank staff time. 140
- Lack of transparency of decision making process
within the organization:
The World Bank works relatively independently from both
member governments and NGOs. Not only are the minutes of ex-
139. Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Chal-
lenge
.
pages 60, 61; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental
Politics
.
pages 54,55; Vig and Kraft, Environmental Policy
in the 1990s
.
page 297; interview with Hamed.
140. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment ,
1991, page 3.
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ecutive directors
' meetings secret, but also their voting
records. All Bank governors, executive directors, alter-
nates, officers, and employees are immune from the legal
process regarding their professional performance. To amend
the World Bank's Articles of Agreement would reguire a
three-fifth majority of its members, which makes democrati-
zation extremely difficult. The time constraints mentioned
above further inhibit a democratic control of the planning
and implementation of programs and projects. 141
- Locus of organizational power:
The USA is the country which contributes most to the
World Bank's budget, and it had the strongest influence on
the World Bank from the beginning. It is likely that it used
this influence to locate the World Bank in its capital Wash-
ington, D.C. While this decision makes the organization eas-
ily accessible for the United States, local NGOs from the
Third World have difficulties to gain access to the organi-
zation for financial and geographical reasons. 142
141. Adams, "The World Bank and the IMF in Sub-Saharan
Africa," pages 109-111; E. Haas, When Knowledge is Power ,
page 142.
142. Ayres, Banking on the Poor
,
pages 64, 65.
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3.2.2 Financial Strnrturp
Considerable influence of donors on budgetary deci-
sions :
The World Bank's donors act relatively autonomously in
budgetary matters. This is due to the confidence of the fi-
nancial community which the Bank gained during the 1950s.
World Bank's lending started with less than $800 million in
loans in the first decade of its existence. It has greatly
increased over the years. By the end of fiscal 1985, the
Bank had committed $149.6 billion aid to the developing mem-
ber countries. 143
This autonomy is not absolute, however. The Bank in-
creasingly joins with private commercial banks and private
lenders in offering a loan. The advantages for the private
lenders are more security with respect to planning and loan-
repayment - for example they profit from greater information
about recipient countries and loan administration services.
The Bank, on the other hand, has greater total amounts of
money available. Some new money sources are especially im-
portant, for example the Middle East, Norway, and Japan. The
situation could become problematic if co-financing increases
to a level of two-third of the total loans. Private banks
143. P. Haas, Levy, and Parson, "Appraising the earth sum-
mit," Environment , Vol.34, No. 8, October 1992, page 18; Le
Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge ,
pages 61-63; Leslie, The World Bank and Structural Transfor-
mation in Developing Countries , pages 3, 26.
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have some criteria which are very different from the ones of
the World Bank's donors, for example where loans should go
and to what purposes. The more the amount of private loans
increases, the more influence private bankers have on the
policy of the World Bank. 144 According to Robert Ayres,
At the extreme, then, all of the changes now
under consideration at the World Bank run the dan-
ger of converting it into little more than an un-
derwriter of the schemes of commercial banks,
multinational corporations, and the supply-side
theories of the more committed capitalist ideo-
logues . 14b
This extreme so far has not been reached, however, and
the World Bank's donors still possess a considerable degree
of autonomy in financial matters.
- Voting is based on amount of financial contribution:
In the World Bank, voting is weighted in relation to
the amount of a country's contribution. 146
- Large budget:
The World Bank currently is the leading international
development bank. In this position, it controls and dis-
tributes billions of dollars annually. 147 Accordingly, its
clients and creditors are all the more eager to define the
144. Ayres, Banking on the Poor , pages 238, 239, 242, 244.
145. Ayres, Banking on the Poor , page 245.
146. P. Haas, Levy, and Parson, "Appraising the earth sum-
mit," page 28; Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environ-
mental Challenge , pages 61-63.
147. For example more than $16 billion in fiscal year 1986.
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governing criteria of its loans. In practice, these criteria
are mainly defined by the developed countries. 148
8 • 8 The World Bankas Programs
In the 1970s and 1980s, the World Bank has developed
so-called "structural adjustment programs." These programs
provide loans for projects which aim at market-oriented
"adjustments" of Third World economies to the economic
structure of the developed countries. For example, in the
1970s and 1980s, the Bank supported rain forest colonization
schemes in Brazil and Indonesia and cattle ranching projects
in Central and South America, all of which where not based
on sustainable development as defined in chapter one. The
World Bank defends its structural adjustment programs: Ac-
cording to Kevin Cleaver, Chief of Agriculture at the Africa
Technical Department of the World Bank, such programs free
agricultural prices, eliminate costly government marketing
boards, and allow farmers to make a living. He claims that
occasional failure is due to civil war, political or social
strife, or a poor economic policy environment. 149
148. P. Haas, Levy, and Parson, "Appraising the earth sum-
mit," page 28; Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environ-
mental Challenge
,
pages 61-63.
149. G. Edward Schuh, Kevin Cleaver, Walter Coward, Robert
W. Herdt, and Ruth Katz, "Improving African farming is a
two-part job," The New York Times
.
Vol.142, October 3, 1992,
page 22L; Omar Sattaur, "Greens in muddy water over Indian
dam," New Scientist
. Vol.132, No. 1789, October 5, 1991, page
16; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
,
page
54.
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Only since the late 1980s has the World Bank financed
more programs which give sustainability concerns higher pri-
ority. in fiscal year 1990, 11 free standing loans or cred-
its were approved - compared to only two in 1989 - which
added environmental and social concerns to economic ones.
Furthermore, in 1990 about 50 percent of Bank loans and
credits during the year combined socioeconomic with environ-
mental components, for example forestry projects, soil con-
servation, and wildlife management. According to the World
Bank, nearly 30 percent of all projects approved in 1992
even had significant environmental impact. 150
Another important development is the introduction of
the EAOD, which incorporates the Bank's environmental con-
siderations into its lending activities. 151 in addition, ef-
forts are taken to change the current UN system of National
Accounts to include environmental aspects in income esti-
mates. According to Professor Peter M. Haas,
Such efforts may have real consequences for
Bank practices: when resource depletion is ac-
counted for Indonesia's annual growth rate falls
from 7,1% to 4%. 152
150. P. Haas, From Theory to Practice
. 1992, page 40; Porter
and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
,
pages 54, 55; The
World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
. 1990, page
6; The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
. 1992,
pages 20-24.
151. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
.
1990, page 7.
152. P. Haas, From Theory to Practice
. 1992, page 40.
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Moreover, the GEF which is managed by the World Bank in
cooperation with UNEP and UNDP, will provide funding for
sustainability programs. The GEF is a pilot scheme to help
developing countries to contribute to the solution of global
sustainability problems. GEF funds totaled $ 1.3 billion in
mid-1991. Governments in the developing countries are the
primary agents for identifying and selecting projects, as-
sisted by GEF agencies, NGOs, and the private sector. During
1992, six GEF investment projects totaling $80 million were
approved. In addition, the GEF was considering more than 70
projects totaling more than $580 million. 153
Another new resource transfer for sustainability im-
provement in developing countries are the debt-for-nature
swaps. Their objective is to reduce Third World debt burden
in exchange for certain activities which promote sustainable
development in these countries. The World Bank facilitates
this process, though it is not participating directly in
such transactions. Debt-for-nature funding from donor gov-
ernments, commercial banks, and NGOs have generated more
than $60 million for conservation so far. Between 1987-1990,
10 debt-for-nature transactions were arranged, valuing $84
millions
.
154
153. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment ,
1990, pages 8, 78, 79; The World Bank, The World Bank and
the Environment . 1991, pages 101-103, 107; The World Bank,
The World Bank and the Environment . 1992, pages 5, 6.
154. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment ,
1990, pages 8, 78, 79; The World Bank, The World Bank and
the Environment . 1991, pages 101-103, 107; The World Bank,
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Moreover, the Bank's Operations Evaluation Department
(OED) currently is studying the human experience of involun-
tary resettlement resulting from Bank-supported energy and
agricultural projects. This project study will review the
sociological, environmental, legal, and economic issues of
resettlement from the perspective of the settlers them-
selves . 155
In addition, the organization increasingly acknowledges
prominent environmental organizations, leading NGOs, and
committees - for example, the Committee of International De-
velopment Institutions on the Environment. It participates
in regular meetings of bodies such as UNEP, environmental
expert meetings, and environmentally related events - such
as the international conference "UNCED." In order to facili-
tate the flow of information and to increase contacts with
NGOs, the World Bank uses the EAOD and GEF. 156
Unfortunately, these positive changes are mainly lim-
ited to the Environmental Department. At the same time, en-
vironmentally damaging projects in other World Bank units
continue to exist. The Bank recently gave loans to energy
and mining sectors in Brazil and to enormous dam-building
projects in India which both caused significant environmen-
155. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment .
1990, pages 3, 9, 81-83; The World Bank, The World Bank and
the Environment . 1991, pages 53, 64, 72.
156. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment ,
1990, pages 3, 9, 81-83; The World Bank, The World Bank and
the Environment , 1991, pages 53, 64, 72.
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tal damage. Loans for such destructive programs and projects
often much higher than loans for environmentally sound
ones. In addition, despite massive criticism, the structural
adjustment loans so far have nor become more sustainable. 157
The World Bank itself admits that it still has problems
with its environmental policy:
In cases staff have had to grapple with
S
Posed by the existence of significanttradeoffs between environmental and short-term
economic objectives.
In addition, due to international recession the global
financial situation is so unstable that World Bank lending
respect to the promotion of sustainable development are
declining. 159
One of the Bank's most criticized recent programs has
been the construction of large dams in India. One of the
world's biggest dam projects is the Sardar Sarovar Project
on the Narmada River in India, approved by the Bank in 1985.
The original plan was to provide drinking water for 40 mil-
lion people in drought-prone areas of northwest India, irri-
gation for nearly 2 million hectares of land, and 1450
157. Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
,
pages
54, 55; interview conducted on March 9th in Washington, D.C.
with Ms. Perumalpellai-Essex, employee at the World Bank's
Environmental Department.
158. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
.
1990, page 6.
159. Bruce Stokes, "World Bank faces a new world, too," Na-
tional Journal
. Vol.24, No. 17, April 25, 1992, page 1000;
Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
,
page 55.
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megawatts of hydroelectric power. An additional aim was to
bring employment opportunity to one of the poorest and most
drought-prone regions of western India. The total cost is
estimated at $11.4 billion. The Bank has so far contributed
$327 million of the $1.4 billion spent to date. The program
was assigned and approved by the local and national govern-
ments in India and the state company Sardar Sarovar Narmada
Nigam Ltd. 160
The Sardar Sarovar Dam is the first of 30 large dam
projects planned in the valley. After its completion in
1994, the project is expected to irrigate 1,875,000 hectares
and generate up to 1450 megawatts of electricity . ^^1 Accord-
ing to Morse and Berger,
The Sardar Sarovar dam, under construction on
the Narmada River, at Navagam and Kevadia, will
impound water to a full reservoir level of 455
feet. It will submerge 37,000 hectares of land in
three states: Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Madhya
Pradesh. The Sardar Sarovar dam, along with
planned developments farther upstream, is designed
to divert 9.5 million acre feet of water from the
Narmada River into a canal and irrigation system.
The canal itself is the biggest in the world in
terms of its capacity, and will extend 450 kilome-
ters to the border with Rajasthan. [...] In addi-
tion to the 100,000 people living in the villages
in the submergence area, there are likely to be
140,000 farmers who will be affected by the canal
and irrigation system. Finally, there are the peo-
160. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
.
1992, page 106; Susan K. Miller, "World Bank admits mistakes
over dam," New Scientist
. Vol.134, No. 1827, June 27, page
4.
161. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
,
1992, page 106; Susan K. Miller, "World Bank admits mistakes
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pie living downstream
thousands more, whose
affected. 162
,
below the dam, numbering
lives will be significantly
In 1985, the Bank entered into credit and loan agree-
ment with the government of India and the affected local
governments. The agreement entitles "project-affected" per-
sons to be resettled under conditions which at least equal
their previous ones. In the same year, the Bank offered
credits and loans in the amount of $350 million to India and
its affected states in order to enable them to construct the
dam and the canal. Meanwhile, applications have been made
for additional $440 million for the dam and an associated
project. 163
3 . 4 The World Bank's Values and Strategies
- One ideology is dominant:
As illustrated above, the World Bank for a long time
has strongly believed that the ideology of maximized eco-
nomic growth will also solve the ecological problems in the
developing countries. Most of its economists have argued
that free market mechanisms or individual property rights
will in the long run enable a country's prospering economy
162. Bradford Morse and Thomas R. Berger, Sardar Sarovar:
The Report of the Independent Review (Ottawa, Canada: Re-
source Futures International (RFI)
,
1992), page XII.
163. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar
.
pages XII, XIII.
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to take care of most social and environmental problems. 164
If the World Bank had any definition of "sustainable devel-
opment" in the first decades, it seems to have been to sus-
tain and develop its own political and financial power by
giving money only to projects which promised profits for the
World Bank and its donors. Only in the late 1980s the Bank
to think about the integration of appropriate social
and environmental concerns in its economic planning.
- Ideology of economic liberalism prevails:
From the beginning, the Bank had few generalized or
professional managers. All key positions in the Bank were
held by economists favoring either classical or managed lib-
eralism: 165 President Robert McNamara was former head of the
Ford Motor Company and U. S. Secretary of Defense in the
1960s, and A. W. Clausen was the former head of the Bank of
America. Current President Lewis T. Preston was former
chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the New York City
investment bank of J. P. Morgan & Co. Thus the ideology of
164. Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Chal-
lenge
.
pages 61, 63. According to Le Prestre, opponents of
this theory argue that individuals do not always know what
is in their best interest, and that the individual's prefer-
ences do not necessarily reflect the interest of the envi-
ronment. Thus economists and ecologists often had - and
still have - very different points of views, the former more
short-term and the latter more long-term oriented.
165. Further information on classical and managed liberalism
in E. Haas, When Knowledge is Power , pages 66, 143.
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the organization tended to be dominated by economic val-
ues. 166
- Values of stability and predictability:
The World Bank from the beginning placed high value on
stability and predictability. As a consequence, the Bank is
known for its institutional rigidities and its hostility to-
ward new ideas and reforms.
- Problems are coped with by shifts in strategies, not
in underlying values:
Traditionally, the World Bank supposed that natural re-
sources would guarantee a steady stream of future income. As
explained in chapter 3.1, it preferred macroeconomic models
in such development sectors as infrastructure and mining,
while ignoring the consequences of social factors and envi-
ronmental deterioration. Later, McNamara's shifts toward so-
cioeconomic strategies tried to cope with the social prob-
lems. However, as long as the shifts in strategies lacked
the environmental perspective, they could only be successful
to a limited extent.
Only in the Bank's recent policy more fundamental val-
ues have begun to change. Today, the organization acknowl-
166. Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Chal-
lenge
.
pages 60, 61, 69; Pearce, "Japan's billions may by-
pass World Bank," page 4; Stokes, "World Bank faces a new
world, too," page 1000.
167. Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Chal-
lenge
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pages 60, 61, 69; Pearce, "Japan's billions may by-
pass World Bank," page 4; Stokes, "World Bank faces a new
world, too," page 1000.
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edges that the promotion of development and the protection
of the environment are complementary aspects of the same
agenda. 168
The Bank lists four objectives with respect to its en-
vironmental strategies:
- To assist member countries in setting pri-
orities, building institutions, and implementingprograms for sound environmental stewardship
— To ensure that potential adverse environ-
mental impacts from Bank-financed projects are ad-dressed
- To assist member countries in building on
the complementarities between poverty reduction
and environmental protection
- To address global environmental challenges
through participation in the Global Environment
Facility (GEF) lbbf
The Bank now claims to prevent the destruction of natu-
ral habitats, land degradation, degradation and depletion of
fresh water resources, urban, industrial, and agricultural
pollution, and degradation of the "global commons." Recog-
nizing that environmental destruction is an increasing
threat to economic development, the World Bank aims at less
resource-intensive development strategies in the Third
World. New strategies are, for example, the pricing of en-
ergy at its true economic cost. The Bank has also developed
168. Adams, "The World Bank and the IMF in Sub- Saharan
Africa," page 100; Ayres, Banking on the Poor
,
page 10;
Leslie, The World Bank and Structural Transformation in De-
veloping Countries
,
page 3; The World Bank, The World Bank
and the Environment
. 1992, page 4.
169. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment ,
page 1
.
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various long-term perspective studies, integrating land
degradation and integrating environmental issues into the
analysis of economic and social conditions. However, this is
just a beginning. Many of the World Bank's promised shifts
in underlying values so far have not been realized, or they
constitute only a small part of the Bank's programs and pro-
jects. 170
Mission of "adaptation" at the point of the organiza-
tion's founding:
The superficial shifts in the first decades suggest
that the implicit mission of "adaptation" was dominant at
the point of organization's founding. Only in the late
1980s, deeper structural changes toward the promotion of
sustainable development prove the Bank's increased capabil-
ity of "learning."
3 . 5 Influence of NGOs on the World Bank
- NGOs are limited to certain advice:
In the first decades of its existence, the Bank did not
pay much attention to NGO participation in its projects.
Since 1982, however, there has been a policy dialogue be-
tween the Bank and NGOs through the NGO-Bank Committee which
is composed of senior Bank managers and 26 NGO leaders,
170. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment ,
1990, page 2; The World Bank, The World Bank and the Envi-
ronment
. 1992, page 1.
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about three-fifth of the latter from developing coun-
tries. 171 As a result, NGOs increasingly succeed in making
Bank-generated information accessible for the public, and
promoting popular participation in sustainability decisions.
Between 1986 and 1991, NGOs
'
participation in the annual 200
projects increased from 10 to 80 projects. 172
Meanwhile, the Bank has begun to collaborate with lead-
ing environmental NGOs in a variety of environmental activi-
ties, for example together they have published the book
"Conserving the World's Biological Biodiversity." in addi-
tion, a growing number of NGOs attend the annual meetings of
the Bank. 173
NGOs have provided the GEF fund with scientific and
technical knowledge to identify, review, and prepare envi-
ronmentally sound projects. The fund implementing agencies
171. This dialogue may also be due to the oil crises in the
mid-70s, when the Bank started to aim at substantial flexi-
bility with respect to changes in the economic environment.
As a consequence, there was growing dialogue and cooperation
between developing countries and the Bank; Husain, "The
World Bank and Economic Policy in Developing Countries,"
page 52.
172. Paul Handley and Anthony Rowley, "Pressure Politics,"
Far Eastern Economic Review
.
Vol.154, No. 47, November 21,
1991, page 67; Williams, "A growing role for NGOs in Devel-
opment," pages 31, 33; P. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean ,
page 16; D. Joseph Wood, "The World Bank of Tomorrow: Poli-
cies and Operations," Recovering in the Developing World .
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, First Annual Report,
1986), page 101; P. Haas, Levy, and Parson, "Appraising the
earth summit," page 31; Adams, "The World Bank and the IMF
in Sub-Saharan Africa," page 105.
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must hold a special NGO forum before each biannual meeting.
Finally, Mohamed El-Ashry, a former NGO lobbyist, directs
this department since July 1991. His new policy makes public
disclosure of project information a requirement for granting
Bank funds. 174
Due to the fact that the World Bank is still a rela-
tively closed organization, the author of this thesis had to
obtain most information on Bank politics relating to sus-
tainable development and NGO involvement from the World Bank
itself. One can assume that the organization would never
publish the information that NGOs are not sufficiently in-
volved in World Bank's planning and decision-making: Thus it
is difficult to judge if NGO participation is currently more
than marginal. One rather critical perspective on the Bank's
attitude toward NGOs is presented by Professor Safei Hamed,
who occasionally counsels the World Bank as an Environmental
Planning Specialist. His association with the institution
began in the mid-eighties, and since then he has been in-
vited to attend some of their forums, conferences, and work
174. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment .
1991, pages 104, 105; The World Bank, The World Bank and the
Environment
. 1990, page 3; Handley and Rowley, "Pressure
Politics," page 67; Williams, "A growing role for NGOs in
Development," pages 31, 33; P. Haas, Saving the Mediter-
ranean
.
page 16; Wood, "The World Bank of Tomorrow: Policies
and Operations," page 101.
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shops. He has never heard about NGO involvement in projects
until 1992:
In fact I remember one occasion when I was
asked to consult for the Bank and prepare a studyto basically establish a regional environmental
agency for one of the Third-World-Countries that
when I suggested as part of my recommendation thatthe governor of the Province will have an advisoryboard from the University Community and also from
the NGOs, I remember that the Project Director re-
fused that recommendation - he accepted the Uni-
versity Advisers to the governor and the new envi-
ronmental agency, but not the NGOs. 175
- NGOs are not included in areas where sustainability
concerns are not first priority:
Structural adjustment loans are still excluded from the
Bank's environmental assessments - neither by NGOs not by
someone else - though some of them have explicit environmen-
tal objectives. This is important insofar as these loans
have always been a major issue of criticism with respect to
their failure to promote sustainability. 176
- NGOs have no access to important meetings and infor-
mations; NGOs do not participate in important decisions:
Considering the fact that the World Bank is still con-
trolled by those who contribute most, it is not astonishing
that NGO participation even today is restricted in many ar-
175. Interview with Hamed.
176. P. Haas, From Theory to Practice . 1992, page 40; Porter
and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
,
pages 54, 55; The
World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment . 1990, page
6; The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment . 1992,
pages 20-24.
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eas, for example NGOs do not attend World Bank Board of Gov-
ernors meetings. Though NGOs attend the first day of GEF
committee meetings, afterwards the session is closed, and
merely the final drafts are public. As a matter of fact, the
major Bank donors and recipients still refuse a profound
ecological rethinking, which would disrupt the flow of de-
velopment finance. 177
As a conseguence of such restrictions, the major NGOs
involved in World Bank's programs and projects work as
watchdogs, exchanging and publicizing information about
World Bank activities. Additionally, NGOs can react to the
Bank's closure by extending their indirect influence on the
World Bank through UNEP or through governments participating
in the World Bank. Third World Countries lacking resources
remain open to NGOs and depend on their assistance heav-
ily
.
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- NGOs tend to confront the organization and its pro-
grams:
Though the frequency of NGO participation in project
analyzing and planning has increased, the main impact of
NGOs on the World Bank has been their criticism and even
open confrontation of some of the Bank's development pro-
jects on the environment. For example NGOs criticize the or-
177. P. Haas, From Theory to Practice . 1992, pages 42, 43;
interview with Walubengo.
178. Haas, From Theory to Practice . 1992, pages 42, 43; in-
terview with Walubengo.
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ganization's support of large development projects, cash
cropping, and chemical-based agricultural development. As a
consequence of such criticism, the focus of the Bank has
started to switch toward poverty and environmental impact
studies of Bank-supported economic policies. Primarily due
to the pressure of NGOs, the World Bank's Environmental De-
partment since 1987 has been responsible for extensive envi-
ronmental assessments of development proj ects . ^
^
According to the results of chapters 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5,
the author concludes that the World Bank has a relatively
closed structure, with exception of its Environmental De-
partment . Since the late 1980s, some deeper structural
changes have taken place, which indicate that the Bank has
begun a very slow opening process right now.
3 . 6 Successes and Failures of the World Bank's Programs
The World Bank's structural-adjustment programs, which
primarily focus on economic growth, have until recently
taken little account of social and environmental conse-
quences. The unlimited economic growth as facilitated by the
World Bank programs was not only accompanied by mass pauper-
ization, but also by short-term ecological exploitation, at
179. Handley and Rowley, "Pressure Politics," page 67;
Aubrey Williams, "A growing role for NGOs in Development,"
pages 31, 33; P. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean , page 16;
Wood, "The World Bank of Tomorrow: Policies and Operations,"
page 101.
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the expense of long-term environmental protection and sus-
tainable economic growth. This pattern of growth included
the depreciation of present and future natural resources.
Currently, the Bank's pressure on developing countries to
reduce their budgetary deficits forces them to draw down
their ecological capital even faster then they would other-
wise. Developing countries even have to use structural ad-
justment loans in order to pay for imports they needed. That
way the structural adjustment money finally returns to the
World Bank instead of solving the long-term ecological and
socioeconomic problems. 180
The Sardar Sarovar Dam Project shows very well how the
lack of sustainable development considerations in the Bank's
policy harms people and the environment. Simultaneously, it
reflects some recent changes in World Bank strategies toward
more environmentally sound strategies, which in the future
may contribute to more success of World Bank projects. 181
The resettlement policies and programs, rehabilitation
activities, and the environmental aspects of the Dam Pro-
180. Scientific American Magazine, Managing Planet Earth .
(New York, New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1990)
,
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jects, all of which are closely interconnected, roused con-
cern during the 1980s. As a consequence, the World Bank it-
self has provided an independent and unsparing review of its
projects for the first time. The Independent Review on the
Sardar Sarovar Dam Projects in India has been carried out in
1991-1992 by Bradford Morse, administrator of the UNDP, and
Thomas R. Berger, a Canadian lawyer concerned with environ-
mental and human rights issues. The Bank's effort in estab-
lishing the review, providing the authors with all necessary
documents, and engaging in the frankest discussions with
them, might be an indicator of the organization's determina-
tion to understand its previous mistakes. The review inves-
tigates the social and environmental impacts of the projects
and identifies weaknesses in planning and implementation. 182
The Independent Review has identified weaknesses in the
Bank's appraisal of the projects, in the borrower's imple-
mentation, and in the Bank's supervisions. The performance
of the projects has clearly failed to fulfill the demanded
policies and guidelines of the World Bank and the government
of India. 183
182. Miller, "World Bank admits mistakes over dam," page 4;
G. K. Helleiner
,
"The IMF, the World Bank and Africa's
adjustment and external debt problems: an unofficial view,"
page 780; Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar . pages XI, XIV,
360-362; The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment ,
1992, pages 4, 106.
183. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar . pages 349-353; The
World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment . 1992, pages
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First of all
,
they did not study the appropriate social
impacts of the projects and did not provide the necessary
basic data. Thus, the social impacts of the projects could
not be appropriately considered. In addition, the Bank's en-
vironmental workplan, required under the 1985 credit and
loan agreements, to be developed by the end of 1985, and
later postponed until 1989, is still not available. These
failures have led to a disjointed piecemeal approach to en-
vironmental planning which is ineffective. For example, no
comprehensive environmental assessment has been made of the
canal and water delivery system in the command area, which
could lead to serious problems with waterlogging and salin-
ity. There is evidence that sediment will collect at the
head of the dam, causing dangerous flooding. 184
This lack of appropriate planning led to an inadequate
understanding of the nature and scale of resettlement. As a
result of the dam project, 18,000 tribal people had to leave
their homes. The people potentially to be affected were not
consulted. 185 This lack of participation seems to be a gen-
eral World Bank problem. According to Patricia Adams,
Participation in decision making is by invi-
tation only, and the public is barred from learn-
ing about Bank designs on their local environment
and Bank policies for their country's economy. Ul-
184. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar, pages 349-353; The
World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment . 1992, pages
104-106.
185. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar . pages 349-351;
Miller, "World Bank admits mistakes over dam," page 4.
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it of all those affected by World
a hearing, to sue and to protect
and their economy remains non-
Even supposed World Bank "experts" often have little
knowledge about the daily lives of their constituencies, and
lack sufficient analysis of the full impact of World Bank
projects. This lack of consultation resulted in opposition
to the project and created great obstacles to successful im-
plementation of the resettlement. 187 The Bank and the Gov-
ernment of India failed to follow their own principles and
policies set out between 1980 and 1985, namely that oustees
should improve or at least regain their former standard of
living. Now, many farmers are rendered marginal or landless.
The mass migration in other areas increased the likelihood
that they will participate in environmental exploitation. 188
These are just the basic failures, and more could be
added. The authors of the review conclude that given the
negative experience in virtually each previous project with
a large resettlement component, the Bank should have adopted
a more realistic estimate of how many people have to be and
can be resettled. 189
186. Adams, "The World Bank and the IMF in Sub-Saharan
Africa," page 105.
187.
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timately, the rigl
Bank projects to
their environment
existent. 186
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Instead, the World Bank developed so-called "pari
passu" ("concurrently with construction") studies in order
to overcome these deficiencies. These studies undermine the
basis for environmental planning, because they mean that ap-
propriate environmental impact studies are not done prior to
the approval of the projects, but concurrently with con-
struction. This greatly undermines the prospects for sus-
tainable development.^®®
So far, the only positive result of the project seems
to be that where the canal has already provided water, agri-
culture has greatly developed. However, the people profiting
from this seldom are local landless families - as was
promised - but land speculators, influential politicians,
and wealthy farmers. Thus, the dam projects increase the gap
between rich and poor, (for the rich mainly profit from its
benefits, while the poor have to bear the losses) . This out-
come clearly does not correspond to the definition of
"sustainable development" as given in the first chapter of
this thesis. In addition, the dam involves an expenditure of
over Rs. 800 million to produce an initial firm power gener-
ator of 226 MW which will be reduced to 100 MW when irriga-
tion commences fully. Compared with about Rs. 150 million
for a 100 MW thermal power station, the dam is an unjustifi-
ably costly way to produce power. The irrigation which will
result from this power generation is not justifiable either:
190. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar
.
pages XXI, 132, 134.
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The project will irrigate 123,000 ha of land by submerging
90,000, thus the expected increase in yields (400-800 per-
cent) are not realistic. Furthermore, over 138,000 people
will be displaced, over 41,000 ha of forests and 50,000 ha
of other land will be submerged, and significant wildlife,
resources
,
and sites of cultural importance will be
lost. Though the project authorities intend to compensate
for these losses, by means including afforestation, new pro-
tected areas for wildlife, and resettlement of the oustees,
however, even official sources admit that most of these com-
pensatory measures are insufficient. 191
Thus the Sardar Sarovar Dam Projects show a clear pref-
erence for economic and financial considerations at the ex-
pense of long-term social and ecological destruction. On the
whole, the overall costs clearly outweigh the overall bene-
fits with respect to the promotion of sustainable develop-
ment as defined in chapter one. At the same time, the newly
emerged self-criticism of the Bank certainly is a resultant
"success" of the project despite its failure in other as-
pects. World Bank President Lewis Preston himself has admit-
191. Edward Goldsmith, Nicholas Hildyard, and Denys Trussell
(Editors)
,
The Social and Environmental Effects of Large
Dams
.
(Wadebridge, England: Wadebridge Ecological Centre)
,
pages 199, 201; further information in Environmental Ser-
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,
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Environmental Services Group (WWF-India)
,
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mada: A Peopled View (New Delhi, India: Environmental Ser-
vices Group, 1986) ; Uwe Hoennig, Tapping Indian Water Re-
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Millions (D+C, 5, 1986)
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ted that the project failed to correspond to World Bank
policies and guidelines. He promised to react with special
remedial actions. Thus, the positive consequence of the dam
constructions seems to be its certain learning affect on the
World Bank and Indian government with respect to sustainable
development. After the very negative report of the impact
assessment of the dam, the Bank decided to review its per-
formance on larger dams. It decided to go ahead with sleight
changes, however, and it included future recommendations
that include the environmental aspects of dams and dam
ssfsty. The publication stresses the need for improved meth-
ods of financial evaluation with respect to environmental
and social costs of dam projects in monetary terms. Increas-
ing attention is paid to improved resettlement procedures.
The Bank has appointed resettlement specialists in most of
its regional environmental divisions. The report also under-
lines the importance of an effective national and local en-
vironmental institutions. In 1991, the Bank for the first
time approved a $153 million loan and credit to the Dam
Safety Project in India, aimed at strengthening the institu-
tion. The project will also facilitate the use of improved
reassessment procedures for flood-handling capabilities of
about 940 large dams in four Indian states, including the
funding of remedial efforts if necessary. Finally, the Bank
review "Dams and the Environment" draws the conclusion that
analysis early in the planning process often leads to pro-
105
tective measures which in turn result in net economic bene-
fits . 192
However, the authors of the Independent Review believe
that the Bank's incremental strategy to obtain resettlement
compliance further undermines the success of the projects.
Instead, Morse and Berger recommend that the Bank uses its
good offices to ensure the appropriate resettlement benefits
to the affected people. They criticize that the Bank contin-
ues to focus on the reduction of environmental damage al-
ready done rather than avoidance of environmental destruc-
tion. However, so far it seems that some powerful people
profit too much from such projects: For politicians, they
bring votes and international kudos, and for local contrac-
tors and foreign engineers, they mean money. 193
Finally, an important change occurred in the World
Bank: Due to the Indian government's refusal to accept any
more loans for the projects, the Bank definitively cancelled
192. Miller, "World Bank admits mistakes over dam," page 4;
Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar
.
pages XI, XII; The World
Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
. 1990, pages 3, 31;
The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment . 1991,
page 43; The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
.
1992, page 4; interview conducted on January 16th in New
York with Nadia Saad, former employee in the World Bank's
Environmental Department.
193. Goldsmith, Hildyard, and Trussell (Editors), The Social
and Environmental Effects of Large Dams
,
page 199; Morse and
Berger, Sardar Sarovar
,
pages 349-351; P. Haas, From Theory
to Practice . 1992, page 42; further information in Bharat
Dogra, "The Indian Experience with Large Dams," in Edward
Goldsmith and Nicholas Hildyard (Editors)
,
The Social and
Environmental Effects of Large Dams: Case Studies .
(Wadebridge, England: Wadebridge Ecological Centre, 1986,
Vol.2) .
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its participation in 1993. Additional positive consequences
of the Sardar Sarovar Dam Projects are that the Bank has re-
cently started to move toward more environmentally sound
policies in other fields. For example, it suspended loans to
a colonization and road-building program in the Amazon rain
forest until the Brazilian government sets aside land for
reserves for indigenous people and wildlife. The Bank has
advocated leaving primary forests alone in deforestation
projects. Instead, it encourages borrowing governments to
cultivate crops with proper soil management. Other positive
developments in Bank projects include numerous agricultural
research stations around the world which focuses upon soil
and water management in fragile ecosystems. Thus, the World
Bank has focused more and more on environmental problems in
recent years, and increasingly supports sustainable develop-
ment projects in the Third World. Insofar, some true
"learning" toward more sustainable development has taken
place. 194
194. Marites Danguilan-Vitug, "People versus forests," Far
Eastern Economic Review . Vol.155, No. 36, September 10, 1992,
page 55; Vig and Kraft, Environmental Policy in the 1990s ,
page 297; Wood, "The World Bank of Tomorrow: Policies and
Operations," page 102; Porter and Brown, Global Environmen-
tal Politics
,
page 54.
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3•
7 Successes and Failures of NGQs 1 Influence on the World
Bank's Programs
In the 1970s, NGOs began to criticize World Bank policy
of large development projects instead of those directly ben-
efiting the poor. This criticism contributed to the World
Bank's shift in focus toward improving income contribution,
promoting rural development, and addressing basic human
needs such as health, education, and family planning, all of
which are essential part of sustainable development. Since
the late 1980s, NGOs have increased their impact on the Bank
with their criticism of specific projects and general World
Bank policies and practices, for example serious effects of
programs on the environment or the negative conseguence of
programs, such as displaced communities and poor resettle-
ment performance. Due to such criticism, the World Bank and
other multilateral development banks ( MDBs ) have agreed to
adopt environmental assessment procedures as part of their
project cycles to support sustainable development pro-
195jects
.
The Sardar Sarovar dam project exemplifies well the in-
fluence of NGOs on World Bank programs. India has a long
history of NGO participation, which is based on the Indian
195. Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
,
page
54; Livernash, "The growing influence of NGOs in the devel-
oping world," page 15; Williams, "A growing role for NGOs in
Development," page 33; P. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean ,
page 16.
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tradition of community and spiritual leadership, resulting
from the success of Mahatma Ghandi. Given the lack of state
welfare, Indian NGOs have worked at many levels of society,
from social services to local economic development . «« NGOs
try to fight poverty and environmental depletion directly,
aiming at the development of necessary mechanisms and bu-
reaucratic procedures which achieve accountability and re-
coverability of production loans, m addition, sustainable
small farmer organizations in the Third World receive tech-
nical, financial, and educational assistance from national
and international NGOs. 197
Due to these functions, NGOs play an important role in
projects such as the Sardar Sarovar Dam Project. They influ-
ence the dam project by provoking public awareness in the
form of articles, books, interviews, for example, which were
extremely critical. From the beginning, local NGOs stood in
opposition to the project, criticizing its negative socioe-
conomic and ecological impact on the region. In 1988, the
Indian NGO "Narmada Bachao Andolan" began to mobilize the
affected population in order to oppose the dam project. This
attracted the attention of other national and international
196. Accordingly, the Indian NGOs consist of a broad area of
professionals, for example agronomists, civil engineers,
economists, sociologists, lawyers.
197. David Barton Bray, "'Defiance' and the search for sus-
tainable small farmer organizations," Human Organization .
Vol . 50
,
No. 2, Summer 1991, pages 126, 129, 130; Morse and
Berger, Sardar Sarovar
.
page 131; Sattaur, "Greens in muddy
water over Indian dam," page 17.
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NGOs, who published articles and monographs on the dams'
negative environmental and social impacts. 198
The tireless efforts of NGOs have also contributed to a
quicker resettlement policy. According to Morse and Berger,
as a consequence of NGO pressure the rate of resettlement
has quickened: Due to collaboration between Nigan officials
and local NGOs such as Arch Vahini and the Anand Niketan
Ashram, the identification of land, its purchase and selec-
tion by oustees, and many other aspects of the relocation
process increased in rate and effectiveness. The NGOs used
their longstanding connections with the affected villages to
encourage acceptance of government policy and to begin the
process of land selection. Moreover, the NGOs were con-
stantly updating oustee lists, in order to ensure that all
the people who qualified for the benefit package actually
became officially eligible. They also designed housing sites
and accommodations and ensured that the resettlement process
was done quickly, accurately, and without corruption. Ac-
cording to the research done by Morse and Berger, without
198. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar
.
pages 129, 131; Sat-
taur, "Greens in muddy water over Indian dam," page 17; in-
terview with Saad; further reading in Ashish Kothari and
Shekhar Singh, The Narmada Valiev Project, A Critique
(Delhi, India: Kalpavriksh, 1988) ; Baba Amte, Cry . The
Beloved Narmada (Chandrapur, Maharashtra: Maharogi Sewa
Samiti, 1989); Vijay Paranjpye, "High Dams on the Narmada,"
Studies in Ecology and Sustainable Development (New Delhi:
Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage, 1990,
No. 3); Pravin Sheth, Sardar Sarovar Project: Dynamics of De-
velopment (Ahmedabad, Gujarat: Vikas Bharati, 1991)
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process would
this support of the NGOs, the resettlement
have had disastrous social and ecological consequences. 1”
For example. Anil Patel's "Save the Narmada movement"
initiated to work on resettlement and rehabilitation (RiR)
policy, and was later joined by other NGOs. This movement
believes that it is the responsibility of NGOs to ensure
that the dam builders keep their promises and that the poor
and not the wealthy farmers get the benefits. As a result of
their long battle with the World Bank and the Indian Govern-
ment, the Gujarat state government has implemented a unique
R&R policy. 200 According to Omar Sattaur,
Today, all heads of households in Gujarat who
are to be displaced by the SSP, are entitled to 2hectares of land of their choice, as are their
sons. The government bears the costs of moving
and subsistence until the first harvest. Landless
labourers forced to move out of the zone to be
submerged and people squatting on government land
are offered the same compensation. ^1
Finally, the dam builders were so impressed that they
want to use the R&R policy as a future model for national
guidelines. This is an important move, if one considers the
fact that development projects in India are estimated to
199. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar
.
pages 129, 130.
200. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar
.
pages 129, 130.
201. Goldsmith, Hildyard, and Trussell (Editors), The Social
and Environmental Effects of Large Dams
,
page 199; Sattaur,
"Greens in muddy water over Indian dam," page 17; further
information in Uwe Hoennig, Tapping Indian Water Resources
~ Two Controversial Projects will bring Change to Millions
.
(D+C, 5, 1986)
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displace 2 million people every year. Thus NGOs can increas-
ingly influence World Bank policy toward ecologically and
socially responsible development with their criticism and
with their pragmatic offers of solutions. Their strategies
have to be indirect, however: For example, NGOs succeeded in
pressuring the Indian Government which in turn refused to
take any more loans from the World Bank with respect to the
Sardar Sarovar Dam Projects. As a consequence, the Bank
definitively cancelled its participation in the Sardar
Sarovar Dam Projects in 1993 . 20 ^
The increasing participation of NGOs in Bank projects
not only diminished the failures produced, it also encour-
aged the Bank to include NGOs to an even stronger degree in
future projects with environmental impact. For example, in
1992, NGOs were involved in 66 of 222 projects approved by
the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. 76 percent of these
NGOs were either indigenous intermediary NGOs or grassroots
groups based in borrowing countries. 203
Nevertheless, NGOs also face difficulties in implement-
ing their local programs in the Third World. For example,
their activities are often rejected by developing countries,
because the latter fear the activists might indoctrinate
them with Western ideals. Moreover, NGOs face the danger of
202. Sattaur, "Greens in muddy water over Indian dam," page
17; interview with Ms. Perumalpellai-Essex
.
203. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
.
1992, pages 106, 107, 123; The World Bank, The World Bank
and the Environment
. 1990, page 7.
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nepotism, mistrust from their clientele, and loss of demo-
cratic structure due to increasing bureaucratization
- a
problem most growing organizations have. In addition, though
NGOs can be effective at the level of community mobilization
and policy design, their limited resources do not allow them
to achieve all this for thousands of families spread across
several hundred villages, or for the protection of the en-
tire ecosystem affected. Thus, it remains a major challenge
to ensure the long-term rehabilitation of people, and the
implementation of environmentally sound policy in the World
Bank's programs and projects. 204
204. Bray, "'Defiance' and the search for sustainable small
farmer organizations," pages 131, 133, 134; Handley and Row-
ley, "Pressure Politics," page 66; Morse and Berger, Sardar
Sarovar, pages 129-131.
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CHAPTER 4
COMPARISON OF UNEP AND THE WORLD BANK
4 • 1 Difference in Outputs
When one compares the outcomes of the projects of UNEP
and the World Bank, it becomes clear that they have differ-
ent strengths and weaknesses. The World Bank so far has had
the financial resources and political power to implement its
programs, but neither the environmental knowledge nor the
will to promote the environmental sustainability of its pro-
jects adequately. On the other hand, UNEP's main contribu-
tion is the thorough research and planning of programs and
projects in favor of sustainable development, but it often
lacks sufficient resources to implement them adequately. Al-
though UNEP is a major global environmental agency, it never
had the power to force the implementation of the interna-
tional environmental agreements it has planned or promoted.
Many governments are suspicious of any international agency
that would impose limits on their industrial activity, espe-
cially in hard economic times. UNEP thus depends on volun-
tary cooperation. Accordingly, most of its statements lack
the binding status of treaties, which can make their imple-
mentation difficult. In short, the World Bank tends to fail
in sustainable development at the planning level, and UNEP
tends to fail in sustainable development at the implementa-
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tion level. The World Bank's strength is its economic power,
while UNEP's strength is its informative power. 205
On the whole, though the successes of both institutions
to facilitate environmentally sound development have been
limited, UNEP is more successful than the World Bank: its
openness allows for more influence by environmentally sound
values and strategies of NGOs which promote sustainable de-
velopment - at least in the limited amount of cases when the
implementation is successful. On the contrary, most of the
World Bank's programs in the past - though implemented -
have inhibited rather than promoted sustainable development,
as the case study on Sardar Sarovar has shown. Many of the
organization's programs and projects have even proved to be
counterproductive: They not only inhibited but actively de-
stroyed the environment, human well-being, and long-term
economic development alike. This results from the World
Bank's closed structure and focus on economic profits, which
has begun to open only recently. According to Beth and
Robert Yarbrough,
Thus in the United Nations and the UNEP,
which were already predisposed towards Third World
norms, the Third World has had some success in al-
tering international norms on aid, public goods,
and the global commons; conversely, in the World
Bank and the IMF, where market-oriented principles
205. Vig and Kraft, Environmental Policy in the 1990s
.
page
316; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
,
pages
51, 52; Bennett, International Organizations
,
page 297;
Pearce, "Japan's billions may bypass World Bank," page 545.
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dominated and where Third World leverage was lessimportant, success has been much more limited.
However, this thesis has shown that the World Bank is
able to open its structure and to change its policy, if the
organization wants to promote sustainable development more
seriously in the future, it has to learn from its past mis-
takes: The local population should play a central role in
World Bank's program and project planning, because local
knowledge and vulnerabilities are integral to any under-
standing of the overall conditions. The Sardar Sarovar Pro-
jects have shown that even resolute determination to com-
plete projects quickly in order to accomplish the antici-
pated goal will fail to promote sustainable development. In-
stead, construction should be halted until the necessary so-
cial and environmental impact studies are completed. Then,
the projects could be finished according to the results of
such studies and adhere to the Bank's own policies and prin-
ciples . 207
This does not mean, of course, that people can never be
required to resettle in favor of the national interest, or
that it is generally wrong to promote economic growth. How-
ever, the Bank and the governments concerned have to respect
certain minimum conditions according to the international
standards of human rights and environmental impact assess-
206. Beth V. Yarbrough and Robert M. Yarbrough, "Cooperation
in the liberalization of international trade," International
Organization
.
Vol.41, No.l, Winter 1987, page 26.
207. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar
.
pages 355-357.
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merits. No unattainable levels are required, but India should
use the same world-class standards for social and environ-
mental goals as it uses for engineering technology. This
might include the possibility that alternative projects -
which do not cause compulsory relocation on a large scale or
severe environmental consequences - have to be found. 208 Ac-
cording to Morse and Berger,
The Bank must ensure that in projects it de-
cides to support the principles giving priority to
resettlement and environmental protection arefaithfully observed. This is the only basis fortruly sustainable development. 200
Without integration of social and environmental con-
cerns from the beginning, they become costly and burdensome
add-ons. Thus, in the future the Bank should make ex ante
project assessments an obligatory part of its operational
directives. This investment of time and specialized person-
nel, including local studies and consultation, will eventu-
ally pay off. This learning process has already started. 210
The changes which have already occurred in UNEP and the
World Bank should not be underestimated. Due to its recep-
tive structure, UNEP has been somewhat successful on the in-
ternational, national, and local level promoting sustainable
development. One must be aware that UNEP is much younger
208. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar
.
pages 355-357.
209. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar
.
page 358.
210. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar
.
page 354.
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experience with success—
than the World Bank, thus has less
ful implementation mechanisms. UNEP has had certain suc-
cesses in the form of agreements and conventions, which have
promoted environmentally sound development in the form of
small-scale projects or at least of increased public discus-
sion on the issue. Though the World Bank is much less recep-
tive than UNEP, it has managed to open its structure to some
degree in recent years, resulting in initiating the process
toward more sustainable development
.
4 . 2 Role of Structure
The most important difference between UNEP and World
Bank is their receptivity to outside influence reflected by
the different degree of the openness of their operating
structures. While in the case of UNEP, power is shared be-
tween the Executive Director, the Governing Council, and the
Environmental Coordination Board, in the World Bank power is
concentrated at the top. The hierarchical structure gives
most decision power to the director and a small board of di-
rectors at the second level of decision-making. In addition,
the Director of the World Bank is elected by the Board of
Governors (which has traditionally endorsed the US nominee)
,
and not, as in the case of UNEP, by the General Assembly.
This makes him more independent - but it also seems likely
211. Interview with Walubengo.
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that the economists will elect someone whose focus is on
economic growth rather than on sustainable development.
UNEP's greater degree of openness makes it easier for
NGOs to gain access to the organization 7 for the more people
are sharing power in an organization, the greater is the
likelihood that among them are some who are willing to sup-
port and strengthen the role and ideas of NGOs. In an orga-
nization with hierarchical structure, on the contrary, one
would expect that the people at the top are afraid of let-
ting any external influences gain access: This would
threaten the continued existence of this power structure and
the privileges of the top executives.
Similar arguments are true for most of the other insti-
tutional differences distinguishing UNEP's openness from the
World Bank's relative closure. For example in case of UNEP,
the main function of the executive head is coordination.
This means that he is used to listening to many opinions -
an attitude which increases the likelihood that those of
NGOs are among them. UNEP is divided in many parts which are
interconnected, and the organization maintains contacts to
other organizational units. This means that NGOs have addi-
tional opportunities to make themselves heard through these
parts and units. The same argument is true for the fact that
in the case of UNEP, membership is open to all UN members,
and decisions rather depend on coordination and compromise.
The World Bank's closed structure not only makes wide-
ranging reforms difficult, but also keeps NGOs and their
119
wide-ranging reform proposals outside of the organization.
The strong time-constraints for decision-making prevent the
World Bank's decision-makers from listening to a variety of
proposals - including NGO proposals - because they simply
lack the time to do it. The lesser degree of transparency in
the World Bank hinders NGOs to appropriately criticize and
control the organization already at the planning stage of
programs and projects. The locus of organizational power is
important insofar as more "Northern" NGOs can attend World
Bank meetings and more "Southern" NGOs can participate in
UNEP's meetings - simply for financial and geographical rea-
sons. Given the fact that Southern NGOs are the ones mainly
concerned with issues of sustainable development, they have
more difficulties to gain access to the World Bank than to
UNEP.
Similar conclusions between the structure of the two
organizations and the likelihood of NGOs to gain access to
them can be drawn with respect to their financial structure.
The relative budgetary autonomy of the World Bank does not
require it to listen to anybody else than its few financial
donors - which hardly happen to be NGOs. The same is true
for the World Bank's voting procedure, which is based on the
amount of financial contribution. UNEP's limited budgetary
autonomy, on the other hand, makes the realization of its
programs and projects dependent on the support of voluntary
contributions and other financial sources from a broad vari-
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ety of sponsors. This increases the likelihood that NGOs or
sponsors favoring their ideas are among them.
An additional difference between the two organizations
is the amount of money they have available: The World Bank's
extensive resources have allowed it to bestow or withdraw
money to a much greater extent than any other IGO, thus mak-
ing it a powerful instrument for the implementation of its
policy. It not only has an enormous lending budget in com-
parison to UNEP, but also has considerably increased its fi-
nancial sources over the last decades. UNEP, by contrast, is
not a funding agency and has a very small budget, thus de-
pending on the good will of agencies, organizations, and
governments. The different amount of money the World Bank
and UNEP have available indicates the different structure of
the two IGOs and the different degree of access which NGOs
can gain: It can be assumed that clients and donors will
only contribute a large amount of money when they know that
they have considerable influence to decide for which pur-
poses this money is used. Consequently, they will refuse to
contribute large amounts of money to an organization whose
open structure and strong NGO influence promotes democratic
and unpredictable decision-making.
However, despite UNEP's financial disadvantages, the
analysis of this thesis has shown the many advantages which
UNEP's structure has for strong NGO influence and the promo-
tion of sustainable development in comparison to the World
Bank. An exception is, for example, that the World Bank can
121
pursue much quicker and more decisive strategies and policy
implementations than UNEP. UNEP ' s open structure and cat-
alytic function, though facilitating democratic and reason-
able decisions, have the disadvantage that the negotiation
and implementation process takes much more time. UNEP's
broad receptivity has created a degree of power and influ-
ence distribution that resulted in a lack of authoritative
leadership. In addition, while the UNEP Governing Council
members are elected on a staggered basis for three years
only, World Bank Governors can hold the power for a long
time, which gives the latter institution more stability in
decision making and more continuity in values and strate-
gies.
Thus UNEP seems to have difficulties in protecting it-
self from disturbing external influences. Critics could
therefore argue that UNEP's open structure, especially the
broad diversity of NGOs involved, leads to a lack of deci-
siveness. However, the second case study has shown that the
World Bank's structural advantages - especially the quick
decisions and implementations - rarely promote sustainable
development . 2 12
Thus for the future, the challenge for both organiza-
tions will be to find a degree of openness which allows for
NGO input and thus sustainable development while encouraging
donor support. It seems that UNCED tried to react to this
212. Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Chal-
lenge
.
page 12; Imber, "Too Many Cooks," page 57.
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problem: In Chapter 38 of Agenda 21, UNEP is charged with an
enhanced and strengthened role. The organization is advised
to focus on an action-and-results oriented approach, and the
article emphasizes the necessity to establish a top-down
managerial style. If UNCED should fail to correct UNEP's
structural weaknesses, maybe they have to be accepted as
necessary price for open, democratic decision-making. At
least, when agreement is reached in UNEP, real change has
taken place toward more sustainable development. 213
The World Bank' structure has to open to a much
stronger degree and to strengthen the role of NGOs within
the organization in order to facilitate sustainable develop-
ment. Optimists believe that this is not too unlikely,
pointing out the increasingly good cooperation between the
two agencies, especially in the GEF, where UNEP is the sci-
entific core agency and the World Bank the "manager". On the
other hand, pessimists such as Louis Kang'ethe, Research
Scientist at Kenya Energy and Environment Organizations
(KENGO)
,
point out that as long as the World Bank does not
change its underlying values, the influence of NGOs will not
be sufficient to realize true change toward sustainable de-
velopment in the World Bank. 214
213. Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Chal-
lenge
.
page 12; Imber, "Too Many Cooks," page 57.
214. Interviews with Walubengo and Mwani; more information
on the issue in Louis Kang'ethe, "Definition of Desertifi-
cation," in Manu, Chris (Editor), Resources (Nairobi, Kenya:
KENGO, Vol.4, No. 2, 1993), pages 5-6.
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The results of this thesis with respect to World Bank
and UNEP can be generalized: An organization which wants to
be successful with respect to the promotion of sustainable
development should aim at the establishment of a relatively
open structure. At the same time, it should avoid UNEP's
mistakes of too much openness as analyzed in order to avoid
lack of chaos as well as financial support.
4 • 3 Role of Values and Strategies
As pointed out in chapters two and three, UNEP has
found a compromise between the two ideologies - ecological
and socioeconomic concerns - combined in the author's defi-
nition of "sustainable development." In the World Bank, on
the contrary, for a long time the ideology of economic lib—
era li-sm prevailed. It was founded as an economic institu-
tion, exclusively aimed at economic growth. Even today, the
environmental department is merely a small part of the Bank,
and it is dependent on the Bank's overall policy. These
facts led to a subordination of environmental protection.
Though the environmental department and the overall Bank ac-
tivities toward more sustainable development have recently
been extended, these efforts remain small in comparison with
the broad contacts and environmental activities of UNEP,
which has already been founded with an exclusive focus on
the environment. In addition, the economic benefits at which
the Bank aimed seldom reached the Poor - as originally
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planned - but rather served to maintain and enrich the World
Bank, its donors, and the governments of the countries con-
cerned. The Sardar Sarovar case study has shown that very
well. It seems that the World Bank until recently has
doubted the possibility to reconcile environmental protec-
tion and economic development - at the expense of the envi-
ronment and, in the long run, of the economy.
These differences in the concept of sustainable devel-
opment, in combination with the other differences in organi-
zational structure already analyzed — led to differences in
the degree of access which NGOs can gain in the organiza-
tions .
Due to the fact that most NGOs share the same values as
UNEP and define sustainable development in a similar way,
the organization is more likely to listen to their advice
than the World Bank. The ideology of global interdependence,
the cross-cutting strategies and wide-ranging linkage of is-
sues, the emphasis on monitoring and consciousness-raising,
and the increase of consensual knowledge also make it rela-
tively easy for NGOs to gain access, because for organiza-
tions with these preferences it is an advantage to listen to
as many opinions as possible, especially to those coming
from experienced NGOs. As a consequence, NGOs ' major influ-
ence on UNEP takes place on the planning level of the orga-
215. UNEP seems to see less conflicts between environment
and development than the World Bank; Tolba, "UNEP - 1991 An-
nual Report of the Executive Director," page 1153.
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nization ' s programs and projects. Some NGOs also participate
in the implementation of programs and projects which facili-
tate sustainable development. However, their involvement on
this level is not as important for the promotion of sustain-
able development, because they have already managed to in-
corporate most of their values and strategies in the organi-
zation's planning level.
In case of the World Bank, the preferred values of sta-
bility and predictability inhibit the fundamental changes in
World Bank policy as proposed by NGOs. As explained in chap-
ter 1.1, an organization which copes with problems by shift-
ing its strategies instead of its underlying values wants to
protect itself from disturbing external factors - thus it
will feel endangered by NGOs and their proposals of funda-
mental change. Though there have been some shifts in the
World Bank's strategies over the decades - the more liberal
McNamara years as compared to the more conservative Reagan
years - and some true value change has taken place toward
sustainable development, most of the shifts so far remain
superficial, rather focussing on damage reduction than on
long-term environmental and socioeconomic planning. 216 As a
consequence, NGOs' major influence on the World Bank takes
place on the implementation level of the organization's pro-
grams and projects. Some NGOs also participate in the plan-
216. For example with respect to the McNamara years; Leslie,
The World Bank and Structural Transformation in Developing
Countries
.
page 26.
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rung of programs and projects, for example in the NGO-World
Bank Committee; but their involvement on this level is
mostly restricted to some advice - for the reasons mentioned
above.
UNEP is in a different situation, for the organization
has always believed in the value of sustainable development.
Therefore, the organization's shift in strategies simply
point out its efforts to approach its basic value most ef-
fectively. This might be a major reason for the change from
the concrete sectorial efforts in the 1970s and the focus on
science and monitoring in the 1980s. 217
Finally, it is likely that the implicit mission of
the point of UNEP's founding supports
"learning" from external knowledge sources such as NGOs as
part of the organization's character. The World Bank's es-
tablished implicit mission of "adaptation," on the contrary,
forces the organization to interpret NGO influence as dan-
gerous to this mission, thus the organization tends to fight
NGOs and their values of sustainable development. Though in
recent years positive interactions between the World Bank
and NGOs increased, it is questionable if their involvement
is strong enough to be called cooperation or even collabora-
tion. Due to this systematic exclusion of external factors,
217. Scientific American Magazine, Managing Planet Earth ,
pages 74, 75, 121; Bennett, International Organizations ,
pages 297, 298; Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environ-
mental Challenge
,
pages 12, 13, 61; Husain, "The World Bank
and Economic Policy in Developing Countries," page 49.
127
NGOs will have to fight very hard to gain more influence in
the future - as can be seen in the case of the Sardar
Sarovar Dam Projects.
According to the results of this thesis, some general
conclusions can be drawn with respect to the best kind of
NGO involvement within an organization for the promotion of
sustainable development. NGOs will be most successful if
they gain access to an organization already at the planning
stage, because at this stage the most important decisions
are made. In addition, their advice and support at the im-
plementation stage is very useful. However, NGOs should
avoid to get involved in the implementation stage alone:
Then they risk to be restricted to the prevention of the
worst damage as a consequence of a lack of sustainability
already at the planning stage.
4 . 4 Role of NGOs
As will be shown in this chapter, the structural frame-
work for the role NGOs play in an organization is an addi-
tional - and the most obvious - indicator for the likelihood
that their ideas of sustainable development gain appropriate
access to the organization. For example, in the case of
UNEP, NGOs work actively within the organization through
lobbying, while in the World Bank, they are limited to giv-
ing some advice - especially through the NGO-World Bank Com-
mittee. UNEP includes NGOs in all areas, while in the World
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Bank they have no possibility to participate in the planning
of structural adjustment programs. NGOs have access to most
of UNEP's important meetings and informations, while they
are refused this right in case of the World Bank. These
three differences show the much greater possibilities NGOs
have to integrate their ideas in UNEP's decisions than in
the Bank's decisions.
Though in both organizations NGOs do not directly par-
ticipate in important decisions, NGOs participate indirectly
in UNEP decisions by lobbying actively. The very fact that
they have done so and still do indicates their positive ex-
perience with this lobbying - an experience NGOs have seldom
made within the World Bank. Finally, the fact that NGOs co-
operate with UNEP proves that their influence reaches a much
more far-reaching level of decision making than in the case
of the World Bank. NGOs which have to focus on confrontation
signalize that they are excluded from all or most important
steps of planning and implementation within the World Bank.
The only way they can promote sustainable development within
the organization is to fight the fact that exactly the oppo-
site is happening.
The strategic difference between confrontation and co-
operation as explained above is also likely to be the reason
why it was impossible to find two case studies of NGO in-
volvement on the same level of comparison. While most NGOs
are able to influence UNEP already at the early interna-
tional planning level - thus promoting sustainable develop-
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ment at the earliest and most effective stage - their influ-
ence on the World Bank is mainly limited to confrontations
at the local level of the Bank's policy implementation. 218
To sum up, NGOs are involved to a much larger degree in
UNEP than in World Bank activities. This is the major reason
why the promotion of sustainable development is much more
successful in UNEP than in the World Bank.
Though the author of this thesis has been able to in-
vestigate the influence of NGOs on UNEP and the World Bank,
she was not able to obtain considerable information on the
kinds of NGOs involved in the promotion of sustainable de-
velopment according to the characterization in chapter 1.3.
Thus she can only speculate about them and their possible
role in the future:
The Independent Report by Morse and Berger shows that
most NGOs actively involved in the Sardar Sarovar Dam Pro-
ject are working on the local level, thus it is likely that
they are grassroots and service NGOs. At the same time,
these local NGOs from the Third World also seem to be the
main activists at the INCD. 219 As the research in earlier
chapters shows, in both case studies local NGOs - though be-
ing from different continents and involved in different pro-
gram levels - seem to share the same values of sustainable
218. Interview with Walubengo.
219. A complete list of all NGOs involved in both case stud-
ies in appendix B.
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development. This makes the comparison of the two case stud-
ies easier.
Due to the importance of local grassroots and service
NGOs in the two case studies it can be assumed that they
will play the same - or an even stronger - leading role in
the future. Their strong influence is reasonable insofar as
the promotion of sustainable development is the main field
their concern and experience. At the same time, a problem
is that these local Southern NGOs often lack the financial
resources to attend national international conferences on
sustainability concerns. Thus in the future it is important
that they increase their cooperation with rich international
Northern NGOs and coalitions of these NGOs. That way, they
could not only get stronger financial assistance, but could
also try to "lobby" their opinions and propositions on sus-
tainability through these international (thematic) NGOs. For
example, international NGOs located in the United States
could then attend all important NGO-World Bank meetings and
push forward the arguments of Southern NGOs. Northern NGOs
would also profit from this strategy, because sustainability
is based on so many interconnected problems that it is of
global importance in the long run.
Southern NGOs should identify and emphasize their
shared points of view which will strengthen their position
in favor of sustainable development. Northern NGOs should
identify and use the differences, divisions, and conflicts
of the industrialized countries to their advantage. The big-
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ger the overall number of Northern and Southern NGOs and the
stronger their unity, the more they can influence IGOs and
governments toward sustainable development. 220
The case study on the INCD has shown — despite certain
limitations - the strong influence of NGOs on UNEP and their
promotion of sustainable development. They are clearly of
increasing importance in raising awareness of environmental
and development issues and accordingly influence UNEP's val-
ues and strategies, by encouraging the IGO to push other in-
stitutions to become more responsive to sustainability con-
cerns. This process is mutually enforcing, because the more
legal participation rights NGOs have, the more they can in-
fluence sustainable development on the international, na-
tional, and local level. In addition, their increased in-
volvement seems to convince UNEP and its participating gov-
ernments of their usefulness, resulting in the support of
even more NGO involvement in the future. This positive de-
velopment not only occurs with respect to UNEP, but also
with the World Bank - though in the latter case to a much
lesser degree, given the more restricted possibilities of
external influence there. According to Professor Hamed,
The more knowledge on the World Bank is com-
ing out, the more NGOs will be able to understand
the mechanism of the World Bank and either inter-
act with it or know whom to complain to or how to
influence a decision. 221
220. Interviews with Mwani, Hill, and Walubengo.
221. Interview with Hamed.
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It remains to predict that the more the World Bank will
open its structure on the planning level, the stronger NGO
influence will be. This interactiveness in turn will promote
an even stronger NGO involvement, allowing the values and
strategies of sustainable development to show their true vi-
ability.
The increase in number and importance of NGOs is likely
to continue the trend of the last 20 years. In order to be
rood's successful, their lessons learned during the negotia-
tions to prepare the INCD should be integrated into future
considerations. For example, general statements and princi-
ples should only be presented at the beginning of a confer-
ence. Afterwards, the detailed legal work is of much greater
importance. NGOs have to be aware that they have a right to
participate in UNEP and World Bank programs, and not only as
observers. It is also necessary for NGOs to understand the
larger dynamics of such meetings, for example some kind of
group is needed to monitor and analyze the positions of gov-
ernments as they evolve. 222 According to Tony Hill,
Above all, it is essential now that you have
really strong working groups that are looking at
the details of the text and making the textual
amendments you would like to see. 223
It is not sufficient to listen to what governments say,
but to engage them in discussions between negotiation ses-
222. Interview with Hill.
223. Interview with Hill.
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sions to understand and influence what they think. Even more
important for NGOs is to influence the national delegations
in their countries between the negotiation sessions. This is
a difficult task, however, because these governments are
normally sworn to secrecy. Another future difficulty to be
overcome will be the possible rejection by developing coun-
tries. According to Wangu Mwangi, NGOs should not fight with
governments, but should operate in cooperation, for example
to help governments with their expertise. The interviews of
the author with NGOs and government representatives in New
York have shown that there already is increased NGO-govern-
ment cooperation in countries of the Third World. In the fu-
ture, NGOs should use their possibilities to promote the im-
plementation of sustainable development to an even stronger
degree by sharing their local experience with the respective
local officials. The long-term aim is to obtain government
commitments to work with NGOs as partners. When governments
depend on NGO expertise in form of community work, for exam-
ple, they will allocate funds to them. If governments and
NGOs work together, they can combine the best contributions
of both: Governments can profit from the criticism of well-
informed and independent NGOs. At the same time, NGOs can
profit from the absence of bureaucratic duties and of too
much integration in a governmental system, which would over-
burden them and inhibit their concentration and purpose.
However, both sides should avoid becoming too dependent on
the other: NGOs have to be aware of the dangers of corrup-
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tion. They should always try to maintain their values,
strategies, and purposes in promoting true sustainable de-
velopment. This is the advantage of the rather critical
"watchdog position" of the NGOs dealing with the World Bank.
Here the NGOs involved are not in as much danger of losing
their aim of sustainability as are NGOs cooperating with
IGOs and governments. 224
For promotion of sustainable development in the future,
some NGOs have shown how more successful management of re-
sources can be achieved. Of special importance is the flexi-
ble learning process approach which allows projects to
change course, predominance of people's priorities, and se-
cure rights and gains for the Poor. At the desertification
conference it was made clear that in order to fight deserti-
fication, true global partnership is necessary. This may
prove true also for the promotion of sustainable development
in general. All relevant institutions such as UNEP, UNDP,
World Bank, GEF, and the Committee on Sustainable Develop-
ment, as well as grassroots, service, and thematic NGOs
should be brought together in a focused working interactive
22 5process.
224. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar . page 131; interview
with Mwani and Hill.
225. Goree, Mwani, and Saini (Editors), "Report of the Work-
shop 'Listening to the People: Social Aspects of Dryland
Management'", page 1; Toulmin, "Combatting Desertification,"
pages 19, 20.
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be an important
Point 8 (5.) of the NGO statements
challenge for the future:
In envisioning implementing tools, it is nec-essary, subject to the national legal specifici-tle® of ®ach individual state, to recognize legal
Tndwfn T eff?ctive and timely participation of
i2
dl
Ii
dUal
?
a™» NGOs ln the domestic applicationof the adopted Convention. Such legal rights
should enable citizen groups and NGOs to fully co-operate with Governments in the real development
and enforcement of the Treaty provisions and itsdomestic legislation. 26
NGOs must become involved in the legal details in order
to reinforce their legal status, and thus to improve their
knowledge on international law and affairs. They have to be
aware that according to the UN Charter of Human Rights, they
have the legal right to be heard and to vote, because NGOs
represent the interests of the "people." 227
Today, about 80 percent of the NGOs are still dealing
with social and environmental aspects of agricultural and
rural development. 228
226. NGO interventions at the Second Session of INCD
.
page
5.
227. Interview with Saad.
228. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
.
1991, pages 104, 105; The World Bank, The World Bank and the
Environment . 1990, page 3.
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4 . 5 Alternative Theories
The author of this thesis has interpreted the results
of her research in terms of institutionalism. She is well
aware of possible limitations of her approach. There appears
to be a direct connection between the increasing influence
of NGOs and changes in the World Bank and UNEP. However,
other factors could be the cause of this relationship.
Changes in strategies and structures might also have oc-
curred in the absence of NGO influence. 229
In chapter 1.2, the author has explained the alterna-
tive approaches of neorealism, group theory, rationalism,
and incrementalism. In addition, alternative explanations
have been mentioned which are not part of a particular the-
ory but may be important. The following paragraphs will as-
sess the outcome of this thesis from the perspective of
these alternative theoretical approaches and explanations.
A neorealist would support the idea that the strong po-
litical and financial influence of the United States is the
major cause for the refusal of the organization to let ex-
ternal factors such as NGOs gain influence. The USA could
even be responsible for the closed structural framework es-
tablished at the point of the World Bank's founding; in this
229. For example changes in McNamara years, which were fol-
lowed by the creation of some new departments in the World
Bank and could be due to the loss of its original function
after the war, to international economic growth, or to in-
creasing power of Third World Countries.
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case, the country would be the driving force "behind the
scene" from the beginning, responsible for the structural
framework analyzed in this thesis. A slightly different neo-
realist explanation would point out the donor and recipient
interests as being hostile to the idea of sustainable devel-
opment in the World Bank, fearing for a loss of their money
and political influence. In the same way, positive or nega-
tive results of environmental projects such as the Sardar
Sarovar Dam Project in India may not be due to NGO involve-
ment. External factors such as the powerful influence of
other governments may have been the most important factor.
Another reason for change toward more environmental protec-
tion might have been the pressure by Senator Robert Hasten
and the US Congress, threatening US vetoes of Bank projects
and the refusal to allocate funding. Similarly, UNEP's
strong promotion of sustainable development could be the
consequence of a lack of influence of one powerful actor or
a dominant group in the organization.
Institutionalists can counter the neorealist approach
in different ways. They can either argue that the possibil-
ity to exert powerful pressure on an organization is in it-
self a consequence of certain structural frameworks. This
leads to the question: What was first: Power or structure? A
second argument would be that in some cases powerful actors
inside and outside the organization can be influenced by
NGOs, thus working as NGOs' mediators. For example, Senator
Hasten got most of his information about the Bank's failures
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to promote sustainable development from two American NGOs:
The Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural Resources De-
fense Council. Institutionalists would also argue that the
importance of NGOs in the World Bank can be seen by appoint-
ment of former NGO member Mohamed El-Ashray as head of the
Environmental Department. 230
Group theory would underline that the different success
of sustainable development in World Bank and UNEP and the
recent opening of the World Bank's structure have resulted
from a group equilibrium and from changes in this equilib-
rium. For example, group theorists would refer to the fact
that the World Bank definitively cancelled its participation
in the Sardar Sarovar Dam Projects in 1993 - due to the fact
that the Indian Government had lost its interest in the pro-
ject and thus refused to take any more loans from the Bank.
In the same way, the policy outcome of the INCD could have
been shaped by an equilibrium of interests of all parties
and governments involved in the negotiation process - in fa-
vor of sustainability.
Institutionalists can counter group theory by arguing
that the group interests and changes of these interests sim-
ply reflect the different degree of NGO influence on these
groups. For example in case of the INCD, the second case
study shows how NGOs managed to bring their own ideas into
230. P. Haas, From Theory to Practice . 1992, page 38.
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the draft of the Convention - indirectly, that means through
skillful lobbying of the governments concerned.
A rationalist would support the idea that as countries
polluted or used up their mineral resources, forests, soils,
lakes, stream, and wildlife, and the capital began to de-
cline as well as the economy, the Bank and its officials
became convinced that the promotion of sustainable develop-
ment was the most reasonable reaction for the Bank's pros-
perity as well as for the well-being of the people con-
cerned. The Bank could also have decided itself to open its
structure to NGO influence: World Bank money often goes into
private pockets in the countries concerned, and incompetent
administrations, rulers or belligerent regimes who are nei-
ther well equipped nor sympathetic to the democratic pro-
cess, therefore often disrupting projects. It is possible
that the World Bank concluded after 40 years of such experi-
ence that if $1 million of money are allocated to NGOs, 90
percent of it will go to the right place, but if allocated
to governments, only 25 percent would be well spent. The
positive experience with such NGO collaboration could fur-
ther have facilitated an opening of the Bank's structure to-
ward NGOs. 231
Institutionalists can counter rationalism by arguing
that it was the fact that NGOs criticized the Bank and mobi-
231. Adams, "The World Bank and the IMF in Sub-Saharan
Africa," page 100; Ayres, Banking on the Poor , page 10;
Leslie, The World Bank and Structural Transformation in De^
velopinq Countries , page 3; interview with Hamed.
140
lized public opinion which initially caused IGO actors to
about past Bank failures and to draw the appropriate
conclusions. In the same way, the ease of NGOs to gain ac-
cess to UNEP could have been used by UNEP's actors to profit
for their decisions from NGO advice rather than drawing con-
clusions based on their own experience.
Incrementalism involves a certain rationality of IGO
actors, thus it is relatively similar to the rationalist ap-
proach. Differences are the constraints of time, intelli-
gence, and costs in case of incrementalism. Thus incremen-
talists would argue that the slow opening of the Bank's
structure was based on past negative experiences of IGO ac-
tors with respect to the closed structure of their organiza-
tion. Though the actors understood that the exclusive eco-
nomic focus inhibited sustainable development, the con-
straints mentioned above made it difficult for the Bank to
change its structures quickly. In the same way, UNEP's
strategic shifts over the years can be explained in terms of
incrementalism.
Institutionalists can counter incrementalism in a simi-
lar way as rationalism. They can argue that the step-by-step
changes are rather due to NGO influence on IGO actors than
to the decision of these actors themselves.
Finally, some counterarguments to the structuralist ap-
proach are not part of any particular theory. On the one
hand, factors such as the global economic situation or
events such as the oil crises might have had considerable
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influence on the promotion of sustainable development as
well. Accordingly, in the future development issues might be
of stronger importance than environmental issues, because
nations struggling for short-term economic survival tend to
ignore long-term sustainability concerns. Alternatively,
difficult political situations - such as the collapse of the
former Soviet Union or the conflicts in the Middle East -
may have diverted attention from the promotion of sustain-
able development. 232 A different explanation is that instead
of NGOs, other external factors such as the public in gen-
eral may have been the most important factor of conscious-
ness-raising toward the promotion of sustainable develop-
ment. According to Professor Hamed,
We do not know really whether there is gen-
uine or defensive mechanism because there has been
a lot of criticism [of World Bank projects] and
the new administration and the new President felt
that having public relations campaign is impor-
tant. 233
However, this thesis has tried to prove that the most
important driving force with respect to the changes in World
Bank and UNEP are the emerging power and perspective of
NGOs. The author has tried to illuminate in this thesis that
the positive structural changes in the World Bank and in
232. Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics , pages
50, 51; Tolba , "UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive
Director," page 1164.
233 . Interview with Hamed ; a complete list of all people
interviewed in appendix B.
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UNEP toward more openness are effectively due to NGO pres
sure and influence. 234
234. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment ,
1992, pages 37, 38; also read P. Haas, From Theory to Prac-
tice . 1992, pages 42, 43.
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APPENDIX A
FIGURES
1975 1980 1989
Regular budget
0 Voluntary contributions of governments to the
Environment Fund
Trust funds
Counterpart contributions
Figure A. 2 Source of UNEP Funds. United Nations Environmen
tal Programme, UNEP Profile . (Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP, 1990)
page 37.
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A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION
0 *cx the y*an, UVEP lod iu ptrmen Live ipooiorrd « wide variety oCpUnj, profnmma, declmoooi ind i*rtemaiu which provide •irwneworh lor (k>b«] lod repcnu] environment!] kub. The alfM..
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Figure A. 4 A Framework for Action. United Nations Environ
mental Programme, UNEP Profile . (Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP
1990), pages 42, 43.
Continued, next page
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Outcomes such as: loss of vegetative cover
baring of soils
A increased erosion
reduced productivity
Due to: Heavy pressure Insufficient investment
on ,and eg. terracing, fertilisation
Underlying physical conditions: soils, climate, vegetation, etc.
Land shortage Poverty Short time horizons Inappropriate
technologies
Size & distribution Agricultural Land tenure Research <fc
population/land price policy insecurity extension
Population growth Marketing Alternative Technical
infrastructure incomes options
Health Education & Training Credit availability ‘Governance’
Overall government policy Structural adjustment Exchange rates
World trade conditions Levels of debt Availability donor funds
Global climatic trends
Figure A. 5 Multi-Level Set of Explanations for Desertifica-
tion. Camilla Toulmin, "Combatting Desertification: Settingthe Agenda for a Global Convention," Dryland Networks Pro-gramme :—Issues Paper, (London, England: International Insti-
tute for Environment and Development (IIED)
,
No. 42 June
1993)
,
page 3
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APPENDIX B
NAME LISTS
NAMES OF NATIONAL NGOS INVOLVED IN THE
SARDAR SAROVAR DAM PROJECT
Anil Patel's "Save the Narmada Movement"
Umbrella Organization "Narmada Bachao Andolan"
Guajarat NGO "Arch Vahini"
Ashram "Anand Niketan" (Leader Harivalabh Parikh)
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NAMES OF INTERNATIONAL NGOS INVOLVED IN THE
SARDAR SAROVAR DAM PROJECT
NAME OF NGO NAME OF REPRESENTATIVE FAX NUMBER
FOE-Japan Yukio Tanaka 01181337606959/350
IRN Juliet Majot 5108481008/476
IRN Patrick McCully 5108481008/476
Both Ends Paul Wolvekamp 01191206208049/268
The Ecologist Nicholas Hildyard 0114425873748/445
The Ecologist Alex Wilks 0114425873748/445
ASW Bruni Weissen 01149302511887/279
KePa Risto Iaomaki 01135806941786/537
KePa Gunnel Nycander 0114618673512
Probe Pat Adams 4169648239/776
CED Villo Komei 0113580318427/566
Greenpeace Francesco Martone 0113965783531/474
FIAN-Germany Frank Brassel 011492823496956/342
FOE-Italy Roberto Smeraldi 01139668308610
KWIA Wendel Trio 0113227968054/594
Coll. Narmada/
FIAN Christian Ferrie 01133142592236/265
FIVAS Eric Hoenes 011472204594/348
Erklaerung Peter Bosshard 0114112726060/382
Urgewald Heffa Schuecking 0114925831081
Aid/Watch Carol Sherman 01161213440078/951
LHCR Jim Ross 2129670916/524
FOE Austria Lyla Mehta 0114315268405
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2 . Association Malienne pour le Developpoment (AMADE)Hippodrome Rue 594 X 439
B.P. 2646
Bamako
Mali
Tel: (223) 22 59 09
Tax: (223) 22 59 09/22 23 59
Established: 1983
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Works towards the empowerment ofgrassroot organisations through the establishment of co-operatives and
access to credit and other financing. Promotes alternative sources oflivelihood which utilise alternative sources of energy.
Association Malienne pour la Promotion du Sahel (A.M A P R O S >
B.P. 6026
Bamako
Mali
Tel: (223) 22 53 95
Fax: (223) 22 02 91
Established: 1989
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Implements agro- forestry pro jects
in the Siby region of Mali and conducts projects on integrated
development at Kamale.
4. Both Ends
Damrak 28-30
1012 LJ Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Tel: (31 20) 623 0823
Fax: (31 20) 620 8049
Established: 1990
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Provides services to NGOs in
concerned countries by desemminating information on desertification.
Stimulates discussions on desertification with the Dutch government,
the public and other NGOs.
5. Centre for Our Common Future
Palais Wilson
52 rue des Paquis
Geneva 1201
Switzerland
Tel: (41 22) 732 71 17
Fax: (41 22) 738 50 46
Established: 1988
Membership: International
Activities relevant to the Committee: Acts as an information exchange
mechanism and a global information clearing house on sustainable
development initiatives, utilising its extensive network covering over
170 countries.
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6 . Christian Cars
120 Baines Avenue
p O Box 33
Harare
t imbabwe
Telt (2634) 24 752
Pax : (2634) 708 248
Established! 1989
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Assists farmers in implementing
environmental protection projects, such as woodlots, gulley
reclamation, natural veld management and water conservation. Provides
environmental education and financial support for projects.
7. Club Unesco FGminin "La Colombe"
B.P. 80.498
Lome
Togo
Tel: (228) 21 49 65
Pax: (228) 21 77 94
Established: 1990
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Educates women in combating
deforestation. Provides support for reforestation activities, tree
nurseries and a reforestation program run by local women's groups.
8. Collectlf des Organisations Non Gouvernementales Actives en Cote
D'Ivoire (CONC.ACI)
20 B.P. 525
Abidjan 20
Cote D'Ivoire
Tel: (225) 26 23 12
Pax: (225) 43 36 34
Established: 1992
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Develops action plans with its
members (over 27 local NCOS) covering all environmental problems. Its
members work closely with rural communities in erosion control,
reforestation, public awareness and education. Also collaborates with
UNDP as a centre for environmental information.
9. Council of Swaziland Churches
P.O. Box 1095
Manzinl
Swaziland
Tel: (268) 539 31
Pax: (268) 535 87
Established: 1976
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Undertakes a number of long-term
programmes such as; a micro-water project; agr cu 't
programmes and an environmental care programme providing training
for
rural communities.
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10. Development Alternative* Network (DAN)
P 0 Box 17038
Nairobi
Kenya
Tel: ( 254 2 ) 506 628
r*xt (254 2) 723 791
Cablei Da.
i
Established: 1993
Membership: National
t0 th* Co"“Ut«' Promotes the con.erv.tion ofAfrican natural reeourcee. Involve* local coimunltle* in th#management and sustainable use of degraded land. Produce* educationresource materials for use by NCOs and governments.
Environment Development Society
Nagorian ka Bas
Jodhpur-342 002
India
Tel: (91 — ) 28486/37536
fax: Not given
Established: 1993
Membership: Regional
Activities relevant to the Committee: Conducts research on localproblems of environmental degradation. Holds awareness raising
workshops encouraging local communities to actively participate in
protecting the environment.
12. Environmental Policy and Society (EPOS)
Uppsala University
Sturegatan 9, ltr.
753 14 Uppsala
Sweden
Tel: (46) 18 18 33 25
Pax: (46) 18 18 27 32
Established: 1991
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Operates an Interdisciplinary
research network concerned with environmental security in relation to
competition for natural resources. Organises seminars on the Drylands.
13. P6d6ration des Associations des Parents d'elBvee du Cameroun
26 Bd. des Nations Unies
B.P. 1831, Douala
Cameroun
Tel: (237) 42 56 26
fax: (237) 43 29 17
Established: 1971
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Conducts awareness campaigns,
education and training for extension officers. Organises re-
forestation and erosion control campaigns. Participates in program
development activities on environment and conservation.
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14. Federation dee ONC au Togo ( FONCTO)
39 Route de Kpallmd
B.P. 1176
Lorn#
Togo
Tell (228) 21 49 65
Fax: (228) 22 17 32
Xetabliehedi 1986
Membership! National
Activities relevant to the Committee! Co-ordinates an NGO network on
the management of natural resources and the protection of the
environment. Operates a documentation centre on appropriate
technologies. Organises training on sustainable development for NCOs.
15. Foundation Palx et Developpement (F.P.D.)
Immeuble Fahd Ben Abdel Aziz
Boulevard DJliy
Kbaye x Kacodou Ndiaye 146ae
Dakar
Senegal
Tell (221) 22 90 08/22 93 50
Faxi (221) 22 90 73
Established! 1991
Membership! International
Activltlee relevant to the Committee! Combats aridlsation and restores
degraded ecosystems. Protects the environment by combating bush fires
and transforming vegetable waste Into cattle food. Promotes biogas
energy.
16. Fundacton Ambient# Y Recursoe Haturales (FARM)
Monro# 2142
1428 Buenos Aires
Argentina
Tali (54 1) 781 6115
Faxi (54 1) 781 6115
Established! 1987
Membership! Regional
Activities relevant to the Committee! Conducts research on
implementation of environmental conventions. Publishes legal papers
relevant to desertification. Conducts technical analysis of legal
instruments to facilitate involvement of regional NCOs. Provides
environmental legal assistance to States in the region.
17. Fundaclor. Habitat
San Lorenzo 1582
3000 Santa Fe
Argentlna
Tell (54 42) 32425
Faxi (54 42) 32425
Established! 1992
Membership! National
Activities
seminars
academics
,
Government
relevant to the Cocmltteei Organises awareness campaigns
and
on sustainable development aimed at decision-makers,
and the business community. Facilitates dialogue
with the
on environmental topics.
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18 . Gilma Youngsters
P 0 Box 167 */R
Tama la
Ghana
Tal: Not given
Tax: Not givan
Established
: 1991
Membership: National
Activities ralevant to tha Committee: Rime to organise doodIs
liferam
* ,
*i
f "he
iP P
r°i*ct> ' tree planting exercises, educationt cy work. Promotes cultural and entertainment activitiesorganises youth training.
to
and
and
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' Recherche Action pour la Promotion Economise et Sociale
( >* KA P £ S )
B.P. 6026
Bamako
Mali
Tel: (223) 22 53 95
Fax: Not given
Established: 1990
Membership: National
Activities relevant to tha Committee: Organises campaigns such as
repairing access roads and sanitize drains to clean up the district
around Bamako for the benefit of the urban population. Conducts
education and awareness campaigns.
20.
Institute of Development Studies
8-B Jhalana Institutional Area
Jaipur-302004
India
Tal: (91 41) 515 726
Fax: (91 41) 515 348
Telex: (365) 2163 IDSJIN
Established: 1981
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Conducts research in the area of
development strategy, economic and social policy and resource planning
and management. Provides training on environment, agriculture, women's
development, poverty and health. Operates a multidisciplinary NCO's
resource centra for Rajasthan Stata.
21.
Instituto da Investigacion da Zonas Deserticas de la Universidad
Autonoma da San Luis Potosi
Alta ir 200 - P 0 Box 504
Fracc. del Llano, San Luis Potosi
78377 Mexico
Tel: (525) 48 22 21 30
Fax: (525) 48 22 21 30
Established: 1954
Membership: National
Activities relevant to tha Committee: Organises national seminars on
combating desertification. Concerned with the conservation and
rational utilization of the natural resources of arid and semiand
lands
.
22.
Interdisciplinary Center for Technological Analysis and Forecasting
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Tel-Aviv University
Tel-Aviv 69978
Isrssl
Tel: (972 3) 641 28 82
Fsx: (972 3) 641 01 93
Established: 1972
Membership: National
pro).ct. based on eat.ut. •ultl.p.etKl *PPlld*tioe
23
. de
?
eo<3 r »P*i« Physique 2onale
57
i
r!e
d
p|
FO,r,T’a
^
i0n #t do Rech«che Lettres
u Pierre Taittlngen
Reims 51 100
Prance
Tel: (33) 26 05 36 00
F«x: (33) 26 05 36 46
Established: 1973
Membership: National
•t Sciences Humaines
With ™ .g.neiJ ln COU *b°r*' 1°"
Lesotho Council of NCOs
109 Christie House
Orpen Road, P.B. A445
Maseru 100
Lesotho
Tel: (266) 317 205
Fax: (266) 310 412
Established: 1990
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Participates in drought reliefoperations and long term sustainable development recovery programmes
YnSVd’iSU’T"' « coap.i.alon onft.a.t.r .ad LJSu™"Relief a d on Agriculture, Environment and Natural Resources.
25. Namibia Development Trust
P O Box 8226
57 Pasteur Street
Windhoek-West, Bachbrecht
Namibia
Tel: (061) 380 02/3
Fax: (061) 33 261
Established: 1989
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Supports the participation oflocal communities in land issues. Involved in environmental awareness,promotion and training programmes.
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26 . National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of Swaziland
P.O. Box 298
Mbabane
Swaziland
Tel: (268) 442 48
Fax: Not given
Established: 1968
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Operates a training programme for
pre-school teachers which includes an environmental section.
Implements a wood-lot implementation strategy for local administrative
bodies and the public.
27. Rajastan Pradesh Bharat Sevak Samaj
Rishi Niwas, Baba harish Chandra Marg
Jaipur - 302 001
India
Tel: (141) 62939/729S2
Fax: No fax
Eetablished: 1967
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Organises activities to counter
ecological degradation in the Western region of India, particularly in
the "Great Indian Desert". Educates people for conservation of natural
resources of the region.
28. Sahel Solidarite
01 BP 372
Ouagadougou 01
Burkina Faso
Tel: (226) 31 18 85
Fax: (226) 31 18 85
Established: 1973
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Organises activities to combat
soil erosion, principally aimed at assisting communities to improve
their means of production, their knowledge and especially their
attitude towards the environment.
29. Secretariat de Concertation des ONG Maliennes ( SECO-ONG/MALI
)
Avenue Chelck Zayed X 121
Dravela - Bolibana, B.P 3264
Bamako
Mali
Tel: (223) 22 30 41
Fax: Not given
Established: 1989
Membership: National
activities relevant to the Committee: Promotes the exchange of
experiences through seminars and symposiums between NGOs from the North
end South. Supports the development programmes of Malian
NGOs.
)istr ibutes publications on the activities of local NCOS.
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30 . Service Extension and Action Research for Communities In the Hills
(SEARCH-NEPAL)
Anil Bhavan, Kamaladi
C.P.O. Box 4277
Kathmandu
Nepal
Tel: (977 1) 22 48 35/22 30 09
Fax: (977 1) 22 00 36/22 44 31
Established: 1989
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Provides training, advocacy, and
operational and empirical research. Implements integrated community
development programmes. Collaborates with other NGOs on projects
concerned with the empowerment of women.
31. Solidarite Humaine
B.P. 2573
Lom6
Togo
Tel: (228) 21 38 22
Fax: (228) 22 17 32
Established: 1988
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Promotes the conservation of
water resources. Supports the protection of natural resources through
reforestation, agroforestry and biodiversity conservation programmes.
Promotes education and easy access to information.
32. SOS Nature
B.P. 1838
Lom4
Togo
Tel: (228) 21 51 84/21 30 30
Fax: (228) 22 17 32
Established: 1991
Membership: National
Activities relevant to
agroforestry programmes
Provides local support
the Committee: Implements reforestation and
and erosion and shrub fire control programmes,
to local co-operatives.
33. Swaziland Farmer Development Foundation
M.I.T.C. Complex
P.O. Box 549
Manzini
Swaziland
Tel: (268) 541 14
Fax: (268) 541 14
Established: 1985
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Promotes
co-operati
private bodies, individuals and Government
aiming to
agriculture in the country. Implements group
farming
Provides expertise to member organisations
between
improve
projects
.
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34. Tonga Nawe Environmental Action Croup
P.0. Bo* 2061
Kbabana
Swaziland
Tel: (268) 413 94
Fa*: Not Given
Established : 1987
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Works with rural communitiespromoting sustainable development. Liaises with government and lobbiesto ensure environmental issues and sustainable development are includedin government planning.
35. Zambia Alliance of Women
P.0. Box 5 1068
Lusaka
Zambia
Tel: (2601) 263 073
Fax: Not given
Established: 1978
Membership: National
Activities relevant to the Committee: Organises a training of trainers
workshop on environmental issues in the Southern African region.
Promotes agro-forestry projects using environmentally sound methods.
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NAMES OF ALL PEOPLE INTERVIEWED
1) Dominic Walubengo, representative of the Kenya Energy and
Environment Organizations (KENGO)
2) Wangu Mwani, editor for "Econews Africa" in Kenya
3) Tony Hill, representative of the UN Non-Governmental Li-
aison Service
4) Professor Safei Hamed, Environmental Planning Specialist
at the University of Maryland and Counselor to the World
Bank
5) John K. Sambu, Minister for Environment and Natural Re-
sources in Nairobi
6) Masse Lo, NGO representative from Enda-TM, Senegal
7) Nadia Saad, former employee in the World Bank's Environ-
mental Department
8) Ms Perumalpellai-Essex , employee in the World Bank's En-
vironmental Department
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Introduction
At the organizational session of the Intergovernmental Nego-
tiating Committee for a Convention to Combat Desertification
( INCD) in January 1993 it was decided that "Non-governmental
organizations invited to the Committee may take contribu-
tions to the negotiating process, as appropriate, on the un-
derstanding that these organizations shall not have any ne-
gotiating role during the process, and taking into account,
in particular, decisions 1/1 and 2/1 concerning the partici-
pation of non-governmental organizations adopted by the
Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development at its first and second ses-
sions . "
(Decisions 1/1 and 2/1 you will find in annexes 1 and 2)
This means that NGOs can attend the INCD sessions as ob-
servers. They can make interventions and do their lobbying
work in which they have to comply with certain rules. How-
ever, since NGOs will not be the only ones that will sign
the Convention nor be primarily responsible for the imple-
mentation, their views will only be considered advisory and
not as a crucial element in the formal consensus building.
Some might claim that there are good arguments in favor of a
more influential role for NGOs in the process. In many cases
NGOs have been much more effective in combatting desertifi-
cation than governments. They have built up a wealth of ex-
pertise. And their input will be indispensable in the imple-
mentation of the Convention.
Nonetheless, two rounds of negotiations have shown that if
NGOs play their cards well they can have a constructive in-
put in the elaboration of the Convention. Many important
points that were brought to the fore by NGOs have been in-
cluded in the draft convention.
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The next step is to persuade Governments to maintain the
right things in the draft text, to delete the wrong things
and to include what NGOs feel is still lacking.
The purpose of this manual is to provide NGOs some practical
tips on how to maximize their influence in the negotiations.
Accreditation
Step one is getting access to the INCD process. NGOs that
wish to participate in the INCD have to request for accredi-
tation to the INCD Secretariat. In order to obtain accredi-
tation your NGO has to send to the INCD Secretariat documen-
tation containing the following information:
a) The purpose of your organization;
b) Information as to the programmes and activities of your
organization which demonstrates the organization's com-
petence and relevance to the work of the INCD and in
which country (ies) they are carried out;
c) Copies of your annual reports with financial statements
and statutes of establishment demonstrating that the
organization is a legally registered non-profit organi-
zation ;
d) A listing of governing body members and their country
of nationality;
e) In respect of membership organizations a description
of the membership, indicating total numbers and their
geographical distribution;
f) In order to assist the Secretariat in compiling the NGO
list NGOs are requested to fill in a fact-sheet
NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC and NGOs accredited
with UNCED are exempt from requirements stated in a) to e)
,
however it is necessary for them to complete the fact sheet.
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How to attend the INCH sessions?
After your request for accreditation has been approved the
INCD Secretariat will send you invitations for the INCD ses-
sions. However, for most NGOs it will be impossible to at-
tend the INCD meetings without financial support. The INCD
Secretariat and the UN NGO Liaison Service are doing their
utmost to raise funds to facilitate NGO participation. Obvi-
ously the funds are limited and not all NGOs that request
financial support can be serviced. To make a selection of
NGOs the INCD Secretariat and the NGLS consult a number of
NGOs that act as focal points for their country/region.
[ . . . ] It should be emphasized that attending the INCD ses-
sions is only useful for those NGOs who have done their
homework and who are active in lobbying at the na-
tional/regional level between the INCD sessions.
How to get information
For effective lobbying you need adequate access to informa-
tion. There are several sources of information:
- If you are linked up to the E-mail system you can access
information through the computer conference INC. DESERT;
- Earth Negotiations Bulletin, published by the Interna-
tional Institute for Sustainable Development;
- ECO, the NGO newsletter that is issued at all INCD ses-
sions ;
- E&D File which is published by the United Nations Non-Gov-
ernmental Liaison Service;
- ELCI issues circular letters which are a compilation of
material you need to prepare for the next INCD session. They
contain the NGO interventions, issues of ECO, the Earth Ne-
gotiations Bulletin, etc;
- The INCD Secretariat sends the most important official
documents to all accredited NGOs;
The focal points [ . . . ] have committed themselves to inform
the NGOs in their country/region;
- Reports of your government on the National Plans to Combat
Desertification.
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Lobbying during the TNCD sessions
During the INCD sessions NGOs can lobby through:
1. Making an intervention;
^ • Participating in the delegation of your country;
3. Having meetings with delegations;
4. Writing for ECO.
1. How to make an intervention?
In the rules for NGOs it is stipulated that:
"Relevant non-governmental organizations may, at their own
expense, make written presentations in the preparatory [read
INCD] process through the Secretariat in the official lan-
guages of the United Nations as they seem appropriate. Those
written presentations will not be issued as official docu-
ments except in accordance with United Nations rules of pro-
cedure ;
"
and:
"Relevant non-governmental organizations in consultative
status with the Economic and Social Council may be given an
opportunity to briefly address plenary meetings of the
Preparatory Committee [read INCD] and meetings of the Work-
ing Groups. Other relevant non-governmental organizations
may also ask to speak briefly in such meetings. If the num-
ber of requests is too large, the Preparatory Committee
[read INCD] shall request the non-governmental organizations
to form themselves into constituencies and each constituency
to speak though one spokesman (read spokesperson) . Any oral
intervention by a non-governmental intervention would, in
accordance with normal United Nations practice, be at the
discretion of the Chairman and with the consent of the
Preparatory Committee [read INCD] or the Working Group, as
the case may be."
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In the INCD process it has become good practice that NGOs
wanting to make an oral intervention have to do so on behalf
of all the participating NGOs. If you want to make an inter-
vention on a certain subject it is important to take the
following guidelines into consideration:
1* First go through the agenda to find out when and in
which working group the issue will be addressed. It is
pointless to make an intervention if the issue you want to
address is not the subject of discussion.
2 . In order to make your intervention constructive and to
the point it is important to carefully read what is written
about the issue in the negotiation text. It has happened in
the past that NGO representatives made interventions that
were less progressive from an NGO point of view than what
was already in the negotiation text. Through reading the ne-
gotiation text thoroughly you can avoid mistakes like these.
3. Prepare a draft text for the intervention at least a
day in advance. This will give you the opportunity to dis-
cuss the intervention with other NGOs in the NGO meeting
(NGO meetings are held every day) . It is crucial to discuss
the intervention with the other NGOs since interventions can
only be made on behalf of all the NGOs.
4 . Concerning the contents it is important to take into
account the following:
- In the intervention you address the chairman;
- You start the intervention with stating that you are
speaking on behalf of the NGOs;
- Don't make the intervention too long. NGOs get only 3 min-
utes to make an intervention. 450 words is the maximum.
5. After you have agreed with the other NGOs on the inter-
vention text make sure that you make enough copies to be
distributed among the delegates.
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Before making the intervention be sure you ask the
Chairperson or the Secretary of the plenary or the working
group to give you the opportunity to speak. He/she will ask
you for your name, which NGO you represent and the written
text of the intervention. He/she will also ask if you speak
on behalf of all the NGOs. Then you will wait until the
chairman gives you the floor. This is usually at the end of
a long list of interventions made by government delegates.
2_s—Participating in the government delegation
A few governments have included NGO representatives in their
^®^-®9^^-ion . It might be a good idea to approach your govern—
nisnt and ask them to do the same
. There are advantages and
disadvantages of being part of the official delegation. The
advantage is that it puts NGOs in an excellent position to
express the NGO views from within. On the other hand govern-
ments will not allow an NGO representative in the delegation
to share freely with other NGOs what is discussed behind
closed doors. As a member of your country delegation you
might end up a little isolated from other NGOs.
3 . Meetings with delegations
During the INCD sessions NGOs invite government delegations
to discuss certain issues. The meetings are announced in ECO
and are open to all NGOs that attend the INCD. If you orga-
nize a meeting with a delegation it is important to verify
whether the delegation is going to speak "off the record" or
not. In case of an "off the record" meeting NGOs will have
to promise to refrain from quoting the delegates in public.
The experience has been that meetings with delegates are ex-
tremely useful.
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Of course it is also extremely important to contact delega-tions of your own or other countries "in the corridors". You
can explain to them the NGO position. Delegates can briefyou on the background of their position. It is important to
share this information with other NGOs in the strategy meet-
ings. This will enable NGO representatives who prepare in-
terventions to anticipate on the arguments delegations are
going to use in this discussion.
4 . ECO
ECO is an NGO newsletter which is issued on a daily basis
during the 5 rounds of negotiations. The objectives of ECO
are:
- to give a critical analysis of the negotiations from an
NGO point of view;
to inform delegates on the views and grassroots experi-
ences of NGOs on desertification and related issues.
Though an ECO Team of NGO correspondents will be primarily
responsible for the production of ECO, all NGO representa-
tives are invited to write articles and to participate in
the editorial meetings in which the contents of ECO are dis-
cussed. Delegates are anxious to receive their daily ECO ev-
ery morning and they read the newsletter carefully. ECO is
an important lobby tool.
Lobbying between the sessions
NGOs have to be aware of the fact that at the end of the day
the INCD Secretariat cannot include anything in the final
Convention unless it is supported by Governments. NGOs are
not negotiating parties so we have to work though our Gov-
ernments. NGOs should persuade Governments to maintain the
right things in the draft text, to delete the wrong things
and to include what NGOs feel is still lacking.
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It will be too late if NGOs start lobbying their delegates
,n !„
sessi°n= °my. Delegates go to the INCD sessions
with their instructions and are usually reluctant to moveaway too far from the directions given to them at home It
“ ”UCh better that NGOs approach their governments well
ahead of the INCD sessions and make them familiar with theNGO point of view while they are still in the process of de-
veloping their position.
Again it is important to emphasize that attending the INCD
sessions is not very useful unless the homework is done.
How to approach vour government?
The first step is to identify the ministry (or ministries)
that are dealing with the INCD. Try to arrange a meeting
with the officials who are in charge of developing your
country's position in the INCD. Also contact those members
of parliament that you think might have an open mind to the
NGO point of view on desertification. They might be willing
to address the issue in parliament or in a parliamentary
committee meeting. Your position will be much stronger if
you coordinate your lobby activities with other NGOs.
Before meeting the Government officials or Members of Par-
liament it would be a good idea to send a "lobby" paper con-
taining the NGOs points of view concerning the INCD. For de-
veloping that paper the NGO statements made at the previous
INCD session can be very useful.
Wishing you success in your lobbying endeavors.
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Annex l
1/1 • Bole of non-governmental organis ations in the nr»pJv,-
tion process for the United Nation., Conf«.r.nro „„
ment and Development
1. At its 22nd meeting, on 14 August 1990, the Preparatory
Committee for the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development agreed that the effective contributions of
non-governmental organizations in the preparatory process
were in its interest.
2. There was agreement on broad-based involvement by rele-
vant non-governmental organizations.
3. The Preparatory Committee's policy should be to encour-
age an equitable representation of non-governmental organi-
zations from developed and developing countries and from all
regions and also to ensure a fair balance between non-gov-
ernmental organizations with an environment focus and those
with a development focus. The Preparatory Committee would
encourage the participation of scientific and other organi-
zations .
4. The Preparatory Committee decides that, only for the
purpose of its first session, the following rules would ap-
ply without prejudice to any decision that might be taken by
the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session:
(a) Non-governmental organizations shall not have any nego-
tiating role in the work of the Preparatory Committee;
(b) Relevant non-governmental organizations may, at their
own expense, make written presentations in the preparatory
process through the Secretariat in the official languages of
the United Nations as they deem appropriate. Those written
presentations will not be issued as official documents ex-
cept in accordance with United Nations rules of procedure;
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(c) Relevant non-governmental organizations in consultative
status with the Economic and Social Council may be given an
opportunity to briefly address plenary meetings plenary
meetings of the Preparatory Committee and meetings of theWorking Groups, other relevant non-governmental organiza-
tions may also ask to speak briefly in such meetings, if the
number of such requests is too large, the Preparatory Com-
mittee shall request the non-governmental organizations to
form themselves into constituencies and constituencies to
speak to one spokesman. Any oral intervention by a non-gov-
ernmental organization would, in accordance with normal
United Nations practice, be at the discretion of the Chair-
man and with the consent of the Preparatory Committee or the
Working Group, as the case may be.
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Annex B
2
{
1
—
°cedure
— —
d
etermining non-governmental oraani na-
tions competence and relevance to the work of thg Prepara-
tory Committee
At its 28th meeting, on 18 March 1991, the Preparatory
Committee for the United Nations Conference on Environment
decided on the following procedure for determining non-gov-
ernmental organization's competence and relevance to the
work of the Preparatory Committee:
1. Non-governmental organizations in consultative status
with the Economic and Social Council and others desiring to
be accredited for participation in meetings of the Prepara-
tory Committee, in accordance with decision 1/1 of the first
session of the Preparatory Committee as endorsed by the Gen-
eral Assembly resolution 45/221 of 21 December 1990, may ap-
ply to the Conference secretariat for this purpose.
2. All such applications must be accompanied by informa-
tion on the organization's competence and relevance to the
work of the Preparatory Committee, indicating the particular
areas of the Conference preparations to which competence and
relevance pertains and which could include, inter alia , the
following information:
(a) The purpose of the organization;
(b) Information as to the programmes and activities of the
organization in areas relevant to the Conference and its
preparatory process, and in which country (ies) they are car-
ried out;
(c) Copies of its annual reports with financial statements,
and a listing of governing body members and their country of
nationality
;
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(d) in respect of membership organizations, a description
of its membership, indicating total members and their geo-graphic contribution;
(e) Non-governmental organizations in consultative status
with the Economic and Social Council shall be deemed to have
satisfied these requirements to the extent that they have
already provided such information to the United Nations.
3. In cases where the Conference secretariat believes, on
the basis of the information provided in accordance with
paragraph 2 above, that the organization has established its
competence and relevance to the work of the preparatory Com-
mittee that the organization be accredited. In cases where
the Conference secretariat does not recommend the granting
of accreditation, it will make available to the Preparatory
Committee the reasons for not doing so. The Conference sec-
retariat should make its recommendations available to the
P^®Pa ^"^tory Committee at the start of the session.
4. The Preparatory Committee will decide on all cases
within 24 hours of the Conference secretariat's recommenda-
tions having been made available to its members, in the
event of a decision not being taken within this time frame,
interim accreditations shall be accorded until such time as
a decision is taken.
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ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH
INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE FOR
THE ELABORATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION IN THOSE COUNTRIES
EXPERIENCING SERIOUS DROUGHT AND/OR
DESERTIFICATION, PARTICULARLY IN AFRICA
Third Session
New York, 17-28 January 1994
Agenda item 2
ELABORATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION
IN COUNTRIES EXPERIENCING SERIOUS DROUGHT AND/OR DESERTIFICATION
PARTICULARLY IN AFRICA
Negotiating Text of the Convention
Note by the Secretariat
1. At its second substantive session in Geneva, the INCD requested theSecretariat to draft a single negotiating text of the Convention, which would
serve as the basis for the discussions in the two working groups of the INCDduring its third substantive session in New York. This text is attached for theCommittee's consideration.
2. In preparing the negotiating text, the Secretariat drew heavily on (a)document A/AC. 241/12, the compilation of government views, statements anddrafting proposals prepared as a background paper for the second session, (b)
statements in the two working groups during that session and (c) written
submissions received from governments after that session containing additional
comments and drafting proposals
. In addition, UN agencies concerned with drought
and desertification issues were consulted.
3. The proposed negotiating text does not include the wording of all the
drafting proposals received. The Secretariat's objective was, rather, tointegrate the proposals in a coherent text likely to gather broad support among
INCD member States. The Secretariat took special care, however, to ensure that
the text reflects all views expressed even though this lengthened it somewhat.
Brackets around portions of text or entire articles indicate clear cases of
diverging views.
4. The negotiating text is based on the hypothesis that Regional Implementation
Annexes will be negotiated and form an integral part of the Convention. Should
INCD members decide to adopt a different approach, certain provisions of the text
will have to be modified accordingly. Pending further discussion of the matter
during the January meeting, the Secretariat has not introduced in the text any
direct reference to the specific regional instruments to be included. At a later
stage, however, it might be appropriate to incorporate such references,
particularly in Article 17.
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Negotiating Text
CONVENTION ON COMBATTING DESERTIFICATION
IN THOSE COUNTRIES EXPERIENCING SERIOUS DROUGHT AND/OR
DESERTIFICATION, PARTICULARLY IN AFRICA
The Parties to this Convention,
Reflecting the urgent concern of the international community, including
States and organizations, about the adverse impact of desertification and
drought
,
Aware that arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid drylands together account
for a significant proportion of the earth's land area and are the habitat and
source of livelihood for a large segment of its population,
Acknowledging the global dimension of desertification, its effects in
all regions of the world and the common interest of the international
community in combatting it.
Noting the high concentration of developing countries, notably least
developed countries, among countries experiencing serious drought and/or
desertification, and the particularly tragic consequences of these phenomena
in Africa,
Noting also that desertification is caused by complex interactions among
physical, biological, political and socio-economic factors, including trade
and other aspects of international economic relations,
Conscious that economic growth, social development and poverty
eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries
and are themselves essential to meeting sustainability objectives,
Mindful that desertification affects sustainable development as both a
causal factor and consequence of important social problems such as
poverty,
food security, health and migration,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 47/188, particularly the
priority
it prescribed for Africa, and all other relevant United Nations
resolutions,
dLf.“», .nd on d.d.rtlt io.tlon ,„d drought, .. w.U r.lev.nt
declarations by African countries and those from other regions.
Convinced of the validity and relevance of decisions adopted
»t the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
particularly
Agenda 21 and its Chapter 12,
Appreciating the significance of the past efforts and
experience of
States and international organizations in combatting
desertification
mitiaatina drouqht, particularly in implementing the Plan
of Action f
Combatting Desertification which arose from the 1977 United
Nations Conference
on Desertification,
Realizing that, despite extensive efforts in the
past, progress in
combatting desfrtif icatlor,and mitftti^
that a new approach is needed at all levels i
development
,
Recognizing that the respons lb
^J-y
for co
^
at
^ and
the consequences of drought rests ultimately with
national y
depends on local implementation in affected areas,
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Stressing the critical role played by women in many regions affected by
desertification, particularly in rural area* of developing countries, and the
importance of ensuring the full participation of both men and women in
programmes to combat desertification and mitigate drought.
Emphasizing the special roles of non-governmental organizations, youth
and children, and indigenous people in programmes to combat desertification
and mitigate drought.
Bearing in mind the relationship between desertification and other
environmental problems facing the international community, such as climate
change, conservation of biodiversity and availability of fresh water,
Searing also in mind the contribution that combatting desertification
can make to achieving the objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity
and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and vice-versa.
Believing that strategies to combat desertification and mitigate drought
will be most effective if they are based on sound systematic observation and
rigorous scientific knowledge, and continuously reevaluated in that light.
Determined to spare no effort in combatting desertification and
mitigating drought, for the benefit of present and future generations,
Have agreed as follows:
PART I
INTRODUCTION
Article 1
1 .
(a)
Ose of terms
For the purposes of this Convention:
"desertification' means land degradation in arid, semi-arid and
dry sub-humid areas resulting from various factors, including
climatic variations and human activities;
(b) "drought* means a sustained, regionally extensive deficiency in
precipitation resulting in a period of abnormally dry weather
sufficiently prolonged for the lack of water to cause a serious
hydrological imbalance;
(c) "land degradation" means reduction of the biological and economic
productivity potential of rainfed cropland,
~
~
or range, pasture and forest land by one
processes, including, among others:
irrigated cropland,
or a combination of
(i)
(ii)
displacement of soil materials by wind and water erosion,
internal soil deterioration through physical and chemical
processes such as sal inisat ion , acidification,
aridification, nutrient depletion, compaction, sealing,
crusting, waterlogging and subsidence, and
(iii) long-term loss of natural vegetation;
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(d) "arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas*, or ’affected areas*,
means areas where the ratio of average annual precipitation topotential evapotranepiration is greater than or equal to 0.05 andless than or equal to 0.65 and where the average annual
temperature is greater than [insert appropriate temperature);
(e) "countries experiencing serious drought and/or desertification*,
or "affected countries", means countries whose land areas
include, in whole or in part, affected areas, and which are
listed as such in Annex 1, list A;
(f) "affected countries needing assistance” means the affected
countries listed as such in Annex 1, list B;
(g) "countries in a position to provide assistance* means the
developed and other countries, as well as regional economic
integration organizations, listed as such in Annex 1, list C;
(h) "combatting desertification" means all activities to directly or
indirectly prevent, reduce or reverse land degradation in
affected areas; and
(i) "regional economic integration organization" means an
organisation constituted by sovereign States of a given region
which has competence in respect of matters governed by this
Convention and has been duly authorized, in accordance with its
internal procedures, to sign, ratify, and accede to this
Convention.
2. The Secretariat, working with competent intergovernmental
organizations, shall maintain an information glossary of internationally
agreed definitions of other terms relevant to this Convention. The Conference
of Parties shall periodically review this glossary.
Article 2
Objective
1. The objective of this Convention is to combat desertification (and
mitigate the effects of drought) in countries experiencing serious drought
and/or desertification, particularly in Africa. (, through effective national
action, supported by organized international cooperation and partnership
arrangements based on mutual interest, in the framework of an integrated
approach consistent with Agenda 21 [and aimed at achieving sustainable
development and livelihoods in affected areas.])
[2. Achieving this objective shall involve a long-term central
strategy which focuses simultaneously in affected areas on improved
productivity of lands, conservation and sustainable management of lands and
improved living conditions at the community level, particularly through:
(a) poverty eradication;
(b) assurance of food and energy security;
(c) sustainability of economic growth and employment; and
(d) security and stability of financial resources.)
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(Article 3
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<b>
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ordlniU°n at sub-
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(c)
(d)
(e)
PAJkT II
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 4
General obligations
Convent ion
, "divi^l" or’^ntlT’^er StashT 15;' 10"’ «*•* thl *
api“:?!it.*"t otfangemente,
coherent loAg-t'.'Si^tra" iVViTl"?".!'.
0 c“rd ‘"“* «—lop a
2 .
(a)
(b)
In pursuing the objectives of this Convention the Parties shall:
adopt an integrated approach addressing the
and socio-economic aspects of the processes
physical, biological
of desertification;
(give due attention, within the relevant global and regionalbodies, to the situation of affected developing countries with
regard to international trade, marketing arrangements and debt;)
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[(C)
<d)
(e)
( t )
<g>
^oS«;S„r^lV.d‘70 (or th.
(i) mitigate the impact of external debt on them;
(ti) improve international market conditions for their products;
(iii) reduce the effects of exchange rate variations on them; and
UV)
Sevelor^^
Cilind ^*de P° licie8 that will encourage the
?
productivity of affected areas, including
1® ****"'don"ent Practices, such as the subsidization ofgr icultural exports, that undermine the efforts of localpopulation;
]
eradication as a central element of the efforts tocombat desertification and mitigate drought;]
promote cooperation among affected country Parties needingesistance in the fields of environmental protection andconservation of natural resources, as they relate todesertification and drought; 1
strengthen sub-regional and regional cooperation;
cooperate within relevant intergovernmental organizations to the
extent that their mandate relates to, or has an impact on,desertification and drought; and
develop institutional mechanisms, as appropriate, keeping in mind
the need to avoid duplication.
Article 5
Obligations of affected country Parties
In addition to their obligations in accordance with Article 4, affected
country Parties, conscious of their special responsibility in combattingdesertification and mitigating drought, undertake to:
(a) give due priority to combatting desertification and mitigating
drought, and allocate substantial resources proportionate to the
magnitude of the problem they are experiencing;
(b) establish strategies and priorities, within the framework of
national environmental policy, to combat desertification and make
public the elements of such strategies and their effect on land
degradation in order to determine their efficacy;
(c) focus on the role of affected local populations, while
concentrating on removing the underlying causes of
desertification and paying special attention to the socio-
economic factors contributing to desertification processes; and
(d) emphasize awareness and participation of local populations, both
women and men, recognizing that meaningful participation requires
full public participation and the inclusion of all elements of
society in the benefits of sustainable development.
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Article 6
Obligation, of country f.rti., i*
. position to provide JsllJtMc
.
In addition to their obligations set out in i r »- a a >Partie. and other Parties in a position to provldJthey ire themselves affected by desertif ication and drought undertake \oT
(*)
(b)
actively .upporb the effort, of affected country Partle. needlno
-aaiatance, particularly the lea.t developed among them, in theireffort, to combat de.ert i f icat ion and mitigate drought; and
facilitate access to, and provide, financial resource, and acce..to appropriate technology, to ensure that affected country
"e *cUn<J * ssi9tanc« in • position to effectivelyimplement their long-term strategies to combat desertification
and mitigate drought.
Article 7
Priority to AJrica
In implementing the provisions of thi. Convention,give priority to affected African countries, in light
situation prevailing in this region, while not neglecting
the Parties shall
of the particular
other regions.
Article 8
Relationship vith other Conventions
1. The Parties shall encourage the coordination of activities carried
out under thi. Convention and under other relevant legal instrument.,
particularly the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and theConvent ion _on Biological Diversity , in order to derive maximum benefit from
activities under each Convention while avoiding duplication of effort. The
Parties .hall encourage the conduct of joint programme., particularly in the
field, of research, training and exchange of information, to the extent that
such activities may contribute to achieving the objectives of the Convention,
concerned
.
2. The provisions of thi. Convention shall not affect the right, and
obligations of any Party deriving from a bilateral, regional or global
agreement into which it has entered prior to the entry into force of this
Convention for it.
PART III
ACTION PROGRAMMES, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION
AND SUPPORTING MEASURES
Section 1: Action programmes
Article 9
Basic approach
In carrying out their obligations pursuant to Article 5, affected
country Parties needing assistance shall prepare without delay, make public,
and implement national action programmes, and as appropriate sub-regional and
regional actioa programmes, as the central element of the strategy to combat
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°
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affected country Parti., needing^ae.i.tance Pin° thi®.
* ,B1 * tanc# *h*U »upport
or through appropriate intergovernmental org.nl.Vtio^ direct^
Article 10
national action programme
j
clear and concise manner th^ factors coT P
rogra™G3 19 to identify in a
policy and institutional reforms and orhJ
3ntributln<3 to desertification, the
roles of government
, local ^ c^unitie. and"!^
3 nece”«y' thG
-spective
available or required. National aPH„. d land user3 ' and the resourcesH i o, n ction programmes shall, inter alia :
(a)
<b>
incorporate a long-term and integrated approach forminq cart of
a nd
'
"! nd iVa t* n? " t he * Te'ut lo^bip "^o f °% he* * * ' "^ 1 * develoProentframework.; rela ionsh t programme to that
distinct
f
r
lexible to ada P t to local conditions and allow for
situations;
^ ^ dlfferent socio-economic and ecological
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
give priority to the implementation of preventivelands that are not yet degraded, or which aredegraded, without neglecting degraded areas;
measures for
only slightly
C
„if
n enablln<3 national environment by removing legislativeand other obstacles to required action, particularly localaction, and by giving local populations access to appropriatemanagement technologies and information; V
provi e for effective participation by grassroots organizations
and local populations, both women and men, particularly resource
users, in policy-planning, decision-making and implementation inorder to promote local initiatives and develop a sense ofpartnership providing incentives to improve land management; and
give grassroots organizations, and non-governmental organizations
more generally, an effective role in the preparation,implementation and review of the programmes, making full use oftheir expertise [and granting them institutional recognition and
appropriate assistance].
2. National action programmes shall include clear goals, criteria andbenchmarks, within precise timeframes for execution, and mechanisms for
systematic observation, so as to assess and measure progress in theirimplement at ion
.
[Article 11
Fields Co be covered in national action programmes
Taking into account the conditions and requirements specific to each
affected country Party needing assistance, national action programmes may
include, inter alia
,
measures in some or all of the following fields as they
relate to affected areas and their populations:
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[(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f
)
( 9 )
(h)
(i)
( j)
(M
( 1 )
the development and implementation nf
relating to capacity-building, education^and mea8ur®'scientific and technical cooperation V . , «warene.a,
mechanism., in accordance wi^h Article? iS* to" 23*,
reB°UrCeB and
opportunit ie^
livelihoods tourism promotion, rural in^T/tructure * market
^
and o t he^
<
f
<
i n a n c lYl^ aecv ^ce.^]
CO°^€rat ^ve8
'
-d access to credit
of economic instruments to ensure sustainable
c 1 * 1 Practices and proper resource valuation, includinq
ag?^ultur“l
OC
a
a
nd°
n
e
8
n
t0 a^^tural
-PPort progrUes?ricultu a ergy pricing, minimization of governmentinterference in agricultural production and export incentives,
food security, including improved overall productivity ofagricultural lands, introduction and development of drought-resistant fast-growing crop plants, food security reserves andexpansion of feeder-road networks;
land management, including land tenure andlegislation, soil conservation, sand dune fixation, community-based assessment networks, prior environmental impact assessment
of projects
,
and rational management of agricultural land water-
sheds, forests and wildlife;
other relevant
pasture and range management, including secure access to, and use
of, water and grazing land, allocation of control over waterpoints to pastoral communities, and enactment of pastoral/range
activity legislation that, inter alia , recognizes herding as a
sustainable use of marginal land and ensures the complementarity
of grazing and agricultural activities;
maintenance and sustainable management of vegetation cover,including management of forest resources by local communities'
creation and protection of forest reserves, agroforestry
activities and reforestation of degraded areas;
water management, including maintenance of hydrological capacity,
water conservation, environmentally sound measures to develop
rivers, lakes, catchment areas, watersheds and groundwater,
acquisition of water development technologies at affordable
costs, development of infrastructure for exploiting fossil water,
water quality control measure, and sustainable irrigation and
drainage systems;
meteorological and hydrological services, including strengthening
of personnel and improvement of data collection, analysis,
exchange and dissemination to users;
energy, including the development and efficient use of various
energy sources, the promotion of alternative sources of energy,
particularly solar and wind energy, and specific arrangements for
the transfer, acquisition and adaptation of relevant technology;
conservation and utilisation of all types of biodiversity in
accordance with the provisions of the Convention on Biological
Diversity ;
national population policies, including those to deal with
population pressure on land-carrying capacity; migration, both
within and between countries; family planning services; and
changes in demographic composition; and
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(») institution*!. and legal frameworks, including the
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- ni “tr *t »-v« structures, mechanisms to
nation* 1 *Vl
con * lict * •« * ic ient ly , the coordination ofal activities related to drought and desertification, andoperational measures to empower local communities, both women andmen, such as the transfer of fiscal responsibilities.]
Article 12
Sub-regional action programmes
Affected country Parties needing assistance shall prepare,
appropriate, sub-regional action programmes to harmonize, complementincrease the efficiency of national programmes. The provisions of Article 10shall apply autatis mutandis to sub-regional programmes. They may include,inter alia, measures in some or all of the following areas:
as
and
(a) assessment and strengthening, as appropriate, of sub-regional
institutions and their rationalization to avoid duplication, to
resolve potential conflicts and to effectively perform functions
necessary for the implementation of this Convention;
(b) scientific and technical cooperation in accordance with Articles
18 to 20;
(c) joint programmes for the reforestation and rehabilitation of
degraded ecosystems that straddle national boundaries, and
agreements on the management of shared resources, such as rivers,
lakes, aquifers, wildlife and grazing lands;
(d) joint programmes of cooperation with respect to migratory flows
of people, transhumance
,
the development and promotion of
alternative sources of energy, and hydrology and meteorology;
(e) joint programmes to combat locusts and other pest invasions; and
(f) review of trade practices, within the sub-region, that might have
an adverse impact on the efforts of local populations to combat
desertification.
Article 13
Regional action programmes
Affected country Parties needing assistance shall consult and cooperate
regionally, as appropriate, in the preparation and implementation of a
regional action programme, which may include measures in Article 12, sub-
paragraphs (a) to ((f), to ensure the adoption of a coherent strategy for the
region as a whole. The provisions of Article 10 shall apply mu tat is mutandis
to regional action programmes.
(Article 14
Heasu.res in action programmes to mitigate the effects of drought
Af f ected country Parties needing ass ista nee subject to drought
,
may
lude in thei r action programmes, int<»r alia. some or all of the following
sures to mit igate its effects:
(a) the strengthening of early warning systems, inc lud ing local and
nat lonal facilities as well as joint systems at the sub-reg icDnal
and regional levels, and mechanism a for assist ing re f ugees and
dis placed persons;
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<t>)
( <=
)
(d)
the strengthening of drought
including drought contingency pi
region*! *nd region*! level*}
preparedness *nd management,
*ne *t the loc*l, n*tion*l, sub-
the establishment of food security system*
marketing facilities, the strengthening
better management of food aid; and
including storage and
of coordination and
programmes in areas such as public works and employment safety
nets to help local communities cope with drought.]
Article 15
Assistance in the elaboration and implementation
ot action programmes
Developed country Parties and other Parties in a position to provide
assistance shall support, consistent with their capabilities, the elaboration
and implementation of action programmes, both bilaterally and through
competent intergovernmental organizations, through financial, technical and
other forms of assistance as provided for in this Convention. Supporting
measures shall include, inter alia :
(a) financial cooperation of sufficient duration to provide an
adequate degree of predictability for action programmes, allowing
for necessary long-term planning by countries needing assistance;
(b) use of assistance-delivery mechanisms which better enable support
at the local level, including through non—governmental
organizations;
(c) increased flexibility in project design, funding and
implementation in keeping with the experimental, iterative
approach indicated for participatory action at the local
community level; and
(d) streamlined administrative and budget procedures to increase the
efficiency of assistance programmes.
Article 16
Coordination in the elaboration and implementation
of action programmes
1. Affected country Parties needing assistance and all country
Parties providing assistance to specific action programmes shall work closely
together, directly and through relevant intergovernmental organizations, in
the elaboration and implementation of action programmes.
2. The Parties shall develop operational mechanisms, particularly at
the national and field levels, to ensure the fullest possible coordination
among country Parties providing assistance, countries needing assistance and
relevant international and non-governmental organizations, in order to avoid
duplication, harmonize interventions and approaches, and maximize the impact
of assistance. Arrangements relating to the form of such coordination are set
out in the Regional Implementation Annexes.
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Article 17
Regional Implementation Annexes
:.pl.~«.tlon Annexes
,
B*,l0M1
(4) the specific areas to be covered in the action
countries of a particular region or sub-region and
required in each of these areas;
programmes of
the measures
(b)
(c)
rhno!r
ea3UrGS t0 b® tak6n jointly by groups of country Partiesc oosing to cooperate in the preparation and implementation ofaction programmes in a particular region or sub-region; and
the degree and nature of assistance required from country Partiesin a position to provide assistance in order to elaborate andimplement action programmes.
Section 2: Scientific and Technical Cooperation
Article 18
Information collection
, analysis and exchange
1. In meeting their obligations in Articles 4 to 17, the Parties
agree to integrate and coordinate the collection, analysis and exchange of
relevant short-term and long-term data and information to ensure systematic
observation of land degradation in affected areas and better understand theprocesses and effects of drought and desertification. To this end, thev
shall; 1
(a) support the establishment of a global network of institutions and
facilities for information collection, exchange and monitoring at
all levels, which shall:
(i) use compatible standards and systems;
(ii) encompass meteorological, climatological and
hydrological stations, including sites in remote
areas
;
(iii) use and disseminate, in a targeted and effective way,
modern technology for data assessment, such as high
resolution satellite imagery, areal photography and
geographical information systems; and
(iv) link national and sub-regional data and information
centres more closely with global information sources;
(b) ensure that information collection, analysis and exchange
activities address the needs of local communities, and those of
decision-makers, with a view to resolving specific problems, and
that local communities are involved in these activities;
(c) support and further develop, as appropriate, bilateral and
multilateral programmes aimed at defining, conducting, assessing
and financing data and information collection, analysis and
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exchange, including inter alia
and integrated sett of physical,
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resource inventories
biological, social
, data banks
and economic
make full use of the expertise
organizations and non—governmenta
disseminate relevant information
regions;
of relevant intergovernmental
1 organizations, particularly to
and experiences among different
( *
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biological data; and
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as well as its integration with
exchange of
physical and
(f ) exchange, and make freely,
information from all sources,
scientific observation and'
hydrological data for drought
on training and technologica
and traditional knowledge.
openly and promptly available,
' including not only the results of
research, such as climate and
early warning, but also information
1 programmes as well as indigenous
2 . The Conference of Parties [, on the advice of the Scientifictechnological Council,] shall prepare and adopt, as soon as practicable
D
SyStem for the collection of information to beused by all affected country Parties. Such guidelines shall be based on theincorporation of key variables in minimum data sets.
,
,3' The Secretarlac shall catalogue relevant existing arrangements andfacilities to enable the Conference of Parties to adopt, as soon aspracticable, measures necessary to ensure the effective operation of theg °bal network referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) [, which shall bebased on the Evaluation and Monitoring Centre established in accordance withArticle 27.] Maximum use shall be made of existing institutions at all levels.
Article 19
Research and development
1. In meeting their obligations in Articles 4 to 17, the Parties
undertake to promote technical and scientific cooperation in the fields ofdrought and desertification through appropriate institutions. To this end,
they shall support research activities that:
(a) contribute to increased knowledge of the processes leading to
desertification and drought as well as the impact of, and
distinction between, causal factors, both natural and human, with
a view to achieving improved productivity as well as sustainable
use and management of resources;
(b) respond to well defined objectives, address the specific needs of
local populations and lead to the identification of solutions to
satisfy those needs;
(c) protect, integrate and enhance traditional and indigenous
knowledge
;
(d) develop and strengthen national and sub-regional research
capabilities in affected countries needing assistance, including
the development of local skills;
(e) take into account the relationship between poverty and
desertification; and
(f) give greater weight to socio-economic research, interdisciplinary
research and participatory research.
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f;
Research Panties for particular regions and sub-regions,
reflecting different local conditions, are determined in the RegionalImplementation Annexes. In addition, the Conference of Parties shall reviewresearch priorities periodically (, on the advice of the Scientific andTechnological Council,] and the Secretariat shall maintain an inventory of
relevant research institutions.
[3* The Conference of Parties shall [consider, as soon as practicable,
whether to] establish a clearing-house mechanism linked to the data andinformation network developed pursuant to Article 18, paragraph 3, to promote
and facilitate technical and scientific cooperation pursuant to paragraph 1,
sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) as the core of a network of institutions at theinternational, regional and national levels.]
Article 20
Transfer, acquisition
,
adaptation and development of technology
1. In meeting their obligations in Articles 4 to 17, the Parties
undertake to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer,
acquisition, adaptation and development of relevant, environmentally sound
technologies in accordance with national policies. Such cooperation shall be
conducted bilaterally or multilateral ly, as appropriate, making full use of
the expertise of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. The
Parties shall, in particular:
(a) fully utilize relevant existing national, sub-regional
,
regional
and international information systems and clearing-houses, as
well as the mechanisms developed pursuant to Article 18,
paragraph 3 [and Article 19, paragraph 3], for the dissemination
of information on available technologies, their sources, their
environmental risks and the broad terms under which they may be
acquired
;
(b) assess the cost and benefits of available technology and
facilitate access to technologies most suitable to practical
application for specific needs of local populations, paying
special attention to the social and economic impact of such
technology;
(c) facilitate technology cooperation among affected country Parties
needing assistance through financial assistance or other
appropriate means;
(d) take appropriate measures to create domestic market conditions
and incentives, fiscal or otherwise, conducive to the transfer,
acquisition and adaptation of suitable commercial technology and
knowledge
;
(e) promote the conduct of joint research programmes and ventures
between suppliers and recipients of relevant technologies, in
both the public and private sectors, for the development of
improved, affordable and accessible technologies; and
(f) extend technology cooperation with affected countries needing
assistance to sectors such as utilization of biodiversity and
genetic resources, cottage industries, small business and
tourism, which can provide alternative livelihoods.
2. The Parties shall give special attention to the protection,
promotion and use of relevant traditional and indigenous technology and know-
how, which may have been neglected in the past. To this end, the Parties
undertake to:
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3. Specific provisions
Article, taking account of the
country Parties, sub-regions
Implementation Annexes.
for carrying out cooperation pursuant to this
conditions prevailing in particular affected
and regions, are included in Regional
Section 3: Supporting Measures
Article 21
Capacity building, education and public awareness
The Parties recognize the significance of capacity buildinq, tha*-13 institution building, training and development of indigenous scientificcapacity, in efforts to combat desertification and mitigate drought. In allcapacity building activities, they shall emphasize:
(a) capacity building at all levels, but particularly at the locallevel through full participation of local people, including both
women and men, and partnership with non-governmental
organizations and local organizations;
(b) the strengthening of extension services to disseminate relevant
technology more effectively, and the training of extension agents
and members of rural organizations in participatory approaches toland management;
(c) fostering of the use and dissemination of the knowledge,
expertise and practices of local people relying, wherever
possible, on local rather than foreign experts in technical
assistance programmes;
(d) the adaptation of relevant environmentally-sound technology and
traditional methods of agriculture and pastoralism to modern
socio-economic conditions;
(e) the provision of appropriate training and technology in the use
of alternative sources of energy, particularly to reduce
dependence on wood for fuel;
(f) cooperation to strengthen the capacity of affected country
Parties needing assistance to develop and implement programmes in
the field of information collection, analysis and exchange in
accordance with Article 18, including the acquisition of
appropriate land degradation monitoring technology;
(g) innovative ways of promoting alternative livelihoods, including
training in new skills;
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Article 22
financial resources
1 .
objectives
resources
,
programmes
of \ h r 9 centrality of adequate financing for achievin:t e Convention, the Parties undertake to provide finarconsistent with their capabilities, national plans, prioritie-
. They shall, m particular: nontie.
the
ial
and
(a)
( t>
)
ensure the provision
activities which me e
t
of financing and incentives for spec
the objectives of this Convention;
f ic
give priority to
neglecting other
Africa, in accordance with Article
regions; 7, while not
(c)
<d)
rationalize and strengthen resources already allocate:combatting desertification and the effects of drought bythem more effectively and more flexibly, assessing
successes and shortcomings, removing bottlenecks toeffective use, and reorienting programmes in light oiintegrated approach adopted pursuant to this Convention;
for
using
their
their
the
give due
multilate
countries
likely to
priority and attention, within the governing bodies of
ral institutions, to development assistance for affected
needing assistance in order to support activities
advance the implementation of action programmes;
(e) explore new methods of innovative financing, such as economic or
environmental instruments and taxes, to raise funds from bothpublic and private sources;
(f) provide for equitable burden-sharing among countries providing
assistance;
( g > ensure the replicability and internal sustainability of projects
to combat desertification and mitigate drought; and
[(h) allow Parties providing financial assistance the flexibility to
determine utilization of their funds, including the ability to
designate relevant bilateral aid as contributions to its funding
arrangements
.
]
2. Affected countries needing assistance shall allocate a substantial
portion of their own financial resources to achieving the objectives of this
Convention (and shall establish national funds to combat desertification and
mitigate the effects of drought.)
3. Developed countries and other Parties in a position to provide
assistance shall facilitate the mobilization of, and make available on a
regular, timely, predictable (and concessional) basis [,on such terms and
conditions as may be mutually agreed,) [new and additional) [adequate)
financial resources to assist in the implementation of action programmes of
affected countries needing assistance, and requesting such assistance.
(4. Developed country Parties reaffirm their commitments in
to reach the accepted United Nations target of 0.7 percent of Gross
Product for Official Development Assistance.)
Agenda 21
National
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programmes
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PART IV
INSTITUTIONS
Article 24
Conference of Parties
A Conference of Parties is hereby established.
2. The Conference of Parties is the supreme body of the Convention.
It shall keep the implementation of the Convention under regular review, and
shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote its
effective implementation. To this end, it shall:
(a) periodically review the operation of the Convention and of the
institutional arrangements in light of the experience gained, the
evolution of scientific and technological knowledge (, as well as
the international context);
(b) promote and facilitate the exchange of information on measures
adopted by the Parties, and determine the form and intervals for
transmitting the information to be submitted in accordance with
Article 28, review the reports and make recommendations on them;
1 Along the lines of the proposal in General Assembly document A/36/141
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(c) assess, on the basis of all information made available to it theimplementation of the Convention by the Parties, the effects ofmeaeures taken pursuant to the Convention, and the deqree ofprogress toward achieving its objectives;
<d) make recommendations on any matter necessary for theimplementation of the Convention;
(e) establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for theimplementation of the Convention;
(f) review reports submitted by its subsidiary bodies and provide
guidance to them;
(g) revise periodically the lists of countries in Annex 1;
(h) agree upon and adopt, by consensus, rules of procedure and
financial rules for itself and any subsidiary bodies;
(i) adopt amendments to the Convention in accordance with Article 32;
(j) approve a comprehensive programme and regular budget, (based on
agreed assessed contr ibut ions
) ( to be borne by the regular budget
of the United Nations], to ensure the effective operation of the
Secretariat, the subsidiary bodies (and the international
networks agreed upon in accordance with Articles 18,19 and 21];
(k) seek, as appropriate, the services and cooperation of, and
information provided by, competent intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations; and
(l) exercise such other functions as may be necessary for the
achievement of the objective of the Convention, as well as other
functions assigned to it pursuant to the Convention.
3.
The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, adopt
its own rules of procedure, which shall include decision-making procedures for
matters not already covered by decision-making procedures stipulated in the
Convention. Such procedures may include specified majorities required for the
adoption of particular decisions.
4.
The first session of the Conference of the Parties shall be
convened by the interim Secretariat established in accordance with Article 38
and shall take place not later than one year after the date of entry into
force of the Convention. Thereafter, ordinary sessions of the Conference of
the Parties shall be held (every year unless otherwise] [at regular intervals
as] decided by the Conference of the Parties.
S. Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties shall be
held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference, or at
the written request of any Party, provided that, within six months of the
request being communicated to the Parties by the Secretariat, it is supported
by at least one-third of the Parties.
[6. At the opening of its sessions, the Conference of Parties shall
elect a Bureau comprising a chairman, three vice-chairmen and a rapporteur.
Due regard shall be paid to the need to ensure equitable geographic
distribution and adequate representation of those countries affected by
drought and desertification, particularly in Africa.)
7. The United Nations, i
thereof or observers thereto not
at sessions of the conference of
whether national or international
qualified in matters covered by
ts specialized agencies and any State member
Party to the Convention, may be represented
Parties as observers. Any body or agency,
,
governmental or non-governmental, which is
the Convention, and which has informed the
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Secretariat of its wish
as an observer,
Part ies present object’be subject to the rules
2y^ r:sc:sjsd*:B;.::-:io;.re th- confe—
The admission and participation'of°obee^e?.°i hif 1of procedure adopted by the Conference of Parties
Article 2S
1
.
2 .
(a)
<b>
Secretariat
A Secretariat is hereby established.
*he functions of the Secretariat shall be:
to make
and its
provide
arrangements for sessions of the
subsidiary bodies established under
them with services as required;
Conference of Parties
the Convention and to
to compile and transmit reports submitted to it
(c) to facilitate assistance to affected Parties needing assistance
°"mpXTitltk
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UnLCati°n of information required inaccordance with the provisions of the Convention;
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(e)
(f)
( 9 )
to ensure the
other relevant
necessary coordination with the secretariatsinternational bodies and conventions;
of
to enter, under the overall guidance of the Conference oParties, into such administrative and contractual arrangements amay be required for the effective discharge of its funct
to perform other secretariat functions specified in theConvention and such other functions as may be determined by theConference of Parties.
3.
a permanent
The Conference of Parties, at its first session, shall designate
secretariat and make arrangements for its functioning.
(Article 26
Scientific and Technological Council
1. A Scientific and Technological Council is hereby established.
2. At the request, and under the supervision of, the Conference ofthe Parties, the Scientific and Technological Council shall provide advice on
scientific and technical issues relating to the activities carried out under
the Convention with a view to achieving its objectives, including in
particular the preparation and implementation of national, regional, and sub-
regional action programmes.
3. (The Scientific and Technological Council shall consist of 20
experts appointed by the Conference of Parties in their personal capacity.
It shall be multidisciplinary and its composition shall have due regard to the
need to ensure adequate geographical representation. Members of the Council
shall be elected for a term of three years. They shall be eligible for re-
election.
J (The Scientific and Technological Council shall be open to
participation by all Parties and shall be multidisciplinary. It shall comprise
government representatives competent in relevant fields of expertise.)
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The Council shall report regularlythrough the Secretariat, on all aspects of its
to the Conference of Parties
work.
J
(Article 27
1
. A Drought
hereby established.
Evaluation and Monitoring Centra
and Desertification Evaluation and Monitoring Centre is
2 .
the Drought
Under the authority and supervision of the Conference of Parties,
and Desertification Evaluation and Monitoring Centre shall:
(a) assist, coordinate and strengthen, as appropriate, international
and intergovernmental programmes aimed at defining, conducting,
assessing and financing research, data collection and systematic
observation of drought and desertification in accordance withArticles 18 and 19;
(b) support the establishment of a network of national, sub-regional,
regional and international institutions and technical facilities,
as appropriate, for the continuous assessment and monitoring of
drought and desertification;
(c) support international and intergovernmental efforts to strengthen
national scientific and technical research capacities and
capabilities, particularly in Africa; and
(d) ensure the coordination of activities at the local, national,
sub-regional and international levels.
with
3. In carrying out its
relevant intergovernmental
activities, the Centre shall cooperate closely
organizations to avoid duplication of effort.
4. The Centre shall report regularly to the Conference of Parties,
through the Secretariat, on all aspects of its work.
5. The Centre shall be located in (...]( in Africa).]
PART V
PROCEDURES
Article 28
Communication of information on implementation
1. Each Party shall communicate to the Conference of Parties, through
the Secretariat, reports on the measures which it has taken for the
implementation of this Convention. The Conference of Parties shall determine
the timetable for the submission of such reports.
2. Affected country Parties needing assistance shall provide a
detailed description of the action programmes adopted pursuant to Articles 9
to 14 and of any relevant information on their implementation. Any group of
affected Parties needing assistance may make a joint communication on measures
taken at the regional and sub-regional levels in the framework of action
programmes. Other affected country Parties shall provide a description of the
strategies adopted pursuant to Article 5 and of any relevant information on
their implementation.
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*t the request of any Party to the dispute, in accordance with the procedure
set out in Annex unless the Parties otherwise agree.]
Article 31
Status of Annexes
Regional Implementation Annexes and other Annexes form an integral part
of this Convention and, unless expressly provided otherwise, a reference to
this Convention constitutes a reference to its Annexes.
Article 32
Amendments
1. Any Party may propose amendments to the Convention.
2. Amendments to the Convention shall be adopted at a session of the
Conference of Parties. The text of any proposed amendment shall be
ccrr.municated to the Parties by the Secretariat at least six months before the
meeting at which it is proposed for adoption. The Secretariat shall also
communicate proposed amendments to the signatories to the Convention.
3. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any
proposed amendment to the Convention by consensus. If all efforts at
consensus have been exhausted and no agreement reached, the amendment shall,
as a last resort, be adopted by a [ two-thirds )(( three-fourths ] majority vote
of the Parties present and voting at the meeting. The adopted amendment shall
be communicated by the Secretariat to the Depositary, who shall circulate it
to all Parties for their acceptance.
4. Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be
deposited with the Depositary. An amendment adopted in accordance with
paragraph 3 shall enter into force for those Parties having accepted it on the
ninetieth day after the date of receipt by the Depositary of an instrument of
acceptance by at least (two-thirds ] [three-fourths ] of the Parties to the
Convention
.
5. The amendment shall enter into force for any other Party on the
ninetieth day after the date on which that Party deposits with the Depositary
its instrument of acceptance of the Baid amendment.
6. for the purposes of this Article, “Parties present and voting"
means Parties present and casting an affirmative or negative vote.
Article 33
Adoption and amendment of Annexes
1. Any additional Annex to the Convention, and any amendment to an
Annex, shall be proposed and adopted in accordance with the procedure for
amendment of the Convention set forth in Article 32. The adoption or amendment
of an Annex shall be communicated by the Depositary to all Parties.
2 An Annex, or an amendment to an Annex, that has been adopted
in
.ccorfL with paragraph 1 .hall enter into force for -U
Convention six months after the date of the communication by the
depositary
to such Parties of the adoption of the Annex or of the amendment,
****** *
those Parties that have notified the Depositary in writing,
within. that
period of their non-acceptance of the Annex or the amendment.
The Annex or
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the Amendment to *n Anne* ihall enter
their notification of non-acceptance
which withdrawal of auch notification
into force for Parties which withdraw
on the ninetieth day after the date onhas been received by the Depositary.
into
r
force.
Untl1 BUCh tlmG ** the "*ndm«nt to the Convention enters
Article 34
Right to vote
1. Except aa provided for in paragraph 2, each Party to theConvention shall have one vote. y
. .
2 ' Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within
em ^
competence, ahall exercise their right to vote with a number of votesqual to the number of their member States that are Parties to the ConventionSuch an organization shall not exercise its right to vote if any of its memberStates exercises its right, and vice versa.
Article 35
Depositary
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary ofthe Convention.
PART VI
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 36
Signature
The Convention shall be open for signature at
, on by
States members of the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies or
that are Parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice and by
regional economic integration organizations. It shall remain open for
signature, thereafter, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York until
Article 37
Ratification and accession
1. The Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession by States and by regional economic integration
organizations. It shall be open for accession from the day after the date on
which the Convention is closed for signature. Instruments of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.
2. Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a
Party to the Convention without any of its member States being a Party to the
Convention shall be bound by all the obligations under the Convention. Where
one or more member States of such an organization are also a Party to the
Convention, the organization and its member States shall decide on their
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respective responsibilities for the performance of their obligations under the
Convention. In such cases, the organization and the member States shall not
be entitled to exercise rights under the Convention concurrently.
3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, regional economic integration organizations shall declare the
extent of their competence with respect to the matters governed by the
Convention. They shall also promptly inform the Depositary, who shall in turn
inform the Parties, of any substantial modification in the extent of their
competence
.
Article 38
Interim arrangements
The Secretariat functions referred to in Article 25 will be carried out
on an interim basis by the Secretariat established by the General Assembly of
the United Nations in its resolution 47/188 of 22 December 1992, until the
completion of the first session of the Conference of Parties.
Article 39
Entry into force
1 .
the date
instrument
The Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after
of deposit of the [ s ixt ieth )[ f if t ieth ][ fort ieth )[ thirt ieth
]
of ratification or accession.
2. For each State or regional economic integration organization
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Convention after the
deposit of the [sixtieth] [ fiftieth) ( fortieth J [thirtieth) instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Convention shall enter
into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit by such State or
regional economic integration organization of its instrument of ratification
or acceptance.
3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, any instrument deposited
by a regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as
additional to those deposited by States members of the organization.
Article 40
Reservations
[No reservations may be made to this Convention.)
Article 41
Withdrawal
1. At
Convention has
the Convention
any time after [two] [three) years from the date on which the
entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from
by giving written notification to the Depositary.
2 .
the date
on such
Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from
of receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal,
or
later date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal.
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Article 42
Authentic texts
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF the
* have signed the present
undersigned.
Convent ion
.
being duly authorized
Chinese
,
hall be
to that
DONE AT .
.
and ninety-four.
this day of one thousand nine hundred
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NGO Interventions at the 2nd Session oflNCD
I - NGO Statement on Land Tenure
Thoc arc the views ot ihc NGO community concerning the
oooJ for governments to commit themselves to the revision of
tanO tenure laves in countries affected b> desertification and to
adopt national action plans to revise these laws through a
participatory approach involving local communities. NGOs
and women's groups
In the Bamako meeting it was emphasised that to be effective
the Convention must recognise and protect the land tenure
(and water resource nghls) of aJI groups but particularly these
of tbc pastoraJtsts who live in areas most vulnerable to land
degradation and desertification In addition we feel that the
nghls of pastoral ists to follow their traditional routes of
transhumance. which may cross international borders, need to
be protected to ensure that rational and land use patterns
developed over many ccntunes arc not disrupted leading to
ov ergrazing and desertification.
The NGOs at the Bamako meeting concluded that land is
owned al different levels: by government, communities and
individuals either on a formal or a customary basis The
coov enuon must support processes which arc participatory ad
truly democrauc and which harmonize customary and legal
systems to dev dope! I ecu ve and equitable land tenure systems
applicable at all levels.
The convention should acknowledge ihe fact that manv
lradiuonal six-ieucs have a system of land lenure quite cblTcrcm
from the Western notion of title deeds. Without such
realization, traditional land holding systems arc verv
vulnerable 10 prrdalion For example, land used by nomadic
pastoraJists is usually used on a pcnodic or episodic basis.
This land is not under utilized as mosi people not familiar
with such a system may think.
Naiional government must ensure that ail the systems which
apply to land ownership are w ell defined. Governments should
guarantee equitable access nghls to land for pastoraJists. small
scale fanners, women, indigenous people and other groups.
Accommodation should be made for diversity of land tenure
systems within the legal structures or concerned states For
ibis to be achieved, commitments must be made by
governments to implement participatory action research
programmes which determine the relationship between land
tenure and the desertification process
The NGO community wishes to work with governments in
such a participatory approach to the revision of land tenure
laws and to ensuring that all codes, laws and regulations
pertaining to land lenure are translated into local languages and
thereby made accessible to local people. In addition, NGOs
undertake to educate communiucs in proper land use and land
marugemcm practices
We request that the INCD takes these vtews into account and
includes them in the text of the Convention
2
- NGO Statement on Institutions
NGOs favor the establishment of a Conference of Parties as
the supreme decision making body within the Convention
The Conference of Panics should meel on a regular basis w nh
a maximum interval of 2 years between the meetings. NGOs
w ish to be inv ned to attend ihe meetings of the Conference of
Panics as observers and be given the nghl to make statements
and provide the Conference of Parties with relevant
ItUOTTTUlJOa
One of ihc mosi important functions of the Conference of
Parties will be to review progress in combatting
desertification Panics to the convention w,i; subm.t repons
on the progress of their implementation of the Convention
during each ordinary session of the Conference of Panics
Provisions should be nude for the effective participation by
NGOs m wntmg these progress reports. These reports should
elaborate on successful and unsuccessful projects to combat
desertification, so that countnes and communities facing this
problem can learn from each others experiences. The reports
should elaborate upoo the financial and technical needs at the
countnes and communities involved. The national reports
should also deal wub some of the root causes and
consequences of desertification. The relation between
destruction of biodiversity, desertification, climate change,
structural adjustment, trade and debt should be dealt with.
A Sccretanat should be established to facilitate the fuhcttoning
of the Conference of Parties. In order to facilitate elTecuve
participation by NGOs the Secretarial would need to be
equipped w oh an NGO liaison unit.
Though NGOs. at face value, sec the use of establishing
subsidiary bodies sucb as an implementation committee and
an evaluauon and monitoring center, we also think that before
selling up new organizations, the existing bodies should be
evaluated and rationalized The Convention should permit the
Conference of Parties to establish subsidiary bcdies and NGOs
should be involved in the development and functioning of any
new bodies to be created.
We ask the members of the INCD to lake these views in
account and to include them in the text of the Convention.
3
- NGO Statement On Women
Summary: The role of women's action and knowledge in
relation to desertification and drought has been recognised in
the INCD. This recognition must be accompanied b\
commitments to concrete programmes supporting the effective
participation of women in decision-mating and actions to
combat desertification and the effects ojdrought.
First of all let me stress that women's role is crucial in
relation to drought and desertification processes in developing
countnes because they are the ones who suffer first and
foremost We are the ones who (ill the land while our male
counterparts go in search of jobs in the cities, we are the ones
who go in search of fuelwood; we are the ones who walk
miles in search of dnnking water; we are also guardians of a
wealth of indigenous knowledge about the land, ns needs and
Us potcnnal, and how to work with it in sustainable ways
NGOs therefore support the Tunisian proposal for the
Preamble contained in para 21 (c) of A/AC 241 12 which
affirms the need to ensure that women can participate fully at
all levels of political and economic decision-makjDg on
measures to combat drought and desertification. We also
support the view expressed in para 60 (e) of A/AC.24T12
which calls for commitments based on the importance of the
role of women
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However. this affirmation needs lo be translated into concrete
go\ eminent support for specific, and adcquatclv fuaial
programmes that enable and strengthen the full participauon
of women, including programmes that
• increase the level of education and training of women
• ensure proper access to land (essential as collateral for
credit) through appropriate tenure systems
• create rural banking systems to facilitate women s access
to credit tch 24. Agenda 21)
• involve women tn capacity building
• support the transfer of technology that enhances the
indigenous knowledge of combatting drought and
desertification
We has e attached lo this statement some additional
observations on the role of women, and of the commitments
made by governments at Rio on strengthening our role These
commitments must be taken fully into account in the present
negotiations and reflected finally in the international legal
commitments made within the Convention.
The Importance of Women's Role and Knowledge
In Combatting Desertification and the Effects of
Drought
Women are frequently regarded as contributors to the
desertification process because of our activities as fuelwood
gatherers and food crop producers But research in Sudan.
Senegal, Burkina Faso and northern Ghana has demonstrated
that women possess valuable knowledge about the sustainable
use of land, forests, water systems, soils, food crops and
wildlife which is grounded tn indigenous learning and dailv
experience and innovation
Women's knowledge has often been ignored in efforts to tackle
desertification and so our opportunities to make our
contribution to sustainable development in this area have been
seriously curtailed Women have a vital contnbutiooto make
If our activities contribute to degradation it is due to lack of
alternative energy resources and our struggle to sustain our
livelihoods and those of our families
We have noted with appreciation that the role of women in the
social and economic lives of both developed and developing
countries has gained general support as an element to be
included in the Preamble lo the Convention But the NGOs
have reservations about the adequacy of the emphasis placed
on the role of women in combatting desertification.
Women do indeed have an important part to play as managers
of natural resources But responsibilities as managers must be
backed by access lo dcctsion-makjng and resources Olherw ise
the management role may result in extra burdens being placed
on women who are already overburdened
We would like to remind delegates of the commitments they
already made at Rio Chapter 24 of Agenda 21 deals with
Global Action for Women towards Sustainable and Equitable
Development. This chapter drew substantially on the
Women's Action Agenda 21 which is a compilation of the
work, ideas and values of 1,500 women from around the world
who met at the World Women's Congress for a Healthy
Planet, organized by Women s Env trocmcnt art! Development
Organization Chapter 24 puts forward a comprehensive list
cx activities which governments should undertake. Some are
especially relevant tn the present context.
Further emphasis on the importance of women's role is lo be
found in Agenda 21 on which our present endeavour are based
The section which deals with encouraging and promoting
popular para ct ponon tdenuHes the following as an objective
'lo support local communities in their own efforts in
combating desertification, ensuring the full participation
oj women (Agenda 21. chapter 12. section 56 af)
4 - NGO Statement On The Role Of Basic
Community Education In Combatting
Drought And Desertification
NGOs are concerned that u hile rural populations are only too
well aware oT the effects of deseruficauon they are not
adequately aware of the causes. Effective education of rural
populations fared with desertification is essential if we are to
combat this global problem. Without effecuve educauon. the
feeling of hopelessness of many rural populations in the fare
of land degradation will continue to result in the migration of
'deseruficauoo refugees' to already over-burdened cities anJ
neighbouring countries
We should not limit ourselves to educauon in the dev eloping
countries sulTcnng from deseruficauon The peoples of the
developed world need lo be as aw are of the struggles of their
brothers and sisters against the problem ofdesertification as
they are for example, of the issues of deforestation
Rural Community Education NGO have considerable
experience gained over many years in community development
efforts. In the field of sustainable development they have
found that the conventional approach of delivenng lectures to
rural populations on technical issues is ineffective Educanon
of rural communities on desertification needs to be
muluscctoraj in its approach since the dtfficulues facing the
commuruues are of this nature. NGOs hav e also found that to
be effecuve. educauon of rural commumues affected bv
desertification needs lo be participative NGO and gov ernment
agents have to become facilitators to help the commumues
develop their own plans based on their own extensive local
know ledge and the technical suggestions of the facilitators.
NGOs therefore recommend that government extension agents
be retrained in multisectoral parocipao'e approaches to the
educauon of rural popuJauocs facing deseruficaDon. We also
recommend that extension agents be appraised annually
against agreed goals and those who continue to fail to meet
these goals be reassigned to other areas or retired.
Community Radio Broadcasting: One suggesuon from
the Bamako meeting of NGOs to reinforce community
cducaoonoo deseruficauon, was for the development of rural
community radio stations broadcasnng in local languages.
Programming for such radio stations, formulated with the
input of local communities, would use local knowledge and
success stones Local commumues also need to be trained in
the management and producuon of programmes for their local
radio stations Some governments are now setting up these
community radio stations, others, with resmeuve legislauon
on pnvate and decentralised broadcasnng should be encouraged
bv this convenuon to enact new legislauon
204
primary educat.om ForTe^e 1W J " T* *' en
substanually lower ThenL^ £!t£
»
1 UCk
1°^ nrWrKl;lJ r'sourc« from Ox
national cumcula which have hole relevance
local communities. °*
Parc n is are often reluctant to send their children to school inlearn a national language and ,deas which they neitherundentand or see l„Ue relevance of ln their daily l,?es <StnchilJren themselves give up school after onlv a few Zn
Tjn
™ ,n^ •**» 10 «** of life
In order to coenta. this problem ,n countries suffering fromdesertification NGOs propose that a significam proportion cf
Jf
ponun and secondary school cumcula shouldE lIcxaU level by teachers, government extension agents localassociations mcludtng women's and mdigenojT Soo£
j7
d
(
n0n 'g0 ' enuntnUj <*«anisauons. Edition
meOK.xls should also moreawaj from learning exclusively by
Pn mars “""'I*
6> cxfKncnx throughproblem solvingnun and secondary educations should no, be exclusivelydassruum based but include practical work relevant to the
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matters but parttcularly with desernf,canon N'GOs
recommend that the local' element of the curriculum shouldbe taught in local languages and lhai teachers be trained m (he
causes and remedies ot desertification
5 - Human Contribution To Drought:
An NGO Perspective From Asia
Summary. The INCD has been considering drought as a
natural phenomenon, however there are significant human
contnbunng causes to aspects of drought particularly those
that underrrune the hydrological capacity of catchment areas.
Recognition of these human causes - in which governments
and intergovernmental orgamiations are ke\ actors - and
actions to mil,gate their effects must be incorporated in The
Comention and in regional and nahonal actions plans
During the current Geneva proceedings of the INCD
Convention, a clear, unambiguous distinction between
oeseraficauoo and drought was made. While deseraficaDoc
was defined as being caused by human intervention, drought
has been solely annbuted to meteorological causes Is that
really the case 0 Many areas net) in water-resources in the past
arc non repeatedly being declared as drought prone Why? Let
us look at some illustrations from the Asia region. From the
Indian situation, it is clear that drought must be considered to
be a complex issue
• Deforestation and hydrological destabilization in the
mountain catchments of nvers can male the rivers and
streams dry up in post-monsoon periods causing surface-
naler drought
Excessive pumping of ground water and laree vn,
crops, can create near irrev ersibte gpWd.water,tn,.
y
>..
of the above can be subsumed under the aw,n. ~r
which
.eedTTo £recognised as a key element in sustaining w iter resourors
intergovernmental organizations freq^n'u""* TnimportantcausaJ factor. For example
, D repLxs
'
the
e^Z<;\0f FAO amended tK£r1xtended technical assistance programme one of ih^ „
^ecopoons for enhanong wood production was to turn thecatchment areas into profitable monoculture plantations ofcommercial species like pine or eucalvpms and this has beenmajor cause of flash floods. ^
2®°* *'sh toemphas.ze that The Coovenuoo must take intoaccount the human contnbuuoo to drought to male sure that
111 Uparties can aJdress and reverse the processes that areexacerbating the waicr scaraty situauon caused bv surfacew ater drought and sal-w a ter drought
6 - Declaration des ONG sur la
Participation Populaire
La mtse en oeuvre de la panic,pation populaire necessite une
Ion S politique reelle. La convention devran la considerer
comme une condition sine qua non de la mise en oeusre des
projets de lutte centre la desertification.
Ptus.eurs iravaux on. (U r*a!„<s sur la panic, pat,on
populaire. Dansie cas des pays afncains. elle a fait lobjetdW chane la Charur Afncaine de la parhapauon populaire(Arusha. Tanzame). L'Agenda 21 en parie egalement de
mamire sans Equivoque.
Si jusqu'ici sa mise en oeuvre n'est pas effecuve dansbeaucoup de pays, e'est qu'elle t>e bcneficie pas panout dfine
rtelle volonuf potiuque. II s'agit done mans de d,re de
nouvelles choses sur la quest.on, mais d'amener les
gouvernemems i alter au dell du di scours, en adopunt des
demarches qm permeneot la ccncr<usauoo de la paruapation
populaire
La paruapation populaire est une quesuoo globale qui ne peut
#tre s^parte des problimes de politique fonodrc et des impacts
des rafcamsmes du commerce intemauoria]:
• une poliuque forviere inadapirfc met les populaUoos dans
une situation prfcaire. et il devienl difficile de les
mobiliser pour I'env iroanement.
Imensive use of agnxhemicals have caused sals to lose
their moisture
-conserving capacity, leading to soil-water
drought in spue of adequate rainfall
.
s'agissant du commerce international, la meilleure
illustration, en dehors de la boissc des cours des produits
de base, est I exportation de viandes fortemcnl
subvenuonndes de certains pays du Nord vers d'autres
pays du Sud En Afnque de I'Ouesr ces exportations
acculent les 4 000 000 d'fleveurs sahtfliens & la ruine
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La pmtopat.on popular exige. pour ne pas rester un voeup<cux. une volonuf politique du Nord 4 sengager 4 aligner saMitique commeraale sur sa pohnque d'aide aiLvelop^mem
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"^ S du Sud i aPP,1<tucr lcs engagements deji pns enmaucrc dc participation populsure
Au plan nattona!. la participation populatre exige des
preuiables: c
I accfcs effecuf a la terre el au\ ressources nanirriles.
• le ^enforcement des capacity d'analyse des populauons.
Celui-ct passe par une information, une Education
en\ 1 ronncmentale et une formation adaptbes aux bescxns
des populations, notamment les femmes et les jeuoes,
la decentralisation des pouvotrs de decision et des
responsabihtfs en panant de I'analvse cntique des
institutions.
m A AC 241/12). A mechanism for dotng this could
rund lor Combatting Deseruficauoo.
The Conference of the Panics should elaborate the entena lorfunding thereby taking into account
die les el of dev dopment of the countries affected, and.
ihe extent to which countries include popular
participation and NGO insolsemem as an integrated
element in the programs, and also taking into account
principles of transparency and accountabilus in
management of the resources.
We would like to remind the committee members thatdesemr,cation is not a process that should be seen isolatedirwn economical and financial factors at the global leiel The
negative impact of these factors on desertification will not be
cwnpensated for by funding only. Measures in the areas ofdebt relief and trade reform are oecessarv
la valorisation du savoir traditionnel des populations et
de leurs valeurs socio-cullurelles, ainsi que de la
dimension *thno-sociologique de leurs mfthodes de
gestion des ressources.
Proteger par la loi la liberie de reunion et d'associauon
des comm unautes
Cest a ccs conditions que I on peut garanur I'engagement des
populations 4 une pleine panicipation aux programmes de
lutte cootre la desertification
Les ONG s'engagent 4 collaboreT 4 toute acuon visant la mise
en oeuv re de la participation populaire.
Les gouvemements 4 eux seuls De peuient amier 4 bout de ce
defi, l acuon des ONG. meme si elle est pemnente. ne pem
suffire a elle seule non plus II semble done que tous les
acteurs (ONG et Gouv emements) som condamnes 4coUaborrr
7 - NGO Statement on Financial Resources
and Mechanisms
New and additional financial resources from affected and oon-
afTeaed countries on a proportional basis will be needed to
implement the Convention In order to secure predictability
and I unding on a prompt basis the Convenuon should include
financial obligations that are legally binding for all
contracting parties
Concerning additional funding we would also like to remind
developed countnes of the UN norm of 0.71 of the GNP to
be spent on development assistance At the moment onlv few
developed countries meet thal norm
An independent fund for desertification should be established
through which existing and new funds will be channeled. This
fund should guarantee transparency, democratic accountability
to all signatories and adequate assessment of projects. Also
NGO should have access to all informauon concerning the
spending of the fund. The Convention should stipulate a
percentage that should beallocated to NGOs and local
communities (as has been proposed by the OAU section
To be mote specific
I Measures to combat desertification have been ineffective
e'en non-existent because the governments of affected
coumnes have been unable to generate the neccssan financial
means Therefore NGO support the v, ew S expressed in Article09 i a) i of document A/AC 241/12 w hich calls for reducing
debt burdens, improving market condiuons and comraoditv
markets, lowering trade barriers and cushioning the effects of
deteriorating foreign e\change measures.
- The EC's policy of dumping subsidized surplus beef in the
countries of the Sahel threatens the livelihoods of millions of
people and harms the environment Therefore NGOs would
like io see included in the Convention a clause in which
contraenng panics commit themselves to abolish subsidies on
expons of products that undermine the livelihoods of people
w bo rely on and and semi and lands.
3 Producnon for export can have a negative impact on and
and semi and lands leading to desertification. Examples at
groundnut production in Senegal and cotton production in
Mali. Ii should be included in the Convention, that in those
cases that export producuon causes desertification, the
possibility of implementing alternative environmentaJIv
sound producnon methods will be invesogated Research for
these purposes has to be provided for in the Convention If
alternatives cannot be found, production has to be stopped
provided compensatory economic avenues for the people
affected have been clearly established'
We ask the members of the 1NCD to lake these views in
account and to include them in the text of the Convennon.
8 - NGO Statement On Legal Aspects
Relating To Ratification And Domestic
Implementation Of The Convention
Early attention needs to be given to Ihe process lor
implementing new legal tools and harmontj ng pre-existing
domestic legislation and regulations in the light of the
Convention. There is a need to foster international
cooperation to facilitate timely accomplishment of this task.
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of necessary amendments nor the harmonization ofprc<xisung legislation in light of the requirements of the newconventions As a result, follow
-up adjustments renTnpending unless implementing legal measures are adopted v«legislation or regulation In the meantime mansinternational env ironmentaj treaties have limited practical
effects vt hile trying to meet their goals.
2. The general aw areness on this matter is growing worldwide
and there ,s a challenge ahead to formula^ international ^
nat.onal decisions, which once adopted will make a differencem realiu For the purposes of this particular negotiauon
process on combatting desertification, and once the mean 1S
adopted and enters .mo force, it must be ensured that the
objectives of the Convention are pursued through specific
mcasur«. individual!) adopted by the raids, ngsutes Mans of these measures need to have legally binding
effects on stales and individuals and. subject to the diversity of
options provided by die different legal systems ,n the world
appropriate legal tools must be put in place
.f the Convenuon
^
a " eff«cuve international instrument for
combatting desertification.
3 Analysis on implemeniing tools and harmonization ofdomesue pre-evisung law.
, n |,ght of the new Coovcnuon. ,s
a necessary and useful exercise for nations seriously w dling to
agree on new international environmental obligations Such
an analysis may be initialed once the treats is open for
ratification, taking advantage of the interim period of time
required for the Convenuon to enter into force.
d As such penod is addressed by Item E, III. Section 3 on
Inlerim Arrangements-, it ,s recommended (hat the present ad
hoc Secretariat facilitate international cooperation among
States 10 foster early analysis of implementing domesue legal
tools and harmomzauoo of pre-existing domesue legislation.
5 In envisioning implemenung tools, it is necessary, subject
to the nauonal legal specificities of each mdiv iduaJStale, to
recognize legal nghis for effective and umely participation of
individuals and NGOs in the domestic application of the
adopted Convention Such legal nghis should enable anzrn
groups and NGOs to fully cooperate with Governments in the
real development and enforcement of the Treaty provisions and
ns domestic legislation.
9 - Principles
The Jo!lowing principles hove been pul forward by SGOs as
being the minimum required lo ensure that the Convenuon
achieves ils goals. Il is fell lhai a separate Article for
Principles is preferred as it clearly sets out the basis from
which contracting parties will operate. The SCO community
which is involved with the development of the Convention lo
Combat Desertification urges all parties lo the Convention lo
recognize the global nature of the problem and the presence of
deserafU ation in both the developed and developing world.
For the purpose of achieving ecologically sustainable
development wnhin ihe conlext of the objectives of this
Convention and to implement us provisions, annexes and
protocols, the Parties shall be guided, inter alia, by ihe
following principles:
2??***°** and draw onihe provisions of convenuons and fora address, ne global
U* Climate and Biodiversity convennons and ihe Fores,principles, it should seek lntegrauoo. coordmauon jvJ
-
- vjjAjiniuiiu\ | or the
maimenance of a sound and healthy global environment
" h enu,ls
' ^ aha, rational and ecologically
sustainable management of natural resources, avo.dmg
l-md degradation and loss of producUve capacity
,
?
solidarity and a recogruuon
by the developed countries of their responsibility under
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration
<v that panics must take measures to anucipaic prev ent or
attenuate the causes of drought and deseruficauon and to
seek solutions at the iruemaoonal, regional, nauonal and
local level;
' that all parties seek to prevent, reduce and where possible
reverse land degradation by utilizing ecologically
sustainable land use management practices, by
employing and incorporating appropriate tradiuonal
methods and by taking account of local cultural jrvl
development values;
vi that NGOs especially environment, development,
women's, youth local communities and indigenous
groups - as well as individuals - must be mvolv ed at all
relevant levels of decision making to combat
Jesemficauoo. To enable these NGOs to focus their
individual and collective talents creatively, financial
assistance and institutional recognition needs io be
prov ided lo facilitate full and effective participation in the
implementation of the Convenuon,
ii recognize the need to develop co-opcranve
arrangements among all levels of government.
communiDes. NGOs.the private profit making sector and
landholders to establish an understanding of the nature
and value of land resources, to work towards their
ecologically sustainable use and to raise funds to
improve their management at the local level.
vtn that national policies and institutional
arrangements need to be put in place to idenufy
.
examine
and reconcile economic, social, cultural, demographic,
ecological and other concerns in order to sustain the full
range of uses for land for the benefit of the whole
community into the future.
x that education, especially basic literacy, is one of
the main keys lo local populations acquiring the basic
knowledge required lo combat desertificauon;
that the degradation of productive ecosystems is
posing a serious threat to human progress and to the
survival of the populations concerned Because of its
irans-txxder effects, there is a need lo establish worldwide
207
mernauona)
cooperation. espccialh with respect torade pohc.es. the prtn,s,c*i of aid aod ass.sun^e L^rtranvler ol Uichnologv and in the consent auoo protecUon™°n or tf, health and mtegnb of£££
'*
£at Pnnopfes 5. 7. g. , 0
. 15. p. 20 and 27 of the RioDeclaration shall speeificaJIv underpin the thinking oUJI
Principles from the Rio Declaration
Principle 5
i
,l
eSSS an Pe°Ple SWI ln ** «s^ual task
m“' --
--2s?5
Principle 7
States shall cooperate tn a spirit of global partnership toconse.se. protect and restore the health and ,n\^v of ^Eart^ s ecosystem In t,e» of the different contnbuuons toglobal environmental degradation. States base common bmdifferentiated responsibilities The deseloped countnesacknowledge the responsibility that thes ^car
, n theinternational pursuit of sustainable development
,n sievs ofthe pressures then socieocs place on the global environment
and of the technologies and financial resources thev command
Principle 8
To achieve sustainable development and a higher qualitv otlife for all people. Slates should reduce and el.mmate
^susumab'e patterns of production and consumpuon Zpromote appropriate demographic policies
Principle 10
Environmental issues are best hamiled u,th the panic, potion
of all concerned cinzrns, at the relevant level A. the nationallevel, each mdmduaJ shall have appropriate access to
mJormanon concerning the environment that is held bv public
authorities, including information 00 hazardous materials yd
activities m their communities, and the opportunity to
participate ui decision-making processes Slates shall facilitate
and encourage public aware ness and participation bv makine
m/ormanon widel> available. Effective access to judicial and
adraimstranve pnxeedings, including redress and remecK shallbe provided.
Prineiple 24
s*"r,w *>«<w.
cooperate
,n ns further development, as necc^
°^
Principle 27
Principle If
In order io proieci the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widelv applied bv States according to their
capabilities Where there are threats of senous or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effecuv e measures to prevent
environmental degradation.
Principle 17
Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument,
shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to
have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are
subject to a decision of a competent national authority
Principle 20
Women have a vital role in environmental management and
development Their full participauon is therefore essential to
achieve sustainable dev dopmem.
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Priorities
The lack of political will is often seen as the missing link
between eomenuons and their ratification, between project
design and implementation. In the case of the present
negotiations for the elaboration of a con\enlion to combat
desertification, donor governments are more and more reluctant
to chip in additional funding for the continuation of the
negotiations on the ground that the money should and can be
raised locally by the demanding governments. In both cases,
political will is required and governments are delaying decision
making on the issue because they are afraid of unpopular
measures, on one side there is a growing public awareness of
the fact that aid money is being wasted, especially the money
that is spent at international meetings; on the other side, the
worrisome economic and social situations make it dangerous
for debt-laden and currency-hungry countries to even try and
impose additional sacrifice on their populations.
Yet, should either party decide to step forward and succeed in
overcoming their domestic obstacles in order to come up w ith
the badly wanted money, additional political will will still be
required to guarantee that NGOs will be given an equal
opportunity access to public funding, and in order for them to
be in a position to foster greater popular participation and
enhanced capacity building at the grassroots lev el. This
raises, of course, the question of how much importance the
go\ cmmcnis arc w illing to consider the role o( NGOs in the
struggle against dcserlilicution and other areas of sustainable
development
Recent history clearly demonstrates that NGOs should not just
sit and wait to be put on the priority list. Thev will ha\e to
fight even harder lor recognition as the struggle against
dcseruficauon is also a fight between nauonal pnonues.
La volonte politique ne nail pas toute seule. Les OSG
doivenl el peuvenl la suciler pour obtenir les resources
locales on etrangeres necessaires pour renfocer la
participation
populaire el devetopper les potentiality locales dans la
lutte
contre la desertification. —
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